Four-year cycle
2017-2020

Questionnaire
GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Region: London  State Party: UK

2. Submission of previous national reports
   2.1. 2013-2016 cycle  No

3. Actors involved in the preparation of the national report
   3.1. Government institutions responsible for the protection of cultural property  Yes
   3.2. National Commission for UNESCO  No
   3.3. Military expert  Yes
   3.4. Independent experts
      If other actors have been involved, please indicate them
      National Trust
      British Red Cross
      Historic England

4. National Focal Point

According to paragraph 120 of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Second Protocol: "Unless a Party requests otherwise, the presumed focal point would be its Permanent Delegation to UNESCO." If you do not consider the Permanent Delegation as a focal point, you are invited to provide the Secretariat with the name and address of a national focal point who will receive all official documents and correspondence related to the national periodic reporting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution:</th>
<th>Email:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Tel.:</td>
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<td>Address:</td>
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</table>
I. The Hague Convention of 1954

1. Article 3 - Safeguarding of cultural property

This Article provides for the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to adopt relevant peacetime safeguarding measures against the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict.

- Has your State undertaken such measures?

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

The UK’s approach to safeguarding measures can be found at Section 2 in the published UK policy paper on Guidance on the Implementation of the Hague Convention (2017), available here.

The UK government considers that trustees and others charged with the care and protection of the UK’s cultural heritage should already be taking appropriate safeguarding measures during peacetime, including under existing legislation and designation schemes. The UK government, the Scottish government, the Welsh government and the Northern Ireland Executive have therefore not found it necessary to mandate any specific measures in connection with the Convention and Protocols. However, we have developed supporting measures such as identifying the individual assets across the UK that are covered by the Hague Convention and Protocols. This list has been collated by Historic England and has been submitted to the UK Defence Geographic Service and also shared with NATO. Meanwhile, other UK organisations have demonstrated considerable best practice in this space: the National Trust (England, Wales and Northern Ireland), for example, already has a robust Emergency Framework and Escalation Protocol in place which enables them to respond to any level of incident in a coordinated and considered manner.

To demonstrate the UK’s commitment to safeguarding and protecting cultural property, the UK government also set up the Cultural Protection Fund in partnership with the British Council 2016. The Fund was a response to the targeting and destruction of cultural heritage in conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and its objective remains to “help to create opportunities for economic and social development through building capacity to foster, safeguard and promote cultural heritage in conflict-affected regions overseas”. Since launching, the Fund has enabled over 45,000 people across the MENA region to undertake activities that increase understanding of, or engagement with, cultural heritage; and over 15,000 people have received new skills training and capacity building in cultural heritage protection and related fields. Cultural Protection Fund projects contribute to peacebuilding objectives through community engagement with cultural property, and are frequently at the centre of protection and conservation efforts in fragile post-conflict contexts.

The Devolved Administrations are responsible for the safeguarding of cultural property in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland Historic Environment Scotland are responsible for undertaking tasks relating to the Hague Convention as a non-departmental body of the Scottish Government, while in Wales responsibility lies with the Welsh Government historic environment service Cadw. Specific guidance can be found here for Scotland and here for Northern Ireland.
2. Article 6 - Use of the distinctive emblem for the marking of cultural property

The 1954 Hague Convention creates a distinctive emblem for the exclusive marking of cultural property, with a view to ensure its recognition, particularly in the event of armed conflict. The marking of cultural property is one of the preparatory measures that can be undertaken in time of peace.

- Has your State marked cultural property by using the distinctive emblem of the Convention?

NO

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

The UK government made the decision not to promote the use of the emblem to mark cultural property protected by Convention on the basis that armed conflict affecting the territory of the UK is not expected in the foreseeable future. Owners and trustees of cultural property in England are able to apply to the Secretary of State to display the emblem in connection with the identified cultural property. The Devolved Administrations similarly allow for exceptional requests to be made to their respective Governments and Executive. It is understood that applications for use of the emblem must make a strong and persuasive case to protect the emblem’s integrity (see further details below).

The UK Government has issued a general permission to allow the use of the emblem in England for education and training purposes and by members of the UK armed forces, the British Red Cross, and the Blue Shield International and its National Committees. Similar authorisation has been granted by Scottish Government ministers and the Minister for Communities in Northern Ireland. The UK recognises that including the emblem in educational materials is important in improving the public’s understanding of the emblem and the protection it represents.

In line with Article 17 of the Convention, the UK has put in place the necessary legal and practical measures to safeguard the integrity of the cultural emblem. The distinctive emblem for the marking of cultural property is protected under UK law. The Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017, in Part 3, prohibits the unauthorised use of the cultural emblem. The Act makes it an offence to use the emblem otherwise than as authorised by, or under the Act. It identifies authorised uses of the emblem, and gives the appropriate national authority power to designate further authorised uses. In addition, the Trade Marks Act 1994, through section 3(4), prohibits the registration of the cultural emblem as a trade mark. Guidance on unacceptable trade marks, including emblems protected under international agreements (such as the cultural emblem), is also provided by the UK Intellectual Property Office.
3. Article 7 - Military measures

This Article provides for the obligations of the High Contracting Parties with regard to the introduction in their regulations or instructions for the use of their armed forces of provisions to ensure compliance with the Convention, as well as to plan or establish within their armed forces, services or specialist personnel whose purpose will be to secure respect for cultural property and to co-operate with the civilian authorities responsible for safeguarding such property. These are obligations to be implemented in time of peace.

- Has your State introduced provisions in the regulations and instructions for your armed forces to ensure compliance with the Convention?

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

The UK has historically recognised the critical importance of the armed forces in securing the protection of cultural property during conflict. Before the UK became a party to the 1954 Convention its armed forces already operated as though bound by the Convention's substantive provisions, achieved through policy and direction given in the UK Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) (JSP 383), the Chief of the Defence Staff's Directive, Targeting Policy, and Rules of Engagement. Dissemination of knowledge of the Hague Convention and its Protocols were also part of regular training in the Law of Armed Conflict (also called International Humanitarian Law).

Following the UK’s ratification of the Convention and acceding to its two Protocols, the following additional steps have been taken or are in the process of being introduced:

The Army:

- References to the importance of protection of cultural property have been present in long-standing reference documents, particularly LOAC and the Army Field Manual: Tactics for Stability Operations (specifically Annex D on CPP); both of these documents are currently under review and will be re-issued in due course to reflect the UK’s commitments under the 1954 Hague Convention.
- The Joint Service direction and guidance on Training, Education and Skills (Joint Service Publication 898 Part 1) mandates that all members of the UK Armed Forces are to be trained in - and maintain - a common baseline of knowledge of the LOAC. Where required, for example prior to a mission-specific deployment, additional training in LOAC and CPP is delivered to supplement the common baseline knowledge.

The Royal Navy:

- All Royal Navy (RN) personnel must complete mandatory training in the Law of Armed Conflict, which includes instructions regarding the protection of cultural property in accordance with the Convention. The training is provided via a formal training package (the Naval Core Training package), which must be undertaken annually. In addition, where personnel are deploying into a theatre under the provisions of the Law of Armed Conflict, further theatre-specific training is provided.
The Royal Air Force:

- All RAF personnel are trained in LOAC, including the broad rules relating to cultural property. This is included in basic training, and on all career courses for officers and airmen, as well as in the regular training received on an annual or twice-yearly basis. Prior to deployment personnel also receive a LOAC brief which includes the principles relating to cultural property. Those personnel who undertake the Foundation Targeting Course or Joint Operational Targeting Course are given more detailed training relating to cultural property.

- Has your State established services or designated specialist personnel within your armed forces to ensure respect for cultural property?

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

As part of the UK’s ratification of the Convention, the Ministry of Defence requested the Army to establish a Cultural Property Protection Unit (CPPU), which was done in 2018. The CPPU is a distinct team of Army Reservists with relevant cultural protection expertise, within a wider specialist unit of the Army’s 77 Brigade Outreach Group, responsible for delivery of Civ-Mil Cooperation and Human Security capabilities, able to deliver multi-disciplinary teams, providing appropriate and assured advice & product to the Armed Forces.

All three of the UK Armed services have dedicated SO1 Human Security officers assigned, which encompasses a responsibility for supporting CPP initiatives and training, all of whom are networked and in line with MOD policy.

The CPPU’s role is to support exercises, training and pre-deployment training; support targeting and operational planning processes; and provide advice to commanders and staff in relation to CPP, conducting relevant Civ-Mil Cooperation (CIMIC) with civilian authorities responsible for safeguarding cultural property when tasked to do so. The CPPU is also involved in supporting the gathering of geographic information systems (GIS) data on cultural property to be protected under the Convention within the UK and on an operation-by-operation basis overseas. The provision of such data to those involved in the planning and execution of military operations is fundamental to the delivery of cultural property protection. This work is being supported by Historic England.

The CPPU, has the capacity to engage in Civ-Mil Cooperation (CIMIC) in relation to CPP activity with a range of cross-UK Govt Depts and Agencies, plus Civil-Society when tasked.

4. Article 25 - Dissemination of the Convention
Regulations relating to the protection of cultural property in time of armed conflict must be included into the programmes of military and, if possible, civilian training. The objective is to ensure that the principles of the Convention are known by the whole population, especially the armed forces and personnel engaged in the protection of cultural property.

- Has your State disseminated the provisions of the Convention within the armed forces as well as among target groups and the general public?

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

Yes; for information on the dissemination within the armed forces, please refer to question 3.

In addition to its dissemination within the armed forces, the provisions of the Convention are promoted by the UK government, its agencies and partners where appropriate, to ensure that the general public is familiar with the Convention; a similar approach is taken in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. The UK Government has published a number of reports and internet resources relating to the provisions of the Convention that are available to access:

- On the day that the Convention was ratified in September 2017, the UK Government put out a press release clearly detailing the provisions of the Convention and the UK’s commitment to cultural property protection. A written statement on the ratification was also published on parliament.uk, and on gov.uk.
- In November 2017, the UK government published a publicly available policy paper on the Protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, which sets out guidance on the Convention and its two Protocols.
- In June 2018, the UK government submitted its follow-up report to the biennial UN General Assembly resolution on the Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts; this included reference to the UK’s ratification of the Hague Convention and its acceding to its two Protocols.
- In July 2018, the UK government published a dedicated webpage on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) on gov.uk, which refers specifically to the Convention and its two protocols.
- In December 2018, the UK government published its Approach to Stabilisation for Policy Makers and Practitioners; the Approach specifically details the need to respect and protect a nation’s cultural heritage in times of conflict.
- In March 2019, the UK government included a dedicated section on the Hague Convention and the protection of cultural property in the UK’s Voluntary Report on the Implementation of IHL at the Domestic Level.
- In November 2019, the UK government produced a toolkit in collaboration with the British Red Cross providing guidance for countries on drafting reports on IHL; cultural property protection was included in the guidance document, which has since been published in Arabic, French, Russian and Spanish.
- In August 2020, the UK government included a section on cultural property protection in its Approach to Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.
The UK Government has also disseminated the provisions of the Convention and its two Protocols through the establishment of the Cultural Protection Fund in partnership with the British Council, and the promotion of the Fund’s activities. The UK Government ran a consultation exercise on the establishment of the Fund in 2016 which explicitly linked the Fund’s inauguration with the ratification of the Hague Convention and acceding to its two Protocols, setting out the importance of tackling cultural heritage destruction. The Cultural Protection Fund has also been included in exhibitions on cultural heritage staged by high-profile UK cultural institutions, including the British Council and the Imperial War Museum, which have featured material on the Hague Convention.

The Scottish Government and Northern Ireland executive have published their own guidance on the provisions of the Convention, which are available online.

The provisions of the Convention and its two Protocols have also been disseminated by UK organisations, who are committed to educating relevant target groups and the public. For example, in 2019 the National Trust set up a Hague Convention Working Group (HCWG), a cross-disciplinary network that ensures that the Trust is fulfilling its obligations under the Convention. The HCWG has published an internal page on its staff intranet and an external page on its website on the Convention, ensuring both staff and the general public are aware of its provisions.

The British Red Cross seeks to signpost to the Convention at every appropriate opportunity: cultural property protection is addressed in their internal training entitled ‘IHL and the Movement’, which is available to staff and volunteers, and is also mentioned by the British Red Cross when delivering presentations on IHL to UK universities. Cultural property protection is also covered in the IHL training that the British Red Cross runs in partnership with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), which is delivered to UK civil servants and diplomats. UK civil servants also have access to the FCDO’s internal training module on IHL, which includes the protection of cultural property during armed conflict. Between 2017-2020, the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols were discussed at every meeting of the UK National Committee on IHL.

5. Article 26(1) - Official translations

This Article requires that the High Contracting Parties communicate to one another, through the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the official translations of the present Convention and of the Regulations for its execution:

Please submit a copy / copies of such translation(s), in electronic format, if possible, to the Secretariat”

Please annex an electronic copy of your translation(s) to this report:

[Attach the document]

6. Article 28 - Sanctions

This Article provides for the obligations of the High Contracting Parties to take, within the framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose
penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, regardless of their nationality, who commit or order a breach of the Convention.

- Has your State **introduced in your domestic legislation all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions against a conduct contrary to the obligations set out in the Convention?**

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 establishes a number of criminal offences, together with related penalties, in relation to the obligations set out in the Convention. There have been no criminal prosecutions under this legislation to date.</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>The Service Prosecuting Authority is responsible for tri-service prosecutions of members of the UK Armed Forces. In accordance with s.42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, a person subject to Service Law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, commits an offence under this section if he does any act that is punishable by the law of England and Wales; or if done in England or Wales, would be so punishable. Following the enactment of the Cultural Property Protection (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 offences may therefore be prosecuted within the Service Justice System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In addition to the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017, the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (as amended), the International Criminal Court (ICC) Act 2001 and its corresponding Act in Scotland (the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001) cover a range of matters relating to the protection of cultural property during armed conflict.</td>
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II. Resolution II of the 1954 Conference
Has your State established a National Advisory Committee in accordance with the wish expressed by the Intergovernmental Conference (1954) in Resolution II?

NO

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

A National Advisory Committee is considered unnecessary by the UK Government as there are already multiple forums in which government officials and external stakeholders monitor and discuss the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols: these include the Interdepartmental International Humanitarian Law Committee, the Military Cultural Property Protection Working Group and the Cross-Government Cultural Protection Working Group.

In the event that you have established a National Advisory Committee, has it been incorporated into a national commission for the implementation of international humanitarian law?

YES: ☐ NO: ☐

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

N/A

III. 1954 (First) Protocol

[To be completed only by the High Contracting Parties to the 1954 Protocol]
The main purpose of the 1954 Protocol is the protection of cultural property in or stemming from occupied territory.

- Has your State undertaken measures to implement these international obligations, including the adoption of relevant legislation?

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

The UK has published specific guidance on the provisions which apply to cultural property in or from occupied territory, including a criminal offence of dealing in cultural property which has been unlawfully exported from occupied territory, in Part 4 of the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017. The UK has also published guidance targeted at assisting art dealers and other art market professionals in understanding the offence of dealing in unlawfully exported cultural property.

Chapter 11 of the Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (JSP 383) also contains detailed instructions for how the UK is to deal with both public and private property (including cultural property) during occupation. JSP 383 is currently under review and will be re-issued in due course to reflect the UK’s commitments under the 1954 Hague Convention.

IV. The 1999 Second Protocol
[To be filled in only by the Parties to the 1999 Second Protocol]

The 1999 Second Protocol supplements the 1954 Hague Convention in many respects. In case the information has already been presented in the context of questions relating to the 1954 Hague Convention, you can directly refer to it.

1. Article 5 - Safeguarding of cultural property

Article 5 of the Second Protocol supplements Article 3 of the Hague Convention by providing concrete examples of preparatory measures to be undertaken in time of peace, such as the preparation of inventories of cultural property or the designation of competent authorities responsible for the safeguarding of cultural property.

- Has your State undertaken such measures?

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

Please refer to the response to Part 1, Question 1 above for information on measures taken.
2. **Article 9 - Protection of cultural property in occupied territory**

Article 9 of the Second Protocol complements Article 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention by imposing specific obligations on the occupying power. Paragraph 119 of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the 1999 Second Protocol requires Parties that are occupying powers to provide information in their national reports on how the provisions relating to the protection of cultural property in occupied territory are being respected.

- *Do you ensure compliance with the provisions relating to the protection of cultural property in the context of military occupation?*

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

Please refer to Part 1, Question 3 for information on the training received by the armed forces; please refer to Part 1, Question 6 for information on penalties and sanctions in the context of military occupation.

The UK is not currently an occupying power for the purposes of IHL. In addition to having in place relevant penalties and sanctions, compliance with the provisions is ensured through the provision of UK Service Legal Advisors, who are always available to advise commanders on their legal obligations and the Army's Cultural Property Protection Unit (CPPU) available to support training and provide CPP advice.

3. **Article 10 - Enhanced protection**


- *Do you intend to request the granting of enhanced protection for cultural property within the next four years or, if appropriate, to submit a national tentative list under Article 11 (1) of the 1999 Second Protocol?*

NO

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

The UK government and the Devolved Administrations have no current plans to submit a tentative list or to request enhanced protection for cultural property in the UK.

**MONITORING OF CULTURAL PROPERTY UNDER ENHANCED PROTECTION**

*If some cultural property in your State benefits from enhanced protection, please also fill in this part of the questionnaire.*

The benefit of enhanced protection implies the continued fulfilment of the conditions provided for in Article 10 of the 1999 Second Protocol.
• Is a specific mechanism for monitoring cultural property under enhanced protection in place? For example, are the measures undertaken to ensure the highest level of protection periodically reviewed to ensure their full adequacy in all circumstances?

NO

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

N/A

Pursuant to paragraph 94 of the Guidelines, a distinctive emblem is created for the exclusive marking of cultural property under enhanced protection.

• Has your State marked with the distinctive emblem cultural property under enhanced protection?

NO

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

N/A

4. Article 15 - Serious violations of the 1999 Second Protocol

“Article 15 obliges Parties to establish as criminal offences in their domestic law offences constituting serious breaches of the Second Protocol, and to make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties”.

• Has your State implemented this obligation? If yes, what measures have been undertaken?

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

Part 2, Section 3 of the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 establishes the acts set out in Article 15(1) of the Second Protocol as criminal offences in UK law; Section 4 makes provision in relation to ancillary offences; Section 5 extends criminal liability to
5. **Article 16 - Jurisdiction**

Pursuant to Article 16 of the Second Protocol, the Parties shall take the necessary legislative measures to establish their jurisdiction over offences set forth in Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol in certain cases.

- *Has your State implemented this obligation?* If yes, what measures have been undertaken to grant jurisdiction to your courts over serious offences under the 1999 Second Protocol?

**YES**

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

The provisions in **Part 2, Section 3** of Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 set out the circumstances in which the UK authorities have jurisdiction in respect of offences related to Article 15(1) of the Second Protocol. For the UK Armed Forces, the Service Prosecuting Authority is responsible for tri-service prosecutions of members of the Armed Forces and certain civilians accompanying the Forces. Please refer to Part 1, Question 6 on sanctions for further information.

6. **Article 21 - Measures regarding other violations**

The 1999 Second Protocol obliges Parties to adopt legislative, administrative or disciplinary measures as may be necessary to suppress certain other violations of the Second Protocol:

a. any use of cultural property in violation of the 1954 Hague Convention or the 1999 Second Protocol;

b. any illicit export, other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property from occupied territory in violation of the 1954 Hague Convention or the 1999 Second Protocol.

- *Has your State implemented such measures?*

**YES**

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

Violations of the Convention and its Protocols are covered by the offences created by **Part 2, Section 3** of the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 in relation to the acts set out in Article 15(1) of the Second Protocol, and by the offence created in **Part 4 Section 17 of the Act** in relation to cultural property unlawfully exported from occupied territory.
Additionally, the Armed Forces Act 2006 contains at least three provisions that are applicable to the Convention and its Protocols:

Section 4: the offence of looting
Section 12: disobedience to a lawful command (e.g. if an individual fails to obey an order to protect cultural property)
Section 13: contravention of standing orders (e.g. if there are in-theatre standing orders in place regarding the protection of cultural property)

All UK service personnel, and at some times UK civilian personnel, are subject to the Armed Forces Act 2006.

7. Article 30 - Dissemination

Article 30 of the Second Protocol complements Articles 7 and 25 of the 1954 Hague Convention. In this regard, Article 30 it asks the Parties, to endeavour by appropriate means, and in particular by educational and information programmes, to strengthen appreciation and respect for cultural property by their entire population, to ensure the dissemination of the 1999 Second Protocol, and to incorporate in their military regulations’ guidelines and instructions for the protection of cultural property.

- Has your State disseminated the provisions of the Convention and the Second Protocol within the armed forces as well as to target groups and the general public?

YES

You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

Please refer to Part 1, Question 4 for details on how the Convention and the Second Protocol are disseminated.

8. Article 33 – Assistance of UNESCO

Pursuant to paragraph 151 of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the 1999 Second Protocol, the Parties having activities at bilateral or multilateral level are invited to inform the Committee, in their periodic reports, of their activities in order to share their experiences or good practices.

- Has your State shared, in particular through the Secretariat of UNESCO, your experiences and good practices in implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention and / or its Protocols?

YES
You can complete your answer below, taking into account the guidelines in the model report.

The UK government stands ready to provide information on its experiences and good practices as appropriate with UNESCO, other State Parties and with states considering acceding to the Convention and Protocols. This is the UK’s first periodic report, following the UK’s ratification of the Convention and acceding to the Protocols in September 2017 and attendance for the first time as a State Party at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the 1954 Convention and Meeting of the Parties to the 1999 Second Protocol in December 2019.

The Ministry of Defence’s Cultural Property Protection Unit (CPPU) has regular engagement with UNESCO, specifically the Cultural Heritage protection Treaties Section (CHPTS). The UNESCO CHPTS Senior Technical Advisor presented at and attended the pilot Cultural Property Protection Special to Arm course in 2019, enabling the exchange of experiences and best practise in the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols. The CPPU also has excellent working relationships with international military partners including the Armee de Terre in France and the Esercito Italiano in Italy, both of which sent officers to attend the Special to Arm course. Other states have contacted the CPPU for advice on how to set up a dedicated cultural property protection unit.


Pursuant to Article 37 of the Second Protocol, the Parties shall translate the 1999 Second Protocol into their official language(s) of their countries and shall communicate these official translations to the Director-General.

**Please submit a copy / copies of such translation(s), in electronic format, if possible, to the Secretariat.**

Please annex an *electronic copy of your translation(s) to this report*.

English is one of the six authoritative languages of the Second Protocol (Article 39).

The acceding (or implementing) legislation for the Second Protocol, the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017, makes reference to articles of the Second Protocol e.g. in section 3 reference is made to Article 15 concerning serious violations of the Protocol. The text of the Second Protocol is annexed as Schedule 4 to the Act, and, whenever necessary, reference would be made to its text in order to interpret and apply the Act.

V. Other questions relating to the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols

1. Ratification of / acceding to other international treaties having provisions of the protection of cultural property

   ● Can you indicate the other international instruments to which your State is a party?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International instruments</th>
<th>Ratification/acceding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the World, Cultural and Natural Heritage</td>
<td>Ratified (29.05.1984)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage</td>
<td>NOT A STATE PARTY</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage</td>
<td>NOT A STATE PARTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions</td>
<td>NOT A STATE PARTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977</td>
<td>Ratified (28.01.1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977</td>
<td>Ratified (28.01.1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol (III) to the Geneva Conventions, 2005</td>
<td>Ratified (23.10.2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. National practice relating to the implementation of the Hague Convention and its two Protocols

The Secretariat would be grateful if you could annex a copy of the following documents in French and/or English:

   ● Relevant civil and military administrative regulations:
Please note it is UK policy to use NATO doctrine where it can, and to ensure UK doctrine is coherent. In NATO, Cultural Property Protection is a cross-cutting issue and is now considered for relevance in every review. These documents are reviewed in a 4-5-year cycle and so many documents are currently being updated to reflect the requirement. Cultural Property Protection is also referenced in numerous Defence Doctrine documents.

The Defence Concepts & Doctrine Centre (DCDC) assists in compliance by ensuring the obligations for Cultural Property Protection are captured in the joint operational doctrine British forces use.

- **Human Security in military operations (Joint Service Publication 1325)** (currently being updated to include Cultural Property Protection). In-theatre instructions will be classified.
- **Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01 Allied Joint Doctrine**. To be included in the next edition (F) under development now.
- **AJP-3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting**. To be included in the next edition (B) in the process of Alliance ratification now.
- **AJP 3.19(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Co-operation (2018)**. A paragraph in an annex refers to CPP as a NATO cross-cutting issue.
- **AJP 3.4.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance**. To be included as a cross cutting issue in the next edition (B) in development now.
- **AJP-3.4.5 Joint Allied Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilisation and Reconstruction**. To be included as a cross cutting issue in the next edition (B) in development now.
- **Joint Doctrine Publication - 05 Shaping a Stable World**. While not explicitly using the term ‘Cultural Property Protection’ the intent is included within the paragraph “protect and secure strategically important institutions (such as government buildings, medical and public health infrastructure, the central bank, national treasury, integral commercial banks, museums and religious sites)”
- **JDP 2-00 - Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations** is currently being rewritten to include Cultural Heritage Intelligence (CHINT).

Cultural Heritage Intelligence. (new term to be approved) - Cultural Heritage Intelligence (CHINT) comprises awareness of both tangible remains (e.g. historic buildings and archaeological artefacts) and intangible heritage (e.g. rituals, customs and crafts) as it relates to human terrain analysis, human security, and actions by State and Non-State actors. Within the operating environment, CHINT can support Cultural Capability but specifically permits understanding of how actors can exploit cultural heritage across different Defence postures and within sub-threshold operations to achieve military, information, political, economic and diplomatic advantage.

Note JSP 900 UK Full Spectrum Targeting Policy (Annex B and C) which belongs to MOD SPO Military Strategic Effects (MSE) also includes a reference.

- **National laws** relating to the protection of cultural property, as well as criminal provisions adopted in the context of the implementation of Article 28 of the Hague
Convention and Articles 15, 16 and 21 of the Second Protocol, and case law relating to the protection of cultural property.

Documents relating to awareness-raising activities (seminar programme, brochures, etc.), as well as any other document (legislative, judicial or administrative) relevant to the dissemination of the 1954 Hague Convention and its 1999 Second Protocol.

- Protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict
- Dealing in unlawfully exported cultural property
- In October 2015, the Secretary of State at DCMS convened a Cultural Protection Summit that brought together experts, practitioners, parliamentarians, organisations and charities to explore the measures the UK could take in supporting cultural heritage protection. The Convention and its two Protocols were covered in these discussions.
- In July 2019, chaired by DCMS, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the British Red Cross co-hosted an event entitled: Protecting cultural heritage in the Commonwealth: challenges and opportunities.
- Two information leaflets about the cultural emblem and other protective signs established under international humanitarian law are also attached. Additional details can be found on the British Red Cross’ website.
- In November 2019 the UK, in collaboration with the British Red Cross, produced a toolkit to provide practical guidance for countries to research and draft their own reports on implementing IHL. The toolkit includes reference to cultural property protection, in both the guidance document and in the template for a long form implementation report. Translations of the toolkit have been published in Arabic, French, Russian and Spanish.
- On 27 August 2020, the UK published its approach paper on Protection of Civilians. It contains a section on Cultural Property Protection and PoC. It refers to the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols, as well as to the importance of the protection of cultural property generally.
- In March 2021, DCMS co-hosted a two-day dialogue with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Wilton Park titled Cultural Heritage Protection, Development and Diplomacy: International Approaches, which made reference to the Convention and its two Protocols in discussions around protecting cultural heritage during and post conflict.
- Following this, in April 2021, DCMS commissioned the FCDO’s K4D (Knowledge for Development) programme to produce an evidence report “Lessons learned on cultural heritage protection in conflict and protracted crisis”.

3. Effectiveness of cooperation mechanisms at the national level

- The implementation of the Hague Convention and its two Protocols requires cooperation at the national level between the various authorities (civil, military, etc.). Can you assess the degree of cooperation, at the national level, in your State?
Further Info
The Army leads in the implementation of the Hague Convention and its 2 protocols and established the Cultural Property Protection Unit (CPPU) for this purpose. The CPP Working Group is attended by representatives from across Defence.

Royal Navy:
RN representatives have also recently established links with their US counterparts in the US War College and have been invited to attend the US CPP Working Group. This will aid coherence between the UK and the US and demonstrates cooperation at a national level with allies.

VI. Self-assessment forms

In order to reflect in the synthesis document of the national reports the status of implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention and its 1999 Second Protocol in key areas, please fill in the two tables below.

1. Assessment of the degree of implementation

[To do this, please use the following rating scale]

1. Not at all implemented;
2. Partially implemented and the process is at standstill;
3. Partially implemented, the process following its course; and
4. Fully implemented.

| Implementation of the safeguarding obligation through the adoption of preparatory measures | 4 |
| Military training on regulations for the protection of cultural property | 3 |
| Use of the distinctive emblem to mark cultural property | 3 |
| Implementation of the obligation to disseminate, through the implementation of awareness-raising activities for target audiences | 3 |
| Adoption of relevant criminal legislation | 4 |

For Parties with cultural property under enhanced protection only.

Establishment of a monitoring system for cultural property under enhanced protection at the national level | N/A |

2. Assessment of the difficulties encountered

[To do this, please use the following rating scale]
1. Difficulties are encountered, but there are no plans to seek technical assistance from the UNESCO Secretariat;
2. Difficulties are encountered, nevertheless, it is planned to make use of the technical assistance of the UNESCO Secretariat;
3. Difficulties were encountered, but thanks to the technical assistance of the Secretariat they could be resolved;
4. Difficulties were encountered at first, but they turned into challenges that were overcome; and
5. No difficulties were encountered.

| Implementation of the safeguarding obligation through the adoption of preparatory measures | 5 |
| Military training on regulations for the protection of cultural property | 5 |
| Use of the distinctive emblem to mark cultural property | 4 |
| Implementation of the obligation to disseminate, through the implementation of awareness-raising activities for target audiences | 5 |
| Adoption of relevant criminal legislation | 5 |
| For Parties with cultural property under enhanced protection only. Establishment of a monitoring system for cultural property under enhanced protection at the national level | N/A |

VII. Enhanced protection mechanism – Opinion survey

Pursuant to Chapter 3 of the 1999 Second Protocol, enhanced protection is granted by the Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict if three criteria are cumulatively met:

✔ Cultural property is of the greatest importance to humanity;
✔ Cultural property is protected by adequate domestic, legal and administrative measures recognising its exceptional cultural and historical value and ensuring the highest level of protection; and
✔ Cultural property must not be used for military purposes or to shield military sites. And the Party which has control over the cultural property has to make a declaration confirming that it will not be used for military purposes or to shield military sites.

As these conditions are set out in an international treaty, their interpretation cannot be made independently of State practice, which is of fundamental importance under international treaty law. Therefore, this national report is an opportunity for the national authorities of the Parties to express their views on the conditions under which enhanced protection is granted.

*For each of the conditions set out in Article 10 of the Second Protocol, please answer the following questions, taking into consideration the relevant paragraphs of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Second Protocol.*

- **Article 10, paragraph (a) - "The greatest importance for humanity"**

Please list the main factors to be undertaken into consideration in determining whether a cultural property is of the greatest importance for humanity?
The UK does not currently have any property which is protected under the enhanced protection regime established under the 1999 Second Protocol, and there are no current plans to request enhanced protection for cultural property in the UK.

When considering whether cultural property is of the greatest importance for humanity, the UK government recommends that a narrow view be taken. This is because most cultural property is already protected as a matter of course under the 1954 Hague Convention, the Rome Statute and/or the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols (i.e. both as civilian objects and as cultural property). To avoid watering down the enhanced protection regime – and to ensure that property placed under enhanced protection is truly of the greatest importance for humanity – the criteria used for making such a determination should be very strict indeed.

Article 10, paragraph (b) - “The highest level of protection”

Please mention the national authorities to be consulted in determining the choice of measures to be adopted to ensure the highest level of protection for a cultural property for which enhanced protection is requested. What measures can ensure the highest level of protection?

The Ministry of Defence and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport are the Government Departments which are most suited to the task of determining the choice of measures to be adopted to ensure the highest level of protection of cultural property for which enhanced protection is requested. The current list of property which is protected for the purposes of the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 has been agreed with the devolved administrations. Therefore, the devolved administrations should be consulted on what cultural property might be candidates for enhanced protection within their respective nations.

Article 10, paragraph (c) - "Not-used for military purposes"

Please mention the national authorities to be consulted in order to take the decision not to use the proposed cultural property for granting enhanced protection for military purposes or to shield military sites?

The Ministry of Defence must be consulted to ensure that any cultural property identified as possible candidates for enhanced protection do not have military objectives nearby. In the UK context, one well-known example of a World Heritage Site which is located near a military objective is Stonehenge. Although there are no military objectives near the stone circle, the boundary of the Ministry of Defence’s garrison at Larkhill overlaps with the
boundary of the World Heritage Site containing Stonehenge, Avebury and Associated Sites, meaning that it would not be possible to place the whole site under enhanced protection.

- Additional national authorities who have an interest and who may usefully be consulted include the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport; depending upon the location, the relevant department in the devolved administration concerned, and for a diplomatic and international perspective, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

- One or more of the relevant advisory bodies might also be consulted. These include the Cross-Government Cultural Protection Working Group, the Military Cultural Property Protection Working Group, and the National Committee on International Humanitarian Law.
JSP 900
UK Full Spectrum Targeting Policy – Edition 4
Part 1: Directive
Foreword

Defence’s unique contribution to HMG Fusion Doctrine encompasses a full spectrum of military effects which span the cognitive, virtual and physical dimensions and strategic success can be defined by our ability to change, or maintain, our adversaries’ behaviours in pursuit of our National Security Objectives. The effects we seek to have on identified audiences should drive our operations and will be identified in the relevant Strategic Communication Activities and Effects Framework (SCAEF).

As we consider our national response to sub-threshold activity, we must instinctively orchestrate all activities and effects to achieve our desired end states. This becomes ever more important as cyber and space related activities become central to achieving our success across the spectrum of conflict. It will no longer be acceptable to consider capabilities in isolation. Rather we must challenge the traditional stove piped targeting solutions, mobilising cyber and information activities to achieve desired end states; we should be curious about how we target, adapting existing capabilities and proposing new ones to generate more options; we should seek to collaborate across Government and allies to ensure that we have available as many options as possible in pursuit of our aims; and we must be committed to the highest standards of targeting that allow us to achieve the mission, without threatening a well-earned reputation for upholding international law.

This timely update of JSP 900 – UK Full Spectrum Targeting Policy provides commanders at all levels with clear direction and guidance on the processes that must be adopted to conduct deliberate targeting and the core principles that will maintain best practice in the operational use of force and the delivery of a full spectrum of activity contributing to achieving the desired effects. Importantly, this update reflects the normalisation of cyber and special capabilities into the full spectrum targeting process. A sound understanding of JSP 900 by all those involved in the targeting process will help ensure that we target the appropriate activities, at the right time and to influence the right audiences to meet national objectives whilst remaining within our legal and policy parameters.

Lt Gen D Chalmers DSO OBE
Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations)

Defence Authority for Operations
Preface

How to use this JSP

1. JSP 900 Edition 4 is to be used by staff responsible for all aspects of targeting and is
to be applied by all UK personnel and commands undertaking Full Spectrum Targeting
(FSpecT). This JSP contains the policy and direction on targeting and guidance on the
processes involved and best practice to apply. The JSP must be used in concert with
Targeting Doctrine, principally Annex A to JDP 3-00 Campaign Execution and, for coalition
operations, AJP-3.9 Joint Targeting.

2. The JSP is structured in two parts:
   a. Part 1 – Directive, which provides Commanders with the direction that must be
      followed in accordance with statute or policy mandated by Defence, or on Defence by
      Central Government.
   b. Part 2 – Guidance, which provides practitioners with the guidance and best
      practice that will assist their compliance with the Directive(s) detailed in Part 1.

Coherence with other Defence Authority Policy and Guidance

3. Where applicable, this document contains links to other relevant JSPs, some of
which may be published by different Defence Authorities. Where dependencies exist,
these other Defence Authorities have been consulted in the formulation of the policy and
guidance detailed in this publication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Related JSPs</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JSP 383</td>
<td>Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP 398</td>
<td>United Kingdom Manual of National Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP 918</td>
<td>Joint Terminal Attack Controller Policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further Advice and Feedback – Contacts

4. The owner of this JSP is the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations &
Commitments) (ACDS(Ops & Cts)) and control is exercised on his behalf through the Joint
Targeting Executive Committee (JTEC). For further information or to provide feedback on
the content, contact the JTEC Secretary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title/E-mail</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:SPOMSE-Tgt-Policy-SO1@mod.gov.uk">SPOMSE-Tgt-Policy-SO1@mod.gov.uk</a></td>
<td>JTEC Secretary</td>
<td>9621 87104 (UK Mil)</td>
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<td>+44 20 721 87104 (Civilian)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 AJP-3.9 is NATO targeting doctrine. This does not fully describe UK targeting operations but should be
used as the basis for non-US-led coalition operations.
5. This work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights belong exclusively to the UK MoD. No information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form outside MoD establishments, except as authorised by Military Strategic Effects (MSE). This document is issued for official use only and the information contained must be treated as UK OFFICIAL SENSITIVE. The JSP has classified annexes, copies of which can be requested from the JTEC Secretary. Much of JSP 900 is aligned to US targeting methodology which is considered to be sensitive and is to be protected outside of FVEY nations.
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Section 1 – The Context of Targeting

Targeting. ‘The command process that identifies, selects and prioritises targets, in order to direct action to achieve required outcomes.’

A Target is approved area, structure, object, person, organisation, mindset, thought process, audience, attitude or behaviour which can be influenced. Targeting can be conducted strategically, operationally, or tactically throughout the continuum of conflict. It aims to synchronise actions in the physical and virtual dimensions, to create desired influence. Targeting determines whether the appropriate effect has been achieved by assessing changes in system behaviour, capability, or operational environment.

Fusion Doctrine

1. Fusion Doctrine is the UK’s cross-government approach to national security introduced in the 2018 National Security Capability Review. It develops the UK’s collective approach to National Security Council priorities by encouraging rigorous consideration of all capabilities and creates a more accountable system by introducing senior responsible owners for each priority. At the operational level this will manifest itself in more unified strategic direction and an expectation of and opportunity for the exchange of liaison officers with and embeds from other government departments.

2. For each National Security Council (NSC) priority a Senior Responsible Owner is appointed and a National Security Strategy and Implementation Group (NSSIG) formed. Cross-government NSSIGs are responsible for the development of options and implementation of NSC objectives. The MoD Security Policy and Operations construct aligns with the NSSIGs and, through the International Policy and Strategy (IPS) Directorates, will coordinate Defence’s contribution.

3. The MoD’s approach will encompass all available capabilities to deliver a full range of effects. Many activities will be carried out by non-military actors in support of wider national objectives given the increasingly complex information environment and new opportunities presented by the rapid development of cyber technologies and communication media.

Strategic Communication

4. StratCom has been defined as ‘advancing national interests by using Defence as a means of communication to influence the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours of audiences.’ It is both military and political in nature and is key to the formulation of a deliberately audience-centric strategy. There is a clear link up to Fusion Doctrine and down to Joint Action.

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2 Joint Doctrine Note 2/18 Draft.
3 Joint Doctrine Note 2/19 Defence Strategic Communication.
4 Ibid.
5. The Strategic Communication Actions and Effects Framework (SCAEF) is central to establishing the MoD’s approach to influencing the attitudes and behaviours of our adversaries or potential adversaries using all possible cross-government ways and means. The SCAEF is not a legal document but informs the ‘understand’ process and can provide start points for intelligence activities, including more detailed Target Audience Analyses.

Joint Action\(^5\)

6. Joint Action is the deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities, integrated across all five domains, to affect an actor’s will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them to achieve influence. Joint Action is implemented through the orchestration of Information Activities, Fires, Outreach and Manoeuvre, and is fundamental to the delivery of StratCom.

\[\text{Figure 1.1: Joint Action}\]

7. Joint Action is neither a capability nor an activity in its own right; it is a framework for the integration, coordination and synchronisation of all military activity in the battlespace. Throughout, it must be cognisant of, and coherent with, non-military activity.

8. Joint Action depends upon comprehensive, accurate, effective, and timely targeting; this is the process of selecting, prioritising, and matching targets and the appropriate effects, taking account of the operational requirements and capabilities.

Full Spectrum Targeting (FSpecT)

9. FSpecT has a key role in identifying the most suitable ways to employ available capabilities efficiently and effectively. It is much more than a precursor to the employment of military assets with intended destructive outputs. FSpecT should be derived from the

\(^5\) JDP 3-00.
full diversity of cognitive effects that need to be generated and identify a range of targets to be the focus of tactical commanders’ plans and activities. The FSpecT process should guard against defaulting to munitions-based options and instead seek solutions that will deliver those outputs most likely to create the appropriate cognitive effects. Full spectrum targeting should also guard against the use of military means as an end in itself – just because something is possible does not automatically mean that it should be done.

10. FSpecT, through Joint Action, provides a mechanism to select action to deliver effects to achieve outcomes and influence. FSpecT covers physical munition targeting, offensive cyber targeting, Special Capabilities (SPECAP) and those elements of Information Activities that, because of potential intended or unintended consequences and are directed in a Targeting Directive, require the level of rigour and scrutiny delivered by a formal Target Clearance Board (TCB).

11. The FSpecT estimate will be informed by as detailed a target systems analysis (TSA) and target audience analysis (TAA) conducted by the intelligence community as is available given time and resource constraints (See part 2 Annex A). This estimate underpins Joint Action to ensure that there is a focus on intended outcomes, set within the overarching narrative and executed in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and other fields of international law applicable to the lawful conduct of States.

12. FSpecT must be outcome focused (Ends). This allows deduction of what action is required (Ways) to achieve the desired outcomes and the resources (Means) to do this.

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**Figure 1.2: An Ends/Ways/Means approach to Targeting**

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6 Influence – The capacity to have an effect on the character or behaviour of someone or something, or the effect itself.

7 Further expanded in Part 2, Section 1, Para 6.
Principles of Full Spectrum Targeting

13. The following principles underpin FSpecT:

   a. **Command High, Controlled Low.** For targeting to be effective, command, through policy and direction, should be provided by the MoD, and control delegated as low as is reasonably possible.

   b. **Coherence.** Ensuring that all activities and words across government are aligned; policy and direction must avoid effects fratricide.

   c. **Economy of Effort.** Avoidance of duplication and exploitation of synergies to achieve the required end-states and decisive condition with the minimum of effort.

   d. **Directed.** FSpecT is dependent on sound intelligence. Intelligence Support to Targeting and Effects (ISTE) needs to be carefully prioritised, resourced, and directed to ensure effective and timely output and coordination of contributing intelligence activity.

   e. **Timely.** Targeting will often require considerable lead-times to generate the detailed analysis and integration of effects required to generate FSpecT.

   f. **Effectiveness.** Applying the most appropriate means to achieve the desired end states, ensuring that the right targets are being prosecuted in a manner coherent with the wider context, policy and direction. There is a requirement to understand as best as possible the impact of possible secondary/tertiary effects.

   g. **Robust Measures of Assessment.** Clear identification of assessment criteria at the start of the process enables the measurement of campaign progress. The baseline for understanding an adversary should be derived from the TSA/TAA, against which the effects employed against mission objectives can be measured.

14. The successful application of these principles will entail considering the use of capabilities with which Defence is not traditionally associated and may drive the development of new capabilities.

Components of Full Spectrum Targeting

15. This document describes the capabilities that contribute to FSpecT:

   a. Intelligence Support to Targeting & Effects (ISTE).

   b. Information Activities (IA).

   c. Offensive Cyber (OC).

   d. Munition based targeting.
e. Special Forces (SF).

f. SPECAP.

Targeting Coherence

16. The Targeting process can start before any detailed operational planning has commenced. Planning can begin in the contingent space against likely audiences, actors and adversaries rather than in direct response to the actions of an aggressor.

17. Ends-based thinking requires all participants to focus on the outcomes required to deliver desired end-states and decisive conditions, the options available to achieve such outcomes, and the most appropriate means for delivery. This is of special importance as the process may be of significant duration.

18. A holistic approach to delivery is required to bring together the MoD’s capabilities that deliver effect in the physical and virtual dimensions, and those capabilities held within Partners Across Government (PAG), by allies, and within the private sector in a coherent way to effect change in the cognitive dimension such that behaviours are changed in accordance with the commander’s intent.

19. FSpecT uses available capabilities to create change over time in one or more of the three effects dimensions (physical, virtual and cognitive) to achieve the desired outcome. Action in one dimension can have consequences in other dimensions which can be exploited through the FSpecT process; there must be consideration of how consequences in one or more dimensions may help or hinder in achieving the desired end state.

Figure 1.3: A holistic approach to targeting
The Targeting Continuum

20. The Targeting continuum is a product of reduced planning time as shown in Figure 1.4, and is applicable to all types of targeting. Whilst this document deals specifically with Deliberate Targeting procedures, it has applicability in the Combat Engagement space (See para 22). It is important to note that LOAC applies throughout the targeting continuum during armed conflict.

![Figure 1.4: The Targeting continuum.](image)

21. **Deliberate Targeting.** The process for prosecuting planned targets that are known to exist. The aim is to direct action in accordance with the Commander’s desired end state. Deliberate targeting can be further sub categorised as:

   a. **Pre-planned Targeting.** Targets that require prosecution beyond the planning cycle duration (e.g. the 72hrs of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) for air delivered munitions) are classed as pre-planned. These targets must be cleared by a formal Target Clearance Board (TCB).

   b. **Accelerated Targeting.** Targets that require prosecution within the planning cycle are classed as accelerated. They require a formal TCB, although the level of detail may reflect the urgent nature of action. Successful accelerated targeting requires suitable levels of delegated authority and/or robust processes at the higher HQ level to allow clearances to be given in a timeframe appropriate to the requirement.

   c. There are two types of accelerated targeting:

      (1) **Dynamic Targeting.** Dynamic targets are targets of opportunity that have not been selected in time to be considered as part of the pre-planned process. Often, they result from actionable intelligence received late in the planning process.
(2) **Time Sensitive Targeting (TST).** A TST is a target designated by a commander that requires an immediate response because it is considered high pay-off, is fleeting in opportunity, or it poses (or will pose) a danger to friendly forces. TSTs may be planned or opportunistic, fixed or mobile. TSTs often require the reallocation of resources to achieve the desired effect.

22. **Combat Engagement.** A Combat Engagement is the offensive use of force, outside of self-defence, to accomplish missions and tasks during operations when it is not feasible to deliver either pre-planned or accelerated targeting procedures. While a formal Target Clearance Board is not required, Qualified Controllers may undertake Combat Engagements against authorised Target Sets whilst adhering to the applicable LOAC principles and employing the Five Pillars of the targeting criteria (see Section 9, para 1) – the attack must be authorised by an authority with the delegated ROE. At the tactical level, targets are primarily engaged under Combat Engagement procedures in accordance with higher-level targeting guidance (e.g. an Effects Guidance Matrix) and authorised Rules of Engagement (ROE).

23. **Self Defence.** JSP 398 provides guidance on the use of force in self-defence. Self-defence procedures may be employed as follows:

   a. Where a commander assesses that there is an imminent threat to life they may nominate targets for indirect-fire attack under the control of a Qualified Controller. The Qualified Controller is to make a positive analysis of the target area and is to take responsibility for ensuring that the attack complies with the requirement that the use of force is no more than is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.

   b. Where there is no Qualified Controller the Weapon Platform Commander is to assume responsibility for making a positive analysis of the target area and ensuring that the response complies with the principles of self-defence, including that the use of force is both necessary and reasonable in the circumstances. Where it is not feasible for the Weapon Platform Commander to make a positive analysis of the target area, this responsibility lies with the Combat Commander.

24. **Operational Considerations.** In complex operational environments commanders must be prepared to move rapidly between sectors of the targeting continuum. It is, however, important for commanders to ensure that personnel at all levels understand under what targeting procedures and ROE an engagement is being conducted.

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8 Often applicable when weapon-locating radar or weapon-locating acoustic systems are the only source of target information.
Section 2 – UK Targeting Governance

1. The Secretary of State (SofS) for Defence owns the risk inherent in the activities of military forces acting on behalf of the Government. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is ultimately responsible for articulating this risk to the SofS based on advice from single Service Commanders.

2. **Defence Authority.** Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy & Operations) (DCDS(MSO)), as the Defence Authority, provides strategic oversight, direction and context for the development of Defence level strategy and policy for FSpecT.\(^9\)

3. **Senior Responsible Officer.** Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations and Commitments) (ACDS(Ops & Cts)) is the interim Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) for FSpecT. ACDS(Ops & Cts) is a member of the Director Joint Warfare (DJW) led 2* Joint Warfare Development Board (JWDB) where targeting issues can be raised.

4. **Joint Targeting Executive Committee (JTEC).** The JTEC, headed by Hd MSE, comprises of OF-5 level representation from MoD, JFC, and all three Services empowered to make executive decisions on targeting issues. Additional representatives will be invited as required. The principle output of each JTEC meeting is a letter to the SRO outlining the current risks and issues within the FSpecT arena.

5. **Targeting Balance of Effort.** Targeting priorities and the relative support to contingent and current operations will be managed through the Intelligence Support to Targeting and Effects Programme (ISTEP). The ISTEP will be managed through the 1* ISTE Meeting, which is co-chaired by Hd MSE on behalf of DCDS (MSO) and Head Defence Intelligence Regional and Thematic (Hd DI (R&T)) on behalf of Chief Defence Intelligence (CDI).

6. **SPECAP.** Single-Service coherence and governance will be provided by the Special Access Programme (SAP) Governance Board.

7. **Cyber.** Governance within the MOD sits with CDI and Dir GCHQ from a PAG perspective. Further details are contained in the Cyber Annex to Part 2.

8. **Risk Register.** MSE will maintain a register of Risks and Issues arising from the targeting enterprise and discussed at the JTEC. This will allow the JTEC to understand where action is required to ensure that FSpecT process remains a viable lever of military effect. While MSE will not take on any risks (beyond policy), it will help to highlight risks areas through the JTEC for action.

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\(^9\) The Defence Authority for IST is Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI).
Section 3 – Policy Releasability

1. The main bodies of JSP 900 are Official Sensitive. All requests for non-MOD organisations to access the policy must be made to MSE.

2. The Part 2 annexes range from OFFICIAL SENSITIVE to TOP SECRET. Requests for access must be made to MSE.

3. **Collateral Damage Effects Methodology (CDEM) Training.**

   a. The MoD adopted US CDEM in 2012 with minor caveats. US CDEM is not UK property and the UK is not permitted to release the US policy or accredit other nations to conduct CDE.

   b. Requests to share CDEM with other nations, Partners in Government and third parties or in relation to MoD Responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) enquires must be submitted to MSE for approval.
Section 4 – Legal Framework for Full Spectrum Targeting including the Law of Armed Conflict

1. Legal and Policy Advice. Commanders should seek legal and policy advice when considering targeting decisions. Legal advisers (LEGADs) and Policy Advisors (POLADs) must be available to operational commanders and their targeting staff in person or through reach-back, at all levels of command, to ensure that any action is consistent with domestic and international law and UK and Coalition policy. LEGADs and POLADs are present within single-Service and Joint HQs. MoD Legal Advisers (MODLA) and Sec Pol & Ops are responsible for providing ACDS(Ops & Cts). Director National Security (Dir Nat Sec) and Ministers with legal and policy input respectively to targeting deliberations. When appropriate, MODLA will consult the Attorney General.

2. International Law. The UK targeting process is bound by international law (principally, international treaties applicable to the UK and customary international law) and the criminal law of England and Wales. The principal international agreements that govern LOAC, also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), include the Hague Conventions and Regulations, the Geneva Conventions, the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP 1), and the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP 2). For Cyber operations conducted other than under LOAC, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA 94) will apply.

3. Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Whatever the legal basis for the operation, the use of force in an armed conflict will be governed by LOAC. However, in situations other than an armed conflict, such as in a traditional peacekeeping role, LOAC will generally not apply and the law of self-defence and the relevant provisions of the ROE (if any) will govern the use of force. LOAC is based on customary principles and international agreements. It sets limits on the way that force may be used, for instance by prohibiting certain weapons, by requiring that attacks are only directed against military objectives and protecting those who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities. Further guidance is to be found in JSP 383 Chapter 2, the principles being:

   a. Military Necessity. Military necessity permits a state engaged in an armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of

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10 Also known as the Laws of War by the US.
11 1907 Hague Conventions.
12 Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 49.
13 1977 Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 49, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP 1).
14 1977 Protocol 2 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 49, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (AP 2).
the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources. The principle of military necessity contains four basic elements:

(1) The force used can be and is being controlled.

(2) Since military necessity permits the use of force only if it is ‘not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict’, necessity cannot excuse a departure from that law.

(3) The use of force in ways which are not otherwise prohibited is legitimate if it is necessary to achieve, as quickly as possible, the complete or partial submission of the enemy.

(4) The use of force which is not necessary is unlawful, since it involves wanton killing or destruction.

b. Distinction. There must be a clear distinction between the armed forces and civilians, or between combatants and non-combatants, and between objects that might legitimately be attacked and those that are protected from attack. Offensive action must be directed against military objectives only. Military objectives include members of opposing forces and objects, which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. All feasible precautions are to be taken in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. The word ‘feasible’ means that which is practicable, or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. Indiscriminate attacks are those that are not directed at specific military objectives, those that employ a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military objective or those that employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited. Consequently, indiscriminate attacks are those that strike military objectives and civilians, or civilian objects, without distinction. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.

c. Proportionality. The principle of proportionality requires that the losses resulting from a military action should not be excessive in relation to the expected military advantage. An attack will be disproportionate if it is expected to cause a level of incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The military advantage anticipated refers to the advantage from the attack considered as a whole, and not necessarily from isolated or particular parts of the attack.

d. Humanity. The concept of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. The principle of humanity is based on the notion that once a military objective has been achieved, the further infliction of suffering is unnecessary.
Thus, if an enemy combatant has been put out of action by being wounded or captured, there is no military purpose to be achieved by continuing to attack them. For the same reason, the principle of humanity confirms the basic immunity of civilian populations and civilian objects from attack because civilians and civilian objects make no contribution to military action.

4. **Anti-Personnel Mines.** The UK has ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, also known as the Ottawa Convention. The Ottawa Convention has been brought into UK Law under the Landmines Act 1998 which prohibits not only the use of anti-personnel mines but also the assisting, encouraging, or inducing their use by another person. The operational use of anti-personnel mines by UK personnel (including embeds) is absolutely prohibited, as is the transport of anti-personnel mines for another state.

5. **Cluster Munitions (CMs).** The UK has ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), also known as the Oslo Convention. The Oslo Convention has been brought into UK Law under the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, however, the UK regularly operates alongside non-parties. Article 21 of the Convention allows for international military cooperation and operations between signatory and non-signatory states, which might engage in activities prohibited by the Convention. The 2010 Act provides legal defences for UK personnel involved in operating alongside allies who are not a State party to the Convention. The following specific interoperability scenarios have Ministerial approval:

   a. **Dispensing CMs.** UK personnel are not to be part of a crew or individual weapon platform that dispenses CMs belonging to a non-party state.

   b. **Command and Staff Appointments.** Commanders and staff officers are able to continue to operate and plan alongside military personnel from non-party states. They must not however expressly request or direct the use of CMs to achieve a task. Operational Staff Work/orders directing the use of CMs are not to be formally signed off by UK personnel.

   c. **Calling for Fire Support.** UK personnel engaged in international military operations or international military cooperation are able to continue to call for fire support using extant procedures, even if they know that such support may come from a non-party state in the form of CMs.

   d. **Logistics.** UK personnel are able to perform logistical planning, handling, storage, maintenance and transport services for non-party states materiel, which may include CMs. However UK personnel engaged in international military operations and co-operation are not permitted to transport CMs across the borders of the UK or British Overseas Territories. Involvement in transporting of non-party states’ CMs in all other geographical areas is permitted.

   e. **Refuelling.** UK personnel engaged in international military operations or co-operation are able to continue to refuel non-party states’ aircraft, vessels and vehicles which may be carrying CMs.
f. **Training.** UK personnel employed in posts which are required to deliver instruction to personnel of non-party states are able to continue to deliver CMs-related training, except for training relating to developing, producing, acquiring, or dispensing CMs, which UK personnel must not undertake.

6. **UK Direct Support to Allied Targeting.** In Coalition operations, the UK would reasonably be expected to contribute to the direct support to targeting and combat engagement conducted by other nations. The UK retains liability for coalition partner missions which originate from UK sovereign territory or involve direct UK support. The relevant Targeting Directive will direct when such support will require pre-clearance by a UK TCB. It should be noted that involvement in the target development process and transmission of information to the MOD does not imply any UK approval or intention to be involved in any potential operation.

7. **Cultural Property Protection (CPP).** The UK’s Cultural Property (Armed Forces) Act 2017 has brought into effect, under UK domestic law, the 1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. The 2017 Act makes it a criminal offence to commit serious violations of the rules on cultural property protection.

8. **Self-Defence.** Under the criminal law of England and Wales, if an individual honestly believes that there is a threat to human life and there is no other way to prevent the threat, he or she may use lethal force to prevent the threat. The key principles that will apply to military action relying on self-defence are those of necessity and reasonableness. Thus, force must be limited only to that which is necessary to protect, and must be commensurate with the level of threat, as it would otherwise be regarded as the employment of excessive force. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to remove the threat. Any force used over and above that would be unlawful. Consistent with these principles, it is not permissible to use lethal force in defence of property alone. UK Armed Forces personnel are entitled to the protection afforded to them by the law of self-defence of England and Wales (and when operating in Scotland, the law of self-defence of Scotland); their inherent right to use reasonable and necessary force in individual self-defence, or in the defence of other UK personnel, whether civilian or military, is never constrained by ROE.

9. The above principles apply equally to the use of force in protection of others but there may be occasions when HMG, as a matter of policy, may wish to limit the use of force in this way on operations. In all cases the utmost care must be taken to avoid unnecessary harm to civilians or damage to civilian property.

10. **Applicability of Domestic Criminal Law.** UK Military personnel are accountable for their actions and decisions and are subject to the criminal law of England and Wales at all times and wherever in the world they are serving.

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17 For example, in a Non-Combatant Evacuation or Peace-Keeping Operation, HMG policy may wish to avoid UK Forces being drawn in to a wider conflict inadvertently or being vulnerable to accusations of support for one belligerent group over another by taking actions in self-defence of others.
11. **Legal Framework for Offensive Cyber.** Offensive Cyber actions are governed by several regulations and laws. These will be covered in the Offensive Cyber Targeting Annex.

12. **Legal Framework for SPECAP.** The use of SPECAP must comply with the appropriate domestic and international law obligations. Where this is in support of armed conflict then LOAC will apply. SPECAP may also be subject to other international legal obligations where the effects occur outside the designated area of operations. SPECAP indoctrinated LEGADs should be consulted for advice.

13. **Suspension of an Attack.** Commanders must cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a valid military objective or that the attack does not comply with LOAC. The requirement to take constant care to avoid civilian casualties and minimise damage to civilian property is a continuing duty, and the reasons for selecting a target must be kept under review.

14. **No Strike Lists (NSL).** Entities that must not be targeted for legal or policy reasons are collated on the NSL. The Category Codes for these will be included in the Targeting Directive (TD). The NSL should **not** be confused with the Restricted Target List (RTL) which contains entities which are valid military targets which are not to be targeted for operational reasons. The NSL may also include people, areas and organisations. Protected or collateral object categories may be modified by HMG as the military or political situation dictates; changes to these categories will be reflected in updates to the operation specific TD. The following objects typically comprise the core of the NSL; however this list is not exhaustive.

   a. Diplomatic offices, foreign missions, and sovereign non-military property of other nations.

   b. Religious, cultural, historical institutions and structures.

   c. Inter-governmental organisations (e.g. United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross) and Non-governmental organisations (e.g. Amnesty International) property, equipment, and personnel.

   d. Medical facilities (both civilian and military, including medical schools and medical interest sites).

   e. Public education facilities including non-military schools, colleges, universities, and institutes.

   f. Civilian refugee camps.

   g. Prisoner of war camps, concentration camps and government detention facilities/prisons.

   h. Facilities whose engagement may result in pollution that cannot be contained to include contamination of standing water, streams, and rivers.
i. Structures and objects such as dams and dykes, where damage could result in the release of significant natural forces (floods, landslides, avalanches etc) into civilian areas; or any other infrastructure whose engagement would result in a widespread, long term, and severe damage to the natural environment.
Section 5 – Targeting Directive

1. **Context.** At the outset of planning for an operation, DCDS(MSO) will establish, via the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) process,\(^\text{18}\) a lead branch to provide advice to Ministers on behalf of the MoD and strategic direction from CDS and Ministers to the Joint Commander and other relevant MoD actors in the form of a CDS Directive.\(^\text{19}\)

2. ACDS(Ops & Cts) has overall responsibility for planning and executing operations, while DG Sec Pol provides policy direction and strategic oversight. The lead Sec Pol Ops branch will produce military strategic direction and act as the strategic-to-operational bridge, ensuring that operational-level plans remain coherent with those at the strategic level and ensuring consistency with ministerial direction and coherence across all activity.

3. CDS routinely delegates the coordination of targeting to Hd MSE who will initiate a FSpect estimate to inform the CDS Planning Directive and the activities of the lead branch. The Targeting Directive (TD), written by MSE, is one of the principal strategic products from the estimate (template at Annex A) and gives overarching direction and guidance on the delivery of FSpect. As an annex to CDS’ Directive to the Joint Comdr it provides the basis for the Joint Comdr’s targeting direction to subordinates.

4. It is good practice for subordinate commands to extract and produce their own Directives and/or letters of delegation to support their own commanders’ intent; as the TD cascades down the chain of command it can become more restrictive, as permissions and delegated authorities are withheld, but it cannot become more permissive. Changes may be required in the TD to react to the changing strategic and operational context. The staffing process for TD amendments is shown in Figure 5.1:

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**Figure 5.1: Targeting Directive staff process**

\(^{18}\) DCMO Standing Operating Procedures, dated Oct 18

\(^{19}\) In practice, the CDS Directive and Joint Commanders’ direction are developed collaboratively, and in parallel, to ensure timeliness and consistency of approach.
5. **Delegation of Engagement Authority.** Target Engagement Authority (TEA) flows from CDS, with Ministerial endorsement, to the Joint Commander, who may in turn delegate further. Irrespective of the Joint Commander's delegated level of authority, their Joint HQ remains the staffing conduit to MoD for targeting. The UK Government is sensitive to allegations of excessive use of force and collateral damage. Where the Casualty Estimate (CE) exceeds the level delegated through the TD (the Casualty Threshold) the target must be elevated to a level where the required permissions are held for a decision.

6. The aim is to delegate as much responsibility and freedom of action, across the range of FSpect capabilities, to the appropriate level of command. In the initial stages of an operation, the target clearance process may be held at ministerial level. Later, as the campaign progresses, policy and operational requirements are likely to change, and the TEA may be delegated to designated military commanders at various levels as shown in Figure 5.2. This illustrates how different capabilities may require different permissions and that even during the course of a campaign there could be short term amendments to the permission space, depending on the prevailing operational, strategic or political situation.

![Figure 5.2: Illustrative permission levels during for a generic campaign](image)

7. **Authorised Target Sets and Targets.** Other than in self-defence or defence of nominated others, the use of force by UK forces which could reasonably be expected to result in death or injury is only permitted against the target sets agreed by the SoS (informed by legal and policy advice) for that operation and detailed in the TD. Prosecution of targets remains subject to LOAC and to the allocation of targeting authorities defined within the TD. The use of effects which could not reasonably be expected to result in death or injury, but which could be considered offensive or provocative, may be permitted against targets outside the authorised target sets. i.e. Target Audiences. The delivery of these activities will still be governed by the permissions and delegations stipulated in the TD.

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20 For non-lethal force, it may be reasonable to expect that death or injury could be a second order consequence of the conduct of activity.
8. **Direct Participants in Hostilities (DPH).** The 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 provide that civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations, and shall not be the object of attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities (Article 51(3) of AP1 and Article 13(3) of AP2). Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions contains a similar provision, stating 'Persons taking no active part in the hostilities...shall in all circumstances be treated humanely...'. An approved target set for offensive operations may include individuals directly participating in hostilities. Where there is a question concerning the status of an individual, a LEGAD should be consulted as part of the targeting process, noting that Commanders with delegated targeting authority will always be supported by a LEGAD.

9. **National Approval Authority.** Commanders with delegated authority in a combined HQ are properly referred to as having National Approval Authority (NAA).\(^{21}\) The NAA role is to ensure that the UK’s assets are only used in accordance with the extant operational ROE and in turn, the criminal law of England and Wales and the UK’s interpretation of international law including the LOAC. For NATO targeting matters, it is the UK National Military Representative (UK NMR) at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Allied Command Operations (ACO) who is responsible for staffing targeting issues to the UK MoD.

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\(^{21}\) Formally and colloquially this was known as a Red Card Holder (RCH).
Section 6 – Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Rules of Engagement are ‘Directives issued by a competent military authority which specify the circumstance and limitations under which forces undertaking any military action will operate.’

1. **JSP 398.** The UK authoritative policy document for ROE is JSP 398. JSP 398 has limited releasability, but the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL) Sanremo handbook\(^{22}\) on ROE provides a suitable framework to mitigate the lack of releasability of JSP 398 beyond UK Forces.\(^{23}\)

2. **Principles of ROE.**
   
   a. ROE encompass political direction together with operational and legal provisions to inform commanders of constraints imposed, or freedoms permitted.
   
   b. ROE are not a comprehensive statement of either law or policy, although they take account of both.
   
   c. ROE do not assign specific tasks or issue tactical instructions, though actions may be restricted either to ensure compliance with law or political objectives. The absence of an authorising rule, where a rule would be required in the ROEAUTH, denotes prohibition.

3. **ROE Authorisation (ROEAUTH).** A ROEAUTH will usually be provided for each operation as part of CDS’ Operational Directive. However, for operations where personnel require no further guidance other than their inherent rights to self-defence, a specific ROEAUTH may not be necessary, although guidance cards from JSP 398 are available.

4. A ROEAUTH may be further distributed to subordinate commanders as it stands or with further restrictions. An increase in permissibility requires permission from the superior commander; dependent upon the authorities held this may ultimately require submission to MSE for ministerial approval.

5. Adherence to ROE does not by itself guarantee the lawfulness of any action; it remains the commander’s legal responsibility to ensure that only the degree of force which is lawful in the circumstances it is used. It follows that all commanders and personnel under their command are to be conversant with, trained in, and understand the LOAC\(^{24}\) and ROE.

6. The individual Service personnel are responsible, under applicable domestic and international law, for their acts and omissions. UK Service personnel are entitled to the

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\(^{23}\) For example, when conducting exercises with partners (Civ and Mil) precluded from seeing JSP 398.

\(^{24}\) LOAC is based on customary principles and international agreements.
protection afforded to them by the law of self-defence of England and Wales\textsuperscript{25} and, when operating in Scotland, the law of self-defence of Scotland.

7. **Linkage of Legal Basis, ROE and TD.** The application of offensive and defensive action is governed by the legal basis for the operation, LOAC, the ROEAUTH and the TD. Commanders and targeting staff must understand the linkage between these. Figure 7.1 and the explanation below are designed to assist this understanding:

> Figure 7.1: Linkages between the Legal basis, CDS' directive, LOAC, ROE and TD

a. Strategic intent at governmental level, coupled with a legal basis for action will govern the nature of the ROE. CDS' Operational Directive combines the nature of the ROE and military intent explaining WHY and WHERE offensive action may be used.

b. When a legal basis for offensive action exists, the ROEAUTH will normally contain one or more rules that permit it. The ROEAUTH explains WHEN (under which circumstances) action may be used.

c. When considering offensive action, the ROE and TD become linked for understanding WHO or WHAT may be attacked. The TD contains a list of approved target sets.

d. The TD adds specific policy constraints on WHAT effects the commander can have on a target: such constraints include limitations for collateral effects.

e. The TD provides the methodology that assists the commander's understanding of HOW a target can be attacked.

f. At every stage in the targeting process, commanders and targeting staff must ensure that their actions are legal and operate within their superior commander's intent and objectives.

\textsuperscript{25} This may include the use of lethal force where there is believed to be an imminent threat to human life and there is no other way to prevent that threat.
Section 7 – Collateral Effects Estimation

**Effects Estimation.** The process of the identification of outcomes or consequences through analysis prior to activities being conducted.26

**Collateral Damage.** The damage to civilians and civilian property in spatial or networked proximity to, but not forming part of, an authorised target and to civilian personnel and/or materiel within the boundary of dual-use targets.

1. **Collateral Effects Estimation.** During any military operation the means and methods of prosecuting targets must, where reasonable and feasible, minimise collateral damage (CD). There is no legal requirement to conduct Collateral Effects Estimation prior to military action and no internationally prescribed methodologies for assessing levels of CD, although there are methodologies for physical munitions and developing methodologies for use in the conduct of Cyber operations and Information Activities. Political and reputational damage must also be considered during any effects estimation process.

2. **Collateral and Unintended Consequence Estimation Policy.** All policy concerning UK collateral and unintended consequence estimation is the responsibility of MSE. Any policy questions or issues should be referred to MSE Targeting for appropriate staffing. Policy updates will be distributed by MSE to the targeting enterprise as required.

3. **Weaponeering and Collateral Estimation.** Collateral estimation must not drive the weaponeering. Achieving the desired end state in a proportional manner is to be the determining factor in selection of the appropriate weapon, not any potential collateral impact. Only once the weaponeering is complete, should collateral assessment be carried out.

4. **Collateral Estimation.** Collateral estimation, as part of Advanced Target Development (ATD), is the application of military judgement, supported by intelligence assessment and, where possible, by a scientific understanding of the effects being delivered. As a minimum, the analysis should consider the following:

   a. **Positive Identification (PID).** Under all circumstances the target must be positively identified. ’Positive’ does not mean 100% mathematical certainty; however, commanders should do everything feasible to verify that the target is a valid military objective.

   b. **Impact on Civilians.** The expected impact of the delivered effects on civilians and civilian objects must be considered, including any Casualty Estimate (CE). A Commander should seek to understand the likely reaction to any effect; not simply the reaction in the immediate target area but also the possible reaction in the wider operational environment. Where objective scientific analysis exists, such as the Collateral Damage Estimate Methodology, it must be used within the overall analysis...

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of the expectation of CD, otherwise informed subjective judgement should be applied.

c. **Human Shields.** Human shields are civilians or Captured Personnel (CPERS) placed around a valid military target by a combatant to hinder friendly force action and delivery of effect. While human shields may be voluntary or involuntary, the UK does not distinguish between them; both represent collateral concerns.

d. **Pattern of Life.** The spatial and temporal Pattern of Life (PoL) in the target area, which can be established through observation, surveillance or other intelligence methods, is a key factor in any collateral estimation. It supports or challenges historical information and assumptions and thereby informs the Commander’s judgement.

e. **Casualty Threshold.** Before authorising offensive action, Commanders must be satisfied that all feasible methods of collateral estimation have been used, and that their delegated level of authority for the expectation of collateral damage will not be exceeded.

5. **Dual-Use entities.** Dual-use Targets are characterised as having both a military and civilian purpose/function. In most cases, dual-use targets consist of facilities/structures providing support to the civilian population and the military effort, e.g. national communications infrastructure, media centres, national power etc. Civilian personnel working within the boundary of dual-use targets must be considered as civilian for the purpose of casualty estimation. Dual-use targets may also consist of facilities/structures, protected under LOAC, which are subsequently occupied/utilised by combatants, but the facility still maintains its core function. LOAC protected structures occupied by enemy combatants for the purpose of advancing military objectives generally lose their LOAC protection. Every practical means should be taken to ensure that the facility/structure no longer retains its original function; however the presentational consequences of prosecution must be considered. Commanders are responsible for determining, with reasonable certainty, the function of civilian structures, based on current intelligence, and decide if the target is dual-use or not. The TD will provide authorisations and/or prohibitions for targeting dual-use objects.

6. **Methodology.** CDE in support of physical attack is a well-established process with existing tools and methodology giving a degree of consistency and assurance to support the targeting process. The UK uses the US CDE process where the degree of risk will be described in terms of the level of weapon mitigation and/or the number of anticipated civilian casualties and damage to buildings; this is articulated in Part 2, Annex D. Effects estimation outside the physical dimension are harder to determine, although in depth TSA and TAA will be able to inform the judgement of the TEA. Dstl have developed the Information Environment Unintended Effects Estimation (IEUEE) framework to complement the CDE process\(^\text{27}\) and there are efforts to define a Cyber operations model.

\(^{27}\) Information Activities and Outreach Work Package 8: Diversifying Effects Estimation in the Kinetic Environment.” dstl, 18 March 2016.
7. **Pre-authorisation.** To accelerate the targeting process, pre-approval of certain targets or target sets may be deemed operationally appropriate or necessary in certain circumstances; for example, where there is a high probability that the target may be of a fleeting nature and speed of response is vital. This pre-approval may be exercised through the MoD, PJHQ or UKSF in the early stages of operational planning but must incorporate a time limit. Commanders must conduct a review of the target prior to any action being taken including any collateral effects estimations conducted.
Section 8 – UK Sensitive Target Approval and Review (STAR).

1. The Targeting Directive cannot cover all eventualities and it is important that, when considering a target, commanders evaluate whether the prosecution of a target or action may be sensitive to the UK or to the Coalition.

2. The UK Government might consider certain consequences of targeting to be especially sensitive where they involve presentational matters or there may be legal ambiguity. POLAD advice should be sought if there is a risk that targeting could pose reputational issues for the UK. LEGAD advice should be sought if there is any doubt regarding the legal status or application of the LOAC. In all cases, if there is any doubt, the target should be referred to the STAR process through PJHQ to MSE. Dstl maintain an on-call, analytical reach back service to support current operations and maintain a national capability for CBRN and environmental impact assessment.

3. The political sensitivity of the UK Government regarding targeting operations will be governed by events and will naturally change over time. It is the responsibility of the POLAD to advise a commander on prevailing political sensitivities. Where there is doubt regarding political or Information Activities sensitivities, clarification must be sought from MSE. If it is deemed that a target is sensitive, the MoD may wish to either inform Ministers through a MINSUB or alternatively conduct additional analysis to support Ministerial approval.

4. The UK STAR process, while closely aligned to the US STAR process, is a sovereign process reflecting the UK legal and policy framework together with reputational sensitivities. If the delegated commander is unhappy with any aspect of the potential target due to its sensitive nature they may refer it up for further analysis. The following categories would may be considered eligible for UK STAR, but this list is not exhaustive:

   a. **Environmental Hazard.** If an entity likely to cause environmental damage is within the CDE Level 1 Collateral Hazard Area (CHA) (or a distance specified in an operational TD) of a potential target, then the target pack must immediately be passed to PJHQ and MSE for consideration and detailed analysis conducted by Dstl.28

   b. **Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Plume hazard.** If an entity likely to cause a CBR plume is within the CDE Level 1 CHA (or a distance specified in an operational TD) of a potential target, then the target pack must immediately be passed to PJHQ and MSE for consideration and detailed analysis conducted by Dstl.29

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28 Working collaboratively with industrial SMEs, Dstl are able to generate detailed analysis of the potential issues that may arise from prosecuting a target to inform the Commander’s risk appreciation.

29 Ibid.
c. **Dual-Use entities.** Dual-use targets pose complex collateral issues that will require detailed analysis of factors which are likely to be beyond the resources of the deployed force. Dual use entities may exist in the virtual dimension as well as physical – e.g. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) control systems for industrial plant and processes, internet-connected networks essential to the military which may also control key civilian infrastructure and processes.

d. **Changed-Use.** Some changed-use targets may pose potential presentational issues, the striking of which could be misinterpreted by the media and/or exploited by adversaries (e.g. an old school or hospital building). Therefore, the STAR process is required to fully understand these issues and how they could be mitigated, unless stated in the relevant TD.

e. **Information Activities.** The Information Activities Appendix to the TD will provide direction on restricted themes. Where the prosecution of a target may impact these themes the STAR process is to be used.

f. **Presentational Issues.** If the commander feels that action, while legal and policy compliant, might cause damage to the mission due to presentational issues, they can use the STAR process – e.g. the presence of third country nationals within a facility whose death, while under a Casualty Threshold, would prove diplomatically contentious.
Section 9 – Targeting Criteria

1. Targeting Criteria - The Five Pillars. For deliberate targeting and combat engagement, five criteria or 'pillars' must be satisfied prior to initiating any engagement. It is essential that all targets, even those that have been cleared previously, are reviewed before final engagement approval to ensure that these criteria remain extant.

   a. Pillar 1 – Rules of Engagement (ROE). The relevant ROE must be understood by all those involved in the delivery of that offensive and defensive action.

   b. Pillar 2 – Estimation of Collateral Damage and Unintended Effects. Deliberate targeting requires consideration of both the intended and unintended consequences on people or objects proximate to the target in space, time and by virtual network. These potential consequences can then be considered during the TCB.

   c. Pillar 3 – Positive Identification (PID). Under all circumstances the target must be positively identified. PID means a reasonable certainty of whether or not the entity for attack is a valid military objective and is functionally defined as a target in accordance with the operational specific TD and associated ROEAUTH. 'Positive' does not mean 100% mathematical certainty; however, commanders should do everything feasible to verify that the target is a military objective. The criteria to be used for identifying potential targets will be contained in a ROEAUTH.

   d. Pillar 4 – Pattern of Life (PoL). PoL helps provide a richer intelligence picture to a commander and may indicate changes in military and civilian activity proximate to the target area. It may also confirm the nature of the target and assist in the assessment of collateral damage and unintended effects. The operational TD will expand upon PoL requirements which will vary, dependent on the nature of the target, the effect being delivered, and the expected benefits balanced against the risks.

   e. Pillar 5 – Clearance. Every engagement, less those conducted under self-defence, require clearance by an individual with delegated Engagement Authority. This delegated authority will be situation dependent but will be specified in the TD.

2. Targeting Assessment. Targeting assessment is not a mandated requirement to proceed with an engagement, but should be considered from the outset of planning, not just as a post-engagement activity – it is an integral part of the Targeting cycle. The prosecution of a target must directly relate to a specific objective/end state within the overall campaign/operational plan. The assessment evaluates the effectiveness and contribution of such prosecution towards these objectives and should help shape subsequent engagements.

3. The FSpect approach requires the synchronisation of targeted actions and an integrated method of assessing levels of success. A target should not be considered for TCB approval unless there is a robust consideration of the assessment plan; if the results
of an engagement cannot be assessed, then there may be little justification in conducting the engagement and the Engagement Authority should carefully consider the justification for the engagement.

4. One of the challenges of targeting assessment is the potential for latency\(^\text{30}\) of the effect. While in the physical dimension the presentation of the effect is rapid, in the virtual and cognitive dimensions, the effect may take a significant amount of time to present in a form that can be measured and assessed. This must be factored into the plan to conduct targeting assessment.

\(^{30}\text{OECD: Latent – Existing but not active or developed or visible.}\)
Section 10 – Target Clearance Board

1. A TCB is to be conducted prior to any action utilising the Deliberate Targeting mechanism which requires a commander’s approval. It will allow the TEA to address two fundamental questions:
   a. Can I? Is the legal and policy basis in place to authorise the action?
   b. Should I? Does the proposed action support the desired outcomes, is the Gain/Loss calculus of the action acceptable, is this action required now?

2. The TCB enables a TEA to Clear/Refer/Reject the recommended action having considered these questions. Whilst the targeting policy is directed by the MoD, the control of the targeting process and TEAs will be delegated as low as is reasonably practicable and will be articulated in the TD.

3. Membership.
   a. The following personnel must be present during a TCB:
      (1) A Minister or delegated military commander chairs the TCB as the TEA. The relevant TD will direct who is authorised as the TEA.
      (2) A qualified UK targeteer\(^32\) to act as secretary for the board and to give general targeting advice.
      (3) A legal adviser.\(^33\)
      (4) A policy adviser.\(^34\)
   b. The following personnel should also be present to provide advice, when requested, to the TCB.
      (1) An Intelligence representative, so that the target pack intelligence can be interrogated by the board.
      (2) Subject matter experts (IA&O, Cyber, SPECAP, SF, Security and Intelligence Agencies, and PAG) pertinent to the nature of the target(s), the capabilities being employed, and the impact of the targeting.
   c. A TCB could also include the following:

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\(^31\) Combat engagements and self-defence do not require a formal Target Clearance Board prior to engagement.
\(^32\) An individual who has completed either JOTC or JTTC and whose qualification is current.
\(^33\) Either in person (preferred) or through reach-back.
\(^34\) Ibid.
(1) Staff from plans and operations to ensure coherence of delivery.

(2) Dstl and MoD civil servant SME representation for scientific advice (including operational analysis).

(3) Industry or third parties to advise on specific matters concerning TCB.

4. **Considerations.** As a minimum, the TCB must consider:

   a. That the target to be prosecuted is within the commander’s delegated authority (as defined by the TD) and meets the superior commander’s intent.

   b. The intelligence assessments contained within the target pack.

   c. Whether the target is lawful and the means and method of attack complies with LOAC.

   d. The likely effect of the attack on civilians and civilian objects in the physical, virtual, and cognitive dimensions.

   e. Risk and consequence of incurring unintended effects, including effects fratricide, effects amplification, and potential intelligence loss,\(^{35}\) in the physical, virtual, and cognitive dimensions.

   f. That the technical aspects of weapon delivery meet the required standard.

   g. That the proposed actions are consistent with the Strategic Communication narrative.

5. Targets are cleared for prosecution by a TCB whose membership reflects the level of delegated authority. Where permission has been delegated, it may still be appropriate for higher level clearance and the following circumstances are illustrative of triggers for this, nothing that the originating and higher headquarters should be in constant dialogue to avoid a cold start to the referral process.

   a. When the STAR process applies – see Section 8.

   b. When TEA considers that the target is politically sensitive or contentious, either because of its inherent qualities or the phase of the operation in which its prosecution sits.

   c. When attacking targets that might exceed the delegated threshold of collateral damage/unintended consequences held by subordinate commanders; involve an expectation of significant risk; and/or the release of CBRN materials.

   d. Where there are differences of opinion with allies or coalition partners over target selection.

\(^{35}\) Commonly referred to as ‘Intelligence Gain/Loss’ or ‘IGL’.
e. Where it is necessary to operate outside of the extant TD.

f. When employing a novel or new weapon system or capability.

6. For those targets where the MoD retains Engagement Authority or where MSE judge that ministerial approval is required, the TCB will normally be chaired by Secretary of State for Defence or a delegated Minister if required. A Target Review Board (TRB) will be held prior to the Ministerial board. The TRB is chaired by ACDS(Ops & Cts), with D Nat Sec, MSE targeting staff, MODLA, and with other senior military, policy, and PAG staff as required. At the TRB the operational level headquarters will advocate the target(s) for TCB approval.

7. **TCB inputs:**

   a. **Target Pack.** The target pack contains all the information to allow an informed decision on whether the proposed action should be authorised. The exact format of the target pack will depend on the action being considered. Recommended formats are to be found within the Annexes contained in Part 2 to this document. The key questions that the Target Pack should seek to answer are:

      (1) Is the Target of enough significance to justify the action proposed?

      (2) Is there a military advantage to be gained from the proposed action?

      (3) Is the target distinct – i.e. is it clearly a military objective?

      (4) Is the proposed action proportionate to the desired end state?

      (5) What are the collateral concerns?

8. **TCB Outputs**

   a. **Engagement Decision.** The board can make one of three decisions:

      (1) **Clear.** Approve prosecution of the target.\(^{37}\)

      (2) **Reject.** This will state the reason for the rejection, often with direction as to what needs to be completed before it could be reconsidered.

      (3) **Refer.** If a target cannot be approved/cleared by the TEA due to constraints place upon that individual, it is referred to a higher HQ for consideration.

   b. **Target Summary Sheet (TSS).** This document provides an audit trail of the advice and decisions taken and records much of the underpinning evidence of the

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\(^{36}\) This may be delegated to Hd MSE.

\(^{37}\) This decision may be accompanied with pre-conditions of the prosecution.
target pack. It is also a briefing tool to enable senior commanders, political decision makers, and LEGADs and POLADs to judge the assessed military advantage of an intended attack against the associated collateral concerns. The exact format of the TSS will depend on the capability being considered – an example is at Annex B to Part 1.

c. **Promulgation.** Upon completion of a TCB the results, recorded in the TSS, will need to be promulgated to the subordinate HQ. There is no need to promulgate the TSS in its entirety, but a concise summary of target details and the approved effects must be distributed.

9. **Duration of Clearance.** The action should be approved as close as possible to mission execution and the timeframe that the clearance is valid for must be stated by the TCB. This validity will vary according to the capability, nature of the target, its surroundings, the ability to collect further intelligence, and the appetite for risk, bearing in mind that all reasonable steps must be taken to apply the principles of LOAC and other applicable legal provisions to the prosecution of the target. This information will be recorded on the TSS.

10. **The Operational Record.** The decision-making process and results of the TCB retained for operational recording keeping and audit purposes.\(^{38}\) This data would also be important evidence at any inquiry.\(^{39}\) Target folders, target packs, and the signed TSS are to be sent to PJHQ Joint Effects where they will be retained for seven years as Operational Records, before being formally placed into the Government Archives.\(^{40}\) Whenever possible this folder should be in an electronic format that is easily transferable and accessible at all levels of command.

\(^{38}\) In accordance with JSP 441: Managing Information in Defence.

\(^{39}\) Service Inquiry, Service Police Investigation, International Commission of Inquiry, ICRC inquiry, or for any response to allegations of infringement of the LOAC.

\(^{40}\) Scanned copies of the TSS are acceptable.
Section 11 – Embedded Personnel

1. **UK Embedded and Exchange Staff.** UK personnel deployed under the command and control of other nations and coalition organisations as embedded or exchange staff are still bound by, and individually responsible for compliance with, UK law and the UK’s obligations and interpretation of international law. In all cases, UK personnel are personally bound by the terms of the UK regulatory framework contained in a CDS’ Directive (and specifically the ROEAUTH and TD). While embedded personnel will operate under the ROE of the HQ’s host nation and, if applicable, the nationality of HQ / unit, they must also abide by the UK interpretation of self-defence and may only take part in the use of offensive force which complies with the principles of LOAC, and which is directed against target sets as authorised by the UK. Individual staff should make the UK operational chain-of-command aware of any concerns they may have in this regard. Further direction will be provided through CDS’ Directive for embedded personnel.\(^\text{41}\)

Where an individual holds a specific command role in a foreign or multi-national HQ\(^\text{42}\) which involves a targeting function, but there is no formal UK participation in a specific operation, there may be the requirement for formal direction to be issued by MSE. The commanders of such appointments should ensure that they have access to JOTC/JTTC qualified targeting personnel, UK LEGADs and UK POLADs to undertake the duties.

2. **Foreign Exchange Staff Embedded in a UK HQ.** Where foreign staff are embedded in a UK HQ and are involved in targeting,\(^\text{43}\) the HQ must carefully consider the integration of this person in to the targeting enterprise, subject to the terms of the applicable bilateral personnel exchange agreement. The HQ is to determine the differences between national policies to understand any targeting constraints that this arrangement creates, specifically with regard to releasability of intelligence and UK targeting policy. They are to complete a risk assessment which is to be endorsed by PJHQ Joint Effects prior to operations and large exercises. The HQ should develop SOPs to manage such constraints and should seek guidance from PJHQ/MSE should they be unable to manage arrangements. Foreign nationals will be subject to their own national regulations and the respective HQ is to ensure that they are fully aware of the constraints which are imposed by the national policy of the individual in question. Some nations may have greater targeting freedoms than the UK, but when a foreign national is operating in a UK HQ they will also be subject to UK targeting and ROE policy and the more restrictive policy will always be applied.

3. **Multi-national Commitments.** Multi-national operations create additional complexity for UK personnel. Other coalition partners may have differing interpretations of what constitutes the legal basis for the use of force. Multi-national ROE, TD, and Tactical Directions must be applied in addition to their UK equivalents. The terminology used in multi-national publications may make translation to the UK regulatory framework difficult; however, where possible, additional caveats, clarifications and amplifications will be provided within UK documentation. Where there is contradiction or confusion the most

\(^{41}\) CDS Operational Directive 02/16 to UK Personnel Embedded within Other Nations’ Forces dated Jan 16.

\(^{42}\) For example, deputy commander of a US or NATO formation or command.

\(^{43}\) It is not uncommon for formations to have foreign deputy commanders who could be required to chair TCBs from time-to-time
restrictive criteria must be applied. MSE and PJHQ Joint Effects will provide advice and clarification through the operation-specific TD where specific problems are identified.

4. Deployed UK Targeting Staff. It is essential that effective liaison is established at all levels of command to ensure the UK is fully involved in multi-national targeting decisions and that a cohesive and coordinated policy is pursued. UK targeting staffs will remain responsible for ensuring that targets assigned to UK assets accord with UK political, legal and military direction. Deployed UK staffs are responsible for drawing the UK operational commander’s attention to any target which does not accord with UK strategic narrative, objectives or legal obligations.
Section 12 – Training and Assurance Policy

1. **Scope.** This JSP is the authority vested in MSE for the provision of Targeting training, including Target Development from validation forward. The authority for Intelligence Support to Targeting and Effects (ISTE) activity up to and including Intermediate Target Development vetting is CDI.

2. The Training Requirements Authorities (TRAs) and Training Delivery Authorities (TDAs) relevant to Targeting are shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Requirements Authority</th>
<th>Intelligence Support to Targeting and Effects</th>
<th>Information Activities</th>
<th>Cyber</th>
<th>Targeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dir JIOC</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Cyber Jt User</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Delivery Authority</td>
<td>JITG</td>
<td>Jt Warfare</td>
<td>Defence Cyber School</td>
<td>Hd MSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AWS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. **Theatre Entry Standards.** PJHQ Joint Effects will determine the training requirements and theatre entry standards for operationally deployed targeting posts; these will be confirmed by the operational owner.46

b. **Joint Education** – Director General Defence Academy.

c. **Joint Operational Training** – Director Joint Warfare.

3. **Training Assurance.** Assurance activity will provide confidence to the chain of command that training and education (T&E) is conducted effectively to meet operational, policy and legal requirements.

   a. First party assurance is conducted at the establishment or organisation where T&E takes place and examines all parts of the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) cycle, whether the responsibility of the TRA or TDA.47

   b. Second party assurance for AWS courses is provided by 22 Gp; second party assurance for RSA courses is delivered by LWC; second party assurance for

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44 sS have TRA/TDA responsibilities for specific courses.
45 sS have TRA/TDA responsibilities for specific courses.
46 e.g. CJO, DSF.
47 It is accepted that some non-UK courses that are used to train UK personnel will not confirm to the UK DSAT process.
Information Activities is co-ordinated on behalf of COS JFC by JW Hd JFT&I using the JITAT.

c. Third party assurance is conducted by organisations external to the MoD.

4. Operational Assurance. The operational chain of command is responsible for the effective direction and control of targeting operations. Assurance will be led by MSE, informed by the operational headquarters. This assurance is achieved by monitoring all operational reports and targeting products and, where required, by theatre visits.

5. Training for Commanders Holding Delegated Target Engagement Authority. Operational commanders’ delegated authority will be articulated in an operation-specific TD. In addition to prescribed pre-deployment training, all commanders and deputies likely to hold delegated authority must contact MSE and PJHQ to discuss appropriate pre-deployment briefing and training. MSE hold a pack that can be delivered to Commanders new in post in order to reduce the training burden immediately prior to operations.

6. Training for Targeteers. All personnel selected to fill formal targeteer appointments either in permanent posts, as Individual Augmentees, or in emergency reinforcements posts are to be appropriately qualified and competent to conduct their role. While mandatory for such targeting posts, it is highly desirable for those non-targeting specialists in the FSpecT process, such as those involved in Cyber, SPECAP, IA&O and ISTE to attend a formal targeting course. This policy attempts to balance the need for currency against the training burden (on individuals and parent units) while giving appropriate weighting to the negative implications of poor targeting advice.

7. Targeting Qualifying Courses. The Joint Operational Targeting Course (JOTC) and the Joint Tactical Targeting Course (JTTC) are the qualifying training courses for UK Targeting. Upon completion of a qualifying course individuals will be deemed to be Targeting Practitioners and will gain the UK service qualification of Joint Operational Targeting (Q-JOT) or Joint Tactical Targeting (Q-JTT) respectively. These are summarised in the table in para 10.

a. Targeting Practitioner Qualifying Course – JOTC. The JOTC, run at the Air Warfare School, RAF Cranwell, is designed for staff who will be employed to provide specialist targeting staff support to Strategic and Operational Commanders; filling roles MoD, PJHQ, (S)JFHQ, single-Service HQs, NATO and targeting support agencies. This course incorporates a one-week CDEC module. This examinable course is lecture-based and incorporates practical exercises and external visits to industrial and infrastructure sites.

b. Targeting Practitioner Qualifying Course – JTTC. The JTTC, run at the Royal School of Artillery, Larkhill, is designed for staff will be employed at

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48 The responsibility for ISTE training lies with Hd DI Regional & Thematic.
49 single-Services should note that personnel filling targeting posts will require a current Developed Vetting (DV) clearance.
50 Qualification. The award of a formal targeting qualification upon successful completion of a qualifying targeting course. A JPA competency is to be recorded for Service personnel.
51 A qualified targeteer is required for a formal Target/Effect Clearance Board.
Headquarters using tactical targeting procedures. This will enable them to operate competently within a targeting organisation specifically at the Component Command level and offer advice as an effective member of a targeting group at the tactical through to the operational level. This course incorporates a one-week CDEC module. This examinable course is lecture-based and incorporates practical exercises and external visits to industrial and infrastructure sites.

c. **JOTC and JTTC Currency.** Qualifications remain current for three years from either the date of the award or from the end of a formal Targeteer posting\(^{52}\) whichever is later. After this period, unless the Targeteer is recertified, the JPA award is suspended. The maintenance of the qualification is the responsibility of the individual concerned and the following conventions apply:

1. **Recertification.** Individuals will be recertified once\(^{53}\) by the school that awarded the original qualification for a further three years through attendance and satisfactory performance on the Foundation Targeting Course (see para 8) which must be attended under the following circumstances:

   a. Conducted three years from the award of the qualification if not employed in a target related post/deployment.

   b. Conducted within three years of completing a targeting or target related appointment.

   c. Recertification may be conducted by personnel whose targeting qualification expired in the previous three years. Applications for this dispensation should be submitted to MSE.

2. **Requalification.**\(^{54}\) Individuals must fully requalify through attendance and satisfactory performance on the JOTC or JTTC in the following circumstances:

   a. Personnel who previously held a targeting qualification which has been removed will be required to successfully complete the appropriate JOTC or JTTC before an award will be reissued.

   b. Personnel who have already recertified for a further three years through attendance of the Foundation Targeting Course and their three-year recertification has expired.

3. **Exceptional Waivers.** It is recognised that these requirements may need to be waived for urgent operational requirements. It is the responsibility of the force generating single-Service to request exemption from this policy from MSE.

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\(^{52}\) For example on the staff at MSE, as a nominated augmentee for JFHQ Joint Effects, or on completion of an operational tour in which the holder is employed in a targeting role.

\(^{53}\) Further recertification can only be achieved by re-attendance on either JOTC or JTTC.

\(^{54}\) **Requalification.** The requirement to complete and pass a qualifying targeting course on a specified anniversary of having qualified previously.
who will liaise with the operation owner to understand the situation and attendant risks of granting the waiver.

d. **Categories of Qualified Personnel.** Dependant on role and employment qualified and current targeteers will fall into one of four categories of qualified personnel:

(1) **In Role.** Those qualified and in a permanent Targeting post, or deployed on operations in a Targeting post, and/or conducting CDE regularly as part of continuation training or operationally.

(2) **Contingency Individual Augmentees (IAs).** Those not in a Targeting post, but with a standing nomination, for the duration of the posting, to deploy as an IA Targeteer to a HQ in the event of contingency operations.\(^{55}\)

(3) **Operational Individual Augmentees.** Those not in a standing Targeting post but selected as an IA for an operational tour in a deployed HQ as a Targeteer.

(4) **Out of Role.** Those not employed in a Targeting post, with no standing contingency Targeting Individual Augmentees commitment, and who have not been selected as an operational Targeting IA.

8. **Foundation Targeting Course (FTC).** The FTC provides an awareness of the targeting processes involved with the selection and prosecution of targets. It is oriented towards tri-Service and civilian personnel selected to fill posts that will involve the support or management of targeting and target assessment activities and those who have a command responsibility for targeteers. The FTC is recommended training for those who sit on a Target Clearance Board and those contributing to the products that inform that board, e.g. POLADs and LEGADs. More senior permanent staffs, associated with campaign planning and management, whom require an overview of the targeting process may also attend. The FTC also provides a refresh of the key policy and legal aspects of the targeting process and is additionally used to recertify current Targeteers and requalify personnel whose Q-JOT/Q-JTT has been suspended.\(^{56}\) The examined course is lecture and practical exercise based.

9. **Collateral Damage Estimation Course (CDEC).** This one-week course qualifies tri-service and civilian personnel in the UK’s CDE policy, methodology and processes; noting that most of the course content is based on US CDE methodology with UK caveats.\(^{57}\) CDEC is an additional qualification to the Q-JOT / Q-JTT and is a mandatory requirement for any individual engaged in conducting collateral damage estimates. The CDE syllabus includes practical exercises and an end-of-course formal assessment. There is no requirement for a qualified Targeteer to be an in-date CDE analyst, but it is

\(^{55}\) For example pre-nominated Augmentees for JFHQ Joint Effects.

\(^{56}\) Individuals who require requalification must attend the FTC delivered by the same organisation who delivered their original qualification – exceptions must be staffed to MSE for consideration.

\(^{57}\) US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3160.01C series.
recognised that completion of the CDEC course gives an important insight into the munition-based targeting process.

a. **CDEC Currency.** All categories of CDEC qualified personnel must requalify by the third anniversary of their previous CDE qualification if they continue to be required to conduct CDE. Otherwise, recertification is required as follows:

   (1) **In Role.** Those who perform CDE regularly as part of continuation training or operationally must still recertify every 12 months.

   (2) **Contingency IAs.** Contingency IAs must recertify 12 months after the qualification was granted.

   (3) **Operational IAs.** Once selected as an operational IA, the individual must complete CDE recertification successfully prior to deployment.

   (4) **Out of Role.** Those not in a Targeting post should recertify annually if their employing officer is content for them to do so. This would facilitate employment as a Targeteer were there to be an operational requirement.

b. **Training.** The AWS and the RSA deliver CDE training and recertification courses. The one-day recertification course provides an update on policy, methodology and procedures, culminating in a practical test.

c. **Recertification Recording.** AWS and RSA are responsible for the correct recording of CDE qualification and recertification on JPA. This is to ensure that, in a time of crisis, qualified and current personnel can be quickly identified, along with those who will require minimal training to regain currency.
10. Summary of Targeting Courses. The table below summarises paras 7, 8 & 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Targeteer</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Pre-requisite</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Validity</th>
<th>Recertification/requalification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targeting awareness</td>
<td>Commanders, POLADs, LEGADs, etc</td>
<td>FTC</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>3 Days</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Targeteer&lt;sup&gt;58&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Targeteers: 1. In Role 2. Contingency IA 3. Operational IA 4. Out of Role</td>
<td>JOTC or JTTC&lt;sup&gt;59&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>4 Weeks</td>
<td>3 years from qualifying date or completing a targeting role, whichever is later.</td>
<td>Recertification: If within 3 years of initial qualification, or 12 months of targeting role, individuals can be recertified once by the original qualifying school by attending their FTC. MSE can be applied to for dispensations for individuals between 12 and 36 months after leaving their targeting role. Requalification: Outside of the above personnel must requalify by re-attending either JOTC or JTTC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munition CDE analysis</td>
<td>CDE Analysts: 1. In Role 2. Contingency IA 3. Operational IA 4. Out of Role</td>
<td>CDEC</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1 Week</td>
<td>3 years from date of qualification</td>
<td>Requalification: 3 years from qualification. Recertification: (1) In Role. Those who perform CDE regularly as part of continuation training or operationally must still recertify every 12 months. (2) Contingency IAs. Contingency IAs must recertify 12 months after the qualification was granted. (3) Operational IAs. Once selected as an operational IA, the individual must complete CDE recertification successfully prior to deployment. (4) Out of Role. Those not in a Targeting post should recertify annually if their employing officer is content for them to do so. This would facilitate employment as a Targeteer were there to be an operational requirement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>58</sup> An individual who fills a formal targeting role and could reasonably be expected to be the secretary of a Target Clearance Board

<sup>59</sup> JOTC and JTTC includes the one-week CDEC
11. **Information Activities Training Course.** Personnel in Information Activities posts must qualify from the Joint Information Activities Course delivered by the Joint Informational Activities Group (JIAG), based at RAF Halton or an equivalent course (e.g. US Joint Information Ops Planning Course (JIOPC) at the US Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA).

12. **Combat Assessment Training.** Currently munition-based combat assessment training for UK personnel is conducted at the US Joint Targeting School, Naval Air Station Oceana - Dam Neck Annex, Virginia. Introductory combat assessment training is delivered to Defence Imagery Intelligence Analysts as part of their training. It is not explicitly addressed during training for other intelligence disciplines, although many of the analytical skills developed in such courses are transferable.

13. **Documentation.** Single-Services are to maintain JPA training and proficiency records for their targeting staff to ensure that the certification requirements outlined above are enforced.

14. **Target Coordinate Mensuration (TCM).** TCM is a critical function in targeting and personnel conducting this activity must be appropriately certified.\(^{60}\) There are two types of mensuration program accreditation provided by the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA):

   a. **Target Material Production (TMP).** PJHQ analysts at the Cruise Missile Support Activity UK (CMSA UK) supporting the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) are certified under the NGA-accredited US Navy TMP program.

   b. **Target Mensuration Only (TMO).** The Precision Targets Cell (PTC), RSA is accredited, by NGA, as the UK lead to certify tri-Service operators under a TMO program. PTC train and certify users of the Joint Point Mensuration (JPM) system and the Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF). The Storm Shadow Centralised Training Facility (SSCTF) is aligned with PTC and certifies PJHQ’s Storm Shadow analysts.

15. The RSA CONUSE for UK Precision Point Mensuration\(^{61}\) outlines the TMO training, certification standards and proficiency programme requirements across UK Defence to support the continued deployment and application of this capability. The CONUSE is the authoritative document for TMO training and assurance policy.

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\(^{60}\) US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3505.01d TCM Certification and Program Accreditation, dated 15 Jan 19.

\(^{61}\) CONUSE UK Precision Point Mensuration, Dated 22 June 2018.
**Example Targeting Directive (TD)**

**ANNEX [**] TO CDS DIRECTIVE **/*** DATED ** *** **

**OP [******] TARGETING DIRECTIVE (EDITION **)**

**Refs:**

A. JSP 900 - UK Joint Targeting Policy
B. OP [******] MoD ROEAUTH [**/*] dated (DTG).
C. CDS Operational Directive XX/XX
E. Further OSW as required

**GENERAL**

**Introduction**

1. HMG Strategic Aims (Extract directly from the Operational CDS Directive):

   These are to be applied in accordance with references A - E.

2. **Scope/Applicability.** (O-S) This TD regulates the use of all Fires, Cyber, SPECAP and Information Activities by UK forces and those by coalition forces that originate from UK Sovereign territory\(^\text{62}\) or that plan to use UK resources such as refuelling assets.\(^\text{63}\) It applies within the internationally recognised geographic boundaries of [******].

3. **Cross-border operations.** If they come under fire from across an international border UK forces are permitted to take necessary and proportionate action in self-defence so that coalition forces can safely extract at the first possible opportunity – cross border movement is specifically excluded. Any operations that lead to the use of force in self-defence across borders require SINCREP action to the Operational HQ immediately, who will then inform MoD MSE.

\(^{62}\) (O-S) Including RN vessels.

\(^{63}\) (O-S) The air tasking order (ATO) does not expressly state that US assets carrying out offensive ops ‘plan’ to use UK assets, however, this may happen if there are no other assets available once airborne; it is neither practical or possible to predict the subsequent tasking of US assets once refuelled.
4. **Embedded Personnel and Exchange Officers.** (O-S) UK personnel deployed under the command and control of other nations and coalition organisations (embedded personnel) are still bound by, and individually responsible for complying with, UK law. Where individuals have concerns that participating in an operation would contravene the LOAC principles or otherwise be unlawful, they should seek advice through the in theatre UK staff, PJHQ, or through their single-Service staffs. Ref [*] provides definitive guidance.

5. **Coalition Command.** (O-S) For those deployed UK headquarters under command of [named coalition], due regard must be given to [named coalition] procedures; however, in all cases where the [named coalition] and the UK's interpretations of targeting direction are at variance, the most restrictive elements are to apply. Deployed UK HQs must ensure that they have the most up to date [named coalition] SOPs and direction.64

6. **Legal Issues.** (O-S) An explanation of the legal obligations with regard to the use of lethal force and LOAC, including the use of force in self-defence, are at Appendix [*] to this TD.

**Target Set (TS) / Target Audience (TA)**

7. **Area of Operation.** The area of operation that applies to the TS/TA for Op ***** is as follows:

   a. [insert detail]

8. **Authorised Target Sets (TS).** (O-S) Where permitted by ROE, the use of force and delivery of effects against the Op ***** TS is authorised. The UK authorised Op ***** TS is as follows:

   a. [insert table of approved TS for Op *****].

9. **Approved Target Audience (TA).** Where permitted by ROE, Information Activities against Op ***** TA is authorised. The UK authorised Op ***** TA is as follows:

   a. [insert table of approved TA for Op *****].

10. **No-Strike List (NSL).** Unless acting in self-defence or defence of others, requests to conduct lethal effect against any NSL entity must be submitted to the MoD. The Op ***** NSL is at Annex [*].

   a. [if required insert paragraph on Loss of Protection through Change of Use]

   b. [if required insert paragraph on Collateral Effects on NSL Entities]

64 (O-S) Key documents at the time of publication include [Insert Reference].
11. **Restricted Target List (RTL).** Unless acting in self-defence or defence of others, requests to conduct lethal effect against any RTL entity must be submitted to the originator of the restriction. The Op ****** RTL is at Annex [*].
   
   a. [if required insert paragraph on *Change of Use*]

   b. [if required insert paragraph on *Dual Use*]

   c. [if required insert paragraph on *Sensitive Target Approval and Review (STAR)*]

12. **Target Referral.** Where it is necessary to elevate targets for clearance, the Operational HQ should use coalition target packs to review the prospective target rather than initiate production of a bespoke UK version in order to allow for a timely decision. These must be scrutinized by the Operational HQ to ensure compliance with the UK’s targeting criteria, intelligence threshold and the UK interpretation of LOAC.

**Delegated Authority**

13. **Casualty Threshold.** The Op ****** Casualty Threshold (CT) is [*]. Any change to the CT will be subject to additional direction from MoD via the Operational HQ. Any target which returns a Casualty Estimate (CE) above the CT, requires STAR analysis, or in any way exceeds the delegations in this TD, is to be passed to MSE for approval with robust significance statements.

14. **Deliberate Targeting.** That is, where the immediate actions of the TS are not directly threatening Coalition FE or Persons of Designated Special Status (PDSS).
   
   a. **Pre-planned.** CJO is authorised to clear Pre-Planned targets for prosecution under ROE XXX for Op ******. *This authority may be delegated further but not below XXX, who are trained in accordance with JSP 900 and have access to UK legal, policy and targeting advice.*

   b. **Accelerated.** Accelerated Targeting includes Dynamic Targeting and Time Sensitive Targeting (TST). CJO is authorised to clear Accelerated Targets for prosecution under ROE XXX for Op ******. *This authority may be delegated further but not below XXX, who are trained in accordance with JSP 900 and have access to UK legal, policy and targeting advice.*

15. **Recording of Delegated Authority.** Copies of all letters of delegation by CJO are to be held by the Operational HQ.

16. **Combat Engagement.** This is where the immediate actions of the TS demonstrate Hostile Intent (not constituting an imminent attack) or where the TS are committing a Hostile Act (not constituting an actual attack) against specified groups. These targets may be attacked without a formal TCB or the formal Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE).
process providing the attack is under the control of a Qualified Controller. In every case, the Commander must satisfy himself that immediately before committing to the attack that the Qualified Controller has:

a. observed the target area either directly or indirectly, and
b. ensured that the target has been positively identified as being within the delegated TS at Appendix **, and
c. conducted a deliberate analysis of the wider target area beyond the immediate target surroundings, and
d. considered the expectation of collateral damage on surrounding objects and taken responsibility for ensuring that the attack complies with LOAC (Distinction, Humanity, Proportionality and Military Necessity).

**Reporting**

17. This should be developed as required for the operation and could include the following sub headings:

a. Reporting and Assessment.

b. Target Summary Sheets (TSS)

c. Post Strike Reports.

d. Post Strike Assessment.

e. Retention of Information.

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65 (O-S) This does not restrict engagement under self-defence.
66 (O-S) The commander (normally the ground commander) is responsible for applying Paragraph ** whether supported by a UK Qualified Controller or a non-UK [named coalition] Qualified Observer. Where a non-UK ground commander is supported by a UK Qualified Controller, the UK Qualified Controller must take responsibility for applying Paragraph **. Where there is a non-UK [named coalition] Qualified Observer supporting a non-UK ground commander (i.e. no UK ground commander, no UK Qualified Controller) then the UK weapons platform controller must apply Paragraph ** prior to conducting an attack to the best of his ability.
67 (O-S) Defined at Appendix 1 to this TD.
68 (O-S) LOAC principles are defined at Appendix * to this TD.
THE CONDUCT OF FULL SPECTRUM ACTIVITIES

The Conduct of Offensive Operations (Lethal)

18. HMG has permitted the use of offensive force for Op [******]. It is therefore permitted to conduct [insert type of engagement] against the target sets listed at Appendix * to this TD, subject to the principles of LOAC and any additional constraints that apply.

19. Targeting Criteria

   a. **Pillar 1.** ROE. Refer to Reference B (MoD ROEAUTH XX/XX)

   b. **Pillar 2.** CDE. The Casualty Threshold (CT) for Op ****** is X, which applies to both [insert types of engagement].

   c. **Pillars 3 - 5.** Refer to Reference A (JSP 900 Part 1, Section 9).

   d. **BDA/MoE.** Refer to Reference A (JSP 900, Part 2, Section 3).

   e. **STAR.** Refer to Reference A (JSP 900) and develop as required for the operation

Geospatial Information

20. **Target Coordinate Mensuration** Tools. The following tools and imagery sources are validated for the production of target coordinates by UK targeteers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinate Category:</th>
<th>Category Distance</th>
<th>Tool/Imagery Source:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cat 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. **Geodetic Datum.** [State the geodetic datum which is being used – default is WGS84/EDM96].

22. **Direct-fire Weapons.** This TD focuses on the use of indirect-fire weapons; however, the use of direct-fire weapons, outside of Self-Defence, must be in accordance with the following principles. Before releasing weapons the weapon operator must:

   a. Observe the target area either directly or indirectly and conduct a deliberate analysis of the wider target area beyond the immediate target surroundings, and

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69 (O-S) Datum covers height and geo-locational reference.

70 (O-S) The use of direct fire weapons relies upon the weapon operator abiding by the targeting requirements described. A weapon operator of a direct fire weapon is not automatically a Qualified Controller.
b. Ensure that the target has been positively identified (PID)\(^{71}\) as being within the delegated target sets at Appendix *, and

c. Consider the expected collateral effects on surrounding objects and persons and take responsibility for ensuring that the attack complies with the LOAC (Distinction, Humanity, Proportionality and Military Necessity),\(^{72}\) which requires constant care to avoid and, in any event, to minimise civilian casualties and damage to civilian property.

23. **Definition.** For the purposes of this TD, direct-fire weapons are defined as:

a. **Surface-to-Surface.** [Examples may include Small arms and machine guns up to **mm calibre, grenades, anti-tank missiles, **mm mortars, main battle tank armament up to ***mm and artillery used in the ‘sniping gun’ direct-fire mode\(^{73}\).]

b. **Air-to-Surface.** [Examples may include ***inch rockets, machine guns and cannon up to **mm calibre].

**Actions in Self-Defence**

24. JSP 398 provides guidance to UK forces on the use of force in Self-Defence. The following paragraphs amplify the use of lethal force in Self-Defence situations.

25. The use of lethal force in Self-Defence is limited to circumstances where there is an honest belief that force is necessary to avert an imminent threat to life. In every case, the force used must be assessed as proportionate to the risk encountered and the minimum necessary to avert that risk. **Furthermore, all UK personnel must be clear that once the imminent threat to life has been averted the right to employ lethal force under Self-Defence ceases.**

26. Where a ground commander assesses that there is an imminent threat to life, and there is no other way to prevent that threat, he may nominate targets for indirect-fire attack under the control of a Qualified Controller.\(^{74}\)

27. Where there is no Qualified Controller the weapon platform commander is to assume responsibility for making a positive assessment of the target area and ensuring that the attack is justified. Where it is not feasible for the weapon platform commander to make a positive assessment of the target area,\(^{75}\) this responsibility lies with the commander on the ground.

\(^{71}\) (O-S) Defined at Appendix 1 to this TD.

\(^{72}\) (O-S) LOAC principles are defined at Appendix * to this TD.


\(^{74}\) (O-S) Defined at Appendix * to this TD.

\(^{75}\) (O-S) [Insert Examples].
The Conduct of Information Activities (IA)

28. This section will be issued on request.

The Conduct of Cyber Operations

29. This section will be issued on request.

The Conduct of SPECAP Operations

30. This section will be issued on request.

Released by:

DTG: ** *** **

Name
Rank
for CDS

Appendices:

* (O-S) Definitions. [Not Enclosed - this Appendix comprises an abbreviated extract from Annex D of this JSP].

* (O-S) Legal Obligations. [Not Enclosed - this Appendix covers LOAC and any additional treaties/conventions that the UK have signed up to].

* (O-S (S When complete)) No-Strike List (NSL) and Restricted Target List (RTL).

* (O-S (S When complete)) Weapons Restrictions.
Example UK Operational Target Summary Sheet

The following target has been submitted to ……………. for target clearance to prosecute:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Insert Operation Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK Tgt Set</td>
<td>From Targeting Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility / Tgt Name</td>
<td>Verbatim from MIDB (if applicable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE No O-Suffix</td>
<td>Verbatim from MIDB (if applicable)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aim points</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Unique Aim Point Name</th>
<th>Unique Aim Point Name</th>
<th>Unique Aim Point Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Unique Aim Point Reference</td>
<td>Unique Aim Point Reference</td>
<td>Unique Aim Point Reference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinates</td>
<td>See Note</td>
<td>See Note</td>
<td>See Note</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDE Level</td>
<td>CDE for unique Aim Point</td>
<td>CDE for unique Aim Point</td>
<td>CDE for unique Aim Point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned TOT (Z)</td>
<td>Day / Night or specific TOT if required</td>
<td>Day / Night or specific TOT if required</td>
<td>Day / Night or specific TOT if required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Type</td>
<td>Must be completed (include weapon details (mark/version etc))</td>
<td>Must be completed (include weapon details (mark/version etc))</td>
<td>Must be completed (include weapon details (mark/version etc))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Weapons</td>
<td>Must be completed</td>
<td>Must be completed</td>
<td>Must be completed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Tgt CDE:</td>
<td>Must be completed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tgt Board Date</td>
<td>Must be completed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Co-ordinates should be mensurated co-ordinates of aim point - if not available at the time of the Targets Board, in addition to co-ordinate details add ‘Not Mensurated Co-ordinates’

This table can be adjusted for different capabilities and should mirror the relevant target pack.

---

76 Insert Name of Chairman of TCB (Delegated Engagement Authority).
1. **Intelligence**  What intelligence supports or justifies the case for attacking the target? Give a detailed target description and attach any imagery/material to assist in accurate target identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (As required)</th>
<th>J/A/N/G2 Intelligence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Relevant Campaign Objectives.** What campaign objective does this support?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (As required)</th>
<th>J/A/N/G3 Targeteer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **UK Legitimate Military Objective.** What makes this a legitimate military target?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>J/A/N/G3 Targeteer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **UK Military Advantage.** What is the military advantage to be gained by attacking this target and how will it contribute to the campaign objective?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>J/A/N/G3 Targeteer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

77 Supported by J/A/N/G5  
78 Supported by LEGAD/POLAD as required.  
79 Supported by J/A/N/G3 Ops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (As required)</th>
<th>J/A/N/G3 Targeteer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. **UK Expectation of Collateral Damage and Civilian Casualties** What are the collateral damage and Civilian - Casualty estimates? What have you done to mitigate Collateral Damage? Attach any supporting evidence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (As required)</th>
<th>J/A/N/G3 Targeteer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **Military Necessity** Military action must be only that which is necessary to achieve the desired effect. Outline alternatives considered, actions already taken against the target and why a pre-planned attack on this target is the best option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (As required)</th>
<th>J/A/N/G9 LEGAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. **Synchronisation, Coordination and Deconfliction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency/Activity</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCHQ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Ops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. **UK Policy Considerations**  Are there any National Policy considerations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (As required)</th>
<th>J/A/N/G9 POLAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. **UK Legal Considerations**  Are there any Legal considerations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (As required)</th>
<th>J/A/N/LEGAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. **UK Military Judgement**  What is your military judgment? Does the potential gain outweigh the potential pain?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (As required)</th>
<th>Chair80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

80 Drafted by Targeteer, signed off by TCB Chair with Delegated Engagement Authority.  

B – 4  
JSP 900 Part 1 Edition 4 (Jul 19)  
OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
12. **Final Emphasis / Specific Instructions**  Any restriction placed on the attack, \(^{81}\) or circumstances and conditions that must exist before an attack can be made etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (As required)</th>
<th>Chair (^{82})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. **Recommendation:** Recommendation for attack regardless of delegated TEA. If outside the TEA, state here requirement to attack and asking for clearance from higher TEA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Recommendation (As required)</th>
<th>Chair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Recommendation (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Recommendation (As required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt;Component Cdr Signature Block&gt;</th>
<th>&lt;PJHQ Signature Block&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(As required)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt;MSE Signature Block&gt;</th>
<th>&lt;Board Secretary (^{83}) Signature Block&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(As required)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt;Ministerial Signature Block&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\(^{81}\) Such as the consideration/identification of safe disposal areas for loitering or man-guided munitions.

\(^{82}\) Input from the Targeteer, completes and signed off by the Chair of the Clearance Board.

\(^{83}\) Must be a qualified Targeteer in accordance with JSP 900, Ed 4, Part 1, Section 10, para 3.a.2.
TCB Letter of Authorisation Template

File Reference

Date

To

Copy to:

As required

**EXAMPLE**: TARGET CLEARANCE BOARD XXX

1. The MoD conducted Op **EXAMPLE** Target Clearance Board XXX at 0000Z hrs on XX XXX XX, to seek approval from the TEA to strike pre-planned deliberate targets. The TEA approved the target recommendations listed at Annex A.

2. PJHQ is therefore to conduct all necessary targeting activity to enable prosecution of the targets listed.

3. These target approvals remain valid until 0000Z hrs on XX XXX XX as long as there is no change to the conditions upon which the approvals were granted.

4. MSE staff stand ready to provide further guidance, if required.

A NAME

Rank/Role

Annex:

A. MoD Target Clearance Board XXX: Results.
MOD TARGET CLEARANCE BOARD XXX: RESULTS

1. The following Op *EXAMPLE* targets were cleared by the TEA, as specified below, on **XX XXX XX**: 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser:</th>
<th>Facility / Tgt Name:</th>
<th>BE No / O- Suffix:</th>
<th>Aim Points:</th>
<th>Weapon Type:</th>
<th>No. of Weapons:</th>
<th>TOT (Z):</th>
<th>Additional Caveats / Notes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The following DPIs for the target were not approved by the TEA on **XX XXX XX**: 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser:</th>
<th>Facility / Tgt Name:</th>
<th>BE No / O- Suffix:</th>
<th>Aim Points:</th>
<th>Weapon Type:</th>
<th>No. of Weapons:</th>
<th>TOT (Z):</th>
<th>Additional Caveats / Notes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Targeting Definitions

This section will show the definition of terminology used in JSP 900. Wherever possible, NATO terminology\(^84\) should be adopted to improve Targeting interoperability. Where NATO or US definitions differ from those in this document, these are given below for context.

- Definition used in this document (UK unless otherwise stated).
  - NATO definition if different to the one used in this document.
  - US definition if different to the one used in this document.

**Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)**
- The estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or non-lethal military force (US JP 3-0).

**Candidate Target List (CTL)**
- A list of entities submitted by component commanders, approved agencies, or the joint force commander’s staff for further development and inclusion on the Joint Target List, Restricted Target List, or the No Strike List (US JP 3-60).

**Casualty Estimate (CE)**
- The estimated total number of non-combatant and civilian casualties that result from military operations on a given target (US CJCSI 3160.01C).

**Casualty Factor**
- A number (either 1.0 or .25) that represents the fraction of personnel inside a collateral structure or outside in an outdoor area likely to become casualties (US CJCSI 3160.01C).

**Civilian**
- A person who is not a member of the military and who is not taking a direct part in hostilities against a party in an armed conflict (US CJCSI 3160.01C).

\(^84\) [http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/libraries/corporate/Navy/FPGO/NATO_Pubs/AAP6/NATOTerm.pdf](http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/libraries/corporate/Navy/FPGO/NATO_Pubs/AAP6/NATOTerm.pdf)
Collateral Concern
- A collateral object located within the final collateral hazard area after exhausting all mitigation techniques.

Collateral Damage
- The damage to civilians and civilian property in spatial or networked proximity to, but not forming part of, an authorised target and to civilian personnel and/or materiel within the boundary of dual-use targets.
  - Inadvertent casualties and destruction in civilian areas caused by military operations (NATOTerm).
  - Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects what would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. A form of collateral effect (US JP 3-60).

Collateral Damage Estimation
- A methodology that provides a probability, but not certainty, of collateral damage for a specific weapon system (NATOTerm).
  - The holistic process of determining the potential for collateral damage resulting from target engagement (US CJCSI 3160.01C).

Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology
- A body of joint standards, methods, techniques, and processes to conduct collateral damage analysis and produce collateral damage estimates (US CJCSI 3160.01C).

Collateral Effect
- Unintentional or incidental effect to objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time (US JP 3-60).

Collateral Object
- Civilian and non-combatant buildings, structures, vehicles, material, or virtual entities that do not support the activities and/or functions of the enemy’s military or fighting capability (US CJCSI 3160.01C).

Cognitive Dimension
- The dimension where perceptions are formed, and human and automated decisions are made.

Combat Engagement
- A Combat Engagement is the offensive use of force, outside of self-defence, to accomplish missions and tasks during operations when it is not feasible to deliver either pre-planned or accelerated targeting procedures.
Contingency Plan (CONPLAN)
- A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment operations, as a basis for subsequent planning (AAP-6).

Cyber Operations
- The planning and synchronisation of activities in and through cyberspace to enable freedom of manoeuvre and to achieve military objectives (JDN 1/18).

Cyberspace
- An operating environment consisting of the interdependent network of digital technology infrastructures (including platforms, the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, as well as embedded processors and controllers), and the data therein spanning the physical, virtual and cognitive Domain (JDN 1/18).
  - A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (US JP 3-12).

Defence StratCom
- Advancing national interests by using Defence as a means of communication to influence the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours or audiences (Def StratCom JDN X/19).

Dimension
- In operations, the place where effects are realised. The three dimensions are the physical, the virtual and the cognitive.

Direct Fire Weapon
- Fire Directed to a target which is visible to the aimer (NATOTerm).

Domain
- A discrete sphere of military activity within which tactical actions are orchestrated to achieve objectives in support of the missions. The five domains are maritime, land, air, space, and cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum.

Dynamic Targeting
- Targeting that prosecutes targets identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting (US JP 3-60).
Dual-Use
• Targets characterised as having both a military and civilian purpose/function (US CJCSI 3160.01 Series)

Effect
• The resulting intended/unintended consequence(s) of an action.

Effect Dimensions.
• The three dimensions (physical, virtual, cognitive) provide a framework for understanding the purpose and consequence of military activities.

Effect Estimation
• The process of the identification of outcomes or consequences through analysis prior to activities being conducted.

Effects Focussed Intelligence
• The intelligence activity required to directly support the delivery of FSpecT.

Entity
• Within the context of targeting, a term used to describe facilities, individuals, virtual (non-tangible) things, equipment, or organisations (US JP 3-60).

Environment
• The setting for military activities; the environment exists prior to, during and after military activity. It will be specific to operations and headquarters, but environments can be grouped as climatic, topological, informational and societal.

Full Spectrum Targeting
• A holistic approach to targeting, reviewing all targets together and apportioning action (lethal and non-lethal) in accordance with the campaign information strategy and desired behavioural objectives (JDP 0-01.1).

Fusion Doctrine
• To deploy security, economic and influence capabilities to protect, promote and project our national security, economic and influence goals (NSCR 2018).

High payoff target (HPT)
• A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (US JP 3-60).
High value target (HVT)
- A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (US JP 3-60).

Influence
- The capacity to have an effect on the character or behaviour of someone or something, or the effect itself.

Information Activities
- Actions designed to affect information or information systems. Information activities can be performed by any actor and include protection measures (NATOTerm).

Information Environment
- An environment comprised of the information itself; the individuals, organisations and systems that receive, process and convey the information; and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs (AJP 3-10).

Information Operations
- A staff function to analyse, plan, assess and integrate activities to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and North Atlantic Council approved audiences in support of Alliance mission objectives (NATOTerm).

Intelligence
- The directed and coordinated acquisition and analysis of information to assess capabilities, intent and opportunities for exploitation by leaders at all levels (JDP 2-00, 3rd Edition).
  - The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers (NATOTerm).

Joint Action
- The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to affect an actor’s will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them to achieve influence (JDP 3-00).

Joint Desired Point of Impact (JDPI)
- A unique, alpha-numeric coded precise aim point associated with a target to achieve an explicit weaponization objective, and identified by three dimensional (latitude, longitude, elevation) mensurated coordinate.
Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL)
- A prioritized list of targets approved and maintained by the Joint Force Commander. (AJP 3-9, not NATO approved).

Joint Target List
- A consolidated list of selected but unapproved targets considered to have military significance in the joint operations area. (NATOTerm).
  - A consolidated list of selected targets, upon which there are no restrictions placed, considered to have military significance in the joint force commander’s operational area. (US JP 3-60).

Lethal weapon
- A weapon that can be used to cause death or serious bodily injury (NATOTerm).

Law of Armed Conflict
- The body of international law that regulates behaviour during armed conflict (jus in bello).

Measurement of Effectiveness
- The assessment of the realization of intended effects (NATOTerm).

Measurement of Performance
- A criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (NATOTerm).

Mensuration
- The process of measurement of a feature or location on the earth to determine an absolute latitude, longitude, and elevation (US JP 3-60).

Military Objective
- Objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage (Article 52(2), AP1 to the Geneva Convention).

Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB)
Munition Effectiveness Assessment (MEA).
• The assessment of the military force applied in terms of the weapon system and munitions effectiveness to determine and recommend any required changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon system, munitions, fusing, and/or weapon delivery parameters to increase force effectiveness (US JP 2-01).

National Approval Authority (NAA)\textsuperscript{85}
• National Approval Authority is the authority vested in Commanders in a combined HQ with delegated target or weapons system approval authority. The NAA’s role is to ensure that the UK’s assets are only used in accordance with the extant operational ROE and in turn, the criminal law of England and Wales and the UK’s interpretation of international law including the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

Non-lethal weapon
• A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate or repel persons or to disable equipment, while minimising fatalities, permanent injury and damage to property and the environment e.g. directed energy weapons (NATOTerm).

No Strike List (NSL)
• A subset of the integrated database (IDB) comprising of entities which must not be engaged due to protection by international law or for policy reasons as determined by the North Atlantic Council. (NATOTerm).
  o A list of objects or entities characterised as protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement (US JP 3-60).

Operational Domain
• Discrete spheres of military activity within which operations and undertaken to achieve objectives in support of the mission (Maritime, Land, Air, Space, and Cyber & EM. They provide a structural framework for military operations and wider defence activity. They may be integrated, but there is no hierarchy.

Pattern of Life
• Observed numbers, behaviour, and routine of personnel, vehicles and events at, and in the vicinity of a target area. A count of observed people, grouped as men/women/children, described as a “slant” count, may be used in the determination (US CJCSI 3160.01 Series).

Physical Dimension
• Where physical activity occurs.

\textsuperscript{85} Historically the term Red Card Holder has been used. This is now not to be used and NAA is the correct terminology.
Positive Identification (PID)
- An identification derived from observation and analysis of target characteristics including visual recognition, electronic support systems, non-cooperative target recognition techniques, identification friend or foe systems, or other physics-based identification techniques (US JP 3-01).

Restricted target
- A valid target that has specific restrictions placed upon actions authorized against it due to operational considerations (AJP 3-9, not NATO approved).

Restricted Target List
- A list of restricted targets nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the joint force commander or directed by higher authorities (NATOTerm).

Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces undertaking any military action will operate. The issued instructions may be referred to either as an ROEAUTH or an ROE Authorisation (JSP 398 Part 1).

Serious Injury
- Incapacitation that will require personnel with wounds to receive treatment at a medical facility. This criterion is only used for risk and collateral damage estimates; it has no post-wounding time or tactical role associated with it.

SPECAP
- A variety of operational or near operational capabilities requiring enhanced protective security measures that include cyber, multi-source electronic and novel effects capable of delivering both physical and psychological effect on a target.

Strategic Communication
- Advancing national interests by using Defence as a means of communication to influence the attitudes, behaviours, and beliefs of audiences, as part of a cross-government information strategy.

System
- A functionally, physically, and/or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole (US JP 3-0).
Target
- Any approved area, structure, object, person, organisation, mindset, thought process, audience, attitude or behaviour which can be influenced.
  - An area, structure, object, person or group of people against which lethal or non-lethal capability can be employed to create specific psychological or physical effects. The term 'person' also covers their mindset, thought processes, attitudes and behaviours (NATOTerm).
  - An entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other action (US JP 3-60).

Targeteer
- An individual who has completed requisite training and guides the joint targeting cycle in the current duties (US JP 3-60).

Targeting
- The command process that identifies, selects and prioritises targets, in order to direct action to achieve required outcomes.
  - The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities (NATOTerm).

Target Audience Analysis (TAA)
- The identification of targeting opportunities in the cognitive dimension to inform activities intended to change individuals’ or groups’ attitudes or behaviours. TAA is a process used across the intelligence community and by external organisations to understand populations or groups of people. TAA is an all-source process that utilises psychological, anthropological, and socio-cultural methods to analyse state and non-state entities.
  - The systematic study of people to enhance understanding of them and to identify accessibility, vulnerability, and susceptibility to behavioural and attitudinal information activity (NATOTerm).

Target Development
- The systematic examination of potential target systems – and their components, individual targets, and even elements of targets – to determine the necessary type and duration of the action that must be exerted on each target to create an effect that is consistent with the commander’s specific objectives (US JP 3-60).

Target Engagement Authority (TEA)
- The level of command required to authorise an engagement at each collateral damage estimation level (NATOTerm).
Target Folder
- A folder, hardcopy or electronic, containing the target intelligence and related materials prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target (US JP 3-60).

Target Nomination List (TNL)
- A prioritised list of targets drawn from the joint target list, or restricted target list, and nominated by component commanders, appropriate agencies, or the joint force commander’s staff for the inclusion on the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List (US JP 3-60).

Target System
- An adversary system that is typically a broad set of interrelated, functionally associated components and linkages that have a shared task or mission. In most cases, target systems exist and operate in a complex ‘systems-of-systems’ context, with numerous shared relationships and dependencies that may not be readily apparent or confirm to preconceived notions (FVEY agreed definition).

Target System Analysis (TSA)
- The holistic and dynamic intelligence assessment of all aspects of potential target sets (physical and psychological) to identify vulnerabilities which, if targeted by the appropriate capability (lethal or non-lethal), would achieve desired objectives (NATOTerm).
  - An all-source examination of potential target systems to determine relevance to stated objectives, military importance, and priority of attack (US JP 3-60).

Time Sensitive Target
- An all-source examination of the potential target systems to determine their relevance to stated objectives, military importance, and priority of attack. It is an open-ended process designed to identify and characterise the adversary’s target system and target system components, resulting in products which support policy-makers and operational planners through recommended targeting strategy in order to achieve desired objectives (FVEY agreed definition).
  - A joint commander validated target or set of targets requiring immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target or opportunity or it poses (or will pose) a danger to friendly forces (US JP 3-60).

Understanding
- The perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making (JDP 04).
Validation
- A process associated with the collection and production of intelligence that confirms that an intelligence collection or production requirement is sufficiently important to justify the dedication of intelligence resources, does not duplicate an existing requirement, and has not been previously staffed (US JP 2-01).

Vetting
- A part of target development that assesses the accuracy of the supporting intelligence for targeting (US JP 3-60).

Virtual Dimension
- Where intangible activity occurs, and technical tools facilitate communication.

Weapon
- A thing designed or used for inflicting bodily harm or physical damage (2) a means of gaining an advantage or defending oneself (COED).

Weaponeer
- An individual who has completed requisite training to determine the means required to create a desired effect on a given target (US JP 3-60).

Weaponeering
- The process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target (US JP 3-60).
# Targeting Lexicon

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Attorney General</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Air Tasking Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWC</td>
<td>Air Warfare Centre</td>
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<td>AWS</td>
<td>Air Warfare School</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>Battle Damage Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATCODE</td>
<td>Category Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological and Radiological</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Collateral Damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>Collateral Damage Estimation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDEM</td>
<td>Collateral Damage Estimation Modelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDI</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Casualty Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Collateral Effects Radius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Collateral Hazard Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (US)</td>
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<td>CJO</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Cluster Munition</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMSA</td>
<td>Cruise Missile Support Activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTL</td>
<td>Candidate Target List</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cts</td>
<td>Commitments</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCDS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMO</td>
<td>Defence Crisis Management Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPH</td>
<td>Direct Participant in hostilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dstl</td>
<td>Defence Science and Technology Laboratories</td>
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<tr>
<td>DT</td>
<td>Dynamic Target</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFI</td>
<td>Effects Focussed Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSpecT</td>
<td>Full Spectrum Targeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSTMT</td>
<td>Full Spectrum Targeting Mission Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Information Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Individual Augmentee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEUEE</td>
<td>Information Environment Unintended Effects Estimation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IST</td>
<td>Intelligence Support to Targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Command(er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACTSU</td>
<td>Joint Forward Air Controller Training Standardisation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCyG</td>
<td>Joint Force Cyber Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIAG</td>
<td>Joint Information Activities Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIPTL</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List</td>
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<tr>
<td>JITL</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Target List</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTL</td>
<td>Joint Target List</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTT</td>
<td>Joint Target Toolbox</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOTC</td>
<td>Joint Operational Targeting Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPM</td>
<td>Joint Point Mensuration</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPTL</td>
<td>Joint Prioritized Target List</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Service Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTEC</td>
<td>Joint Targeting Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTFC</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTTC</td>
<td>Joint Tactical Targeting Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGAD</td>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOAC</td>
<td>Law of Armed Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Manoeuvre Arm Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEA</td>
<td>Munitions Effectiveness Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIDB</td>
<td>Modernised Integrated Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODLA</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence Legal Advisers</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>Measure of Activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Measure of Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoP</td>
<td>Measure of Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
<td>Military Strategic Effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>Military Strategy and Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTL</td>
<td>Master Target List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAA</td>
<td>National Approval Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMR</td>
<td>National Military Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOCP</td>
<td>National Offensive Cyber Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSSIG</td>
<td>National Security Strategy and Implementation Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSE</td>
<td>No Strike Entity</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSL</td>
<td>No Strike List</td>
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<tr>
<td>O-Suffix</td>
<td>Originator Suffix</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAG</td>
<td>Partners Across Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGK</td>
<td>Precision Guidance Kit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGM</td>
<td>Precision Guided Munition</td>
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<tr>
<td>PID</td>
<td>Positive Identification</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
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<td>POL</td>
<td>Pattern of Life</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Policy Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSS-SOF</td>
<td>Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RED</td>
<td>Risk Estimate Distance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROEAUTH</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROEREQ</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement Request</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Royal School of Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTL</td>
<td>Restricted Target List</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Special Access Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAEF</td>
<td>Strategic Communication Actions and Effects Framework</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SofS</td>
<td>Secretary of State for Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPECAP</td>
<td>Special Capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Senior Responsible Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSCTF</td>
<td>Storm Shadow Centralised Training Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAR</td>
<td>Sensitive Target Approval and Review</td>
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<td>StratCom</td>
<td>Strategic Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>TAA</td>
<td>Target Audience Analysis</td>
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<td>TCB</td>
<td>Target Clearance Board</td>
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<td>TCM</td>
<td>Target Coordinate Mensuration</td>
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<td>TD</td>
<td>Targeting Directive</td>
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<td>Training Delivery Authority</td>
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<td>TEA</td>
<td>Target Engagement Authority</td>
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<td>TIRD</td>
<td>Theatre Information Requirements Document</td>
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<td>TLAM</td>
<td>Tomahawk Land Attack Missile</td>
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<td>TRA</td>
<td>Training Requirement Authority</td>
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<td>TSA</td>
<td>Target Systems Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSS</td>
<td>Target Summary Sheet</td>
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<td>TST</td>
<td>Time Sensitive Target</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVB</td>
<td>Target Validation Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV/S</td>
<td>Unmanned Air Vehicle/System</td>
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<tr>
<td>XWH</td>
<td>Cross Whitehall</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Foreword

Part 2 of this JSP provides guidance in accordance with the policy set out in Part 1 of this JSP; the guidance is sponsored by the Defence Authority for Operations. It provides policy-compliant practices which should be considered best practice in the absence of any contradicting instruction.
Preface

How to use this JSP

1. JSP 900 Edition 4 is to be used by staff responsible for all aspects of targeting and is to be applied by all UK personnel and commands undertaking Full Spectrum Targeting (FSpecT). This JSP contains the policy and direction on targeting and guidance on the processes involved and best practice to apply. The JSP must be used in concert with Targeting Doctrine, principally Annex A to JDP 3-00 Campaign Execution and, for coalition operations, AJP-3.9¹ Joint Targeting.

2. The JSP is structured in two parts:
   a. Part 1 – Directive, which provides Commanders with the direction that must be followed in accordance with statute or policy mandated by Defence, or on Defence by Central Government.
   b. Part 2 – Guidance, which provides practitioners with the guidance and best practice that will assist their compliance with the Directive(s) detailed in Part 1.

Coherence with other Defence Authority Policy and Guidance

3. Where applicable, this document contains links to other relevant JSPs, some of which may be published by different Defence Authorities. Where particular dependencies exist, these other Defence Authorities have been consulted in the formulation of the policy and guidance detailed in this publication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Related JSPs</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>JSP 383</td>
<td>Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP 398</td>
<td>United Kingdom Manual of National Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP 918</td>
<td>Joint Terminal Attack Controller Policy</td>
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</table>

Further Advice and Feedback – Contacts

4. The owner of this JSP is the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations & Commitments) (ACDS(Ops & Cts)) and control is exercised on his behalf through the Joint Targeting Executive Committee (JTEC). For further information or to provide feedback on the content, contact the JTEC Secretary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title/E-mail</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Phone</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:SPOMSE-Targeting@mod.gov.uk">SPOMSE-Targeting@mod.gov.uk</a></td>
<td>JTEC Secretary</td>
<td>9621 87104 (UK Mil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+44 20 721 87104 (Civilian)</td>
</tr>
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¹ AJP-3.9 is NATO targeting doctrine. This does not fully describe UK targeting operations but should be used as the basis for non-US-led coalition operations.
3. This work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights belong exclusively to the UK MoD. No information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form outside MoD establishments, except as authorised by Military Strategic Effects (MSE). This document is issued for official use only and the information contained must be treated as UK OFFICIAL SENSITIVE. The JSP has classified annexes, copies of which can be requested from the JTEC Secretary. Much of JSP 900 is aligned to US targeting methodology which is considered to be sensitive and is to be protected outside of FVEY nations.
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Section 1 – Capability Overview

1. This JSP describes how integration is achieved and how responsibilities are assigned across Defence. This section gives a general overview of the military owned levers that can bring to bear actions to achieve the desired outcomes. The detailed explanation of how each capability achieves its outcomes with respect to targeting are covered in their respective annexes.

2. **Intelligence Support to Targeting and Effects.** Intelligence is a critical enabler of the targeting process and is required throughout the whole targeting cycle to ensure that decisions are made considering the most up-to-date intelligence and context. Timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence supports the ability to achieve a desired end state through targeting. The more specific the desired end state, the greater the need for detailed intelligence. The collection, production, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence requires prioritisation to support targeting, as capabilities are rarely sufficient to satisfy every demand for intelligence. Target intelligence includes Target Systems Analysis (TSA) and Target Audience Analysis (TAA).

3. **Information Activities.** Information Activities seek to achieve influence over approved audiences (aka a target), to adopt or reinforce particular attitudes or behaviours. An actor’s decision-making process is a function of those things that Joint Action seeks to affect – the will to act, the understanding of the situation, and the capability to act. The aim of information activities is to achieve effects against the will and understanding of an array of audiences to change or maintain behaviour and Information Activities must be fully incorporated into the Full Spectrum Targeting process.

4. **Offensive Cyber.**

   a. The offensive use of cyber in support of military operations can deliver action in its own right or be an enabling activity within the targeting cycle. The delivery of cyber action in a networked environment requires the support of a number of cross-Government agencies. MSE has responsibility for ensuring that offensive cyber effects requirements are integrated into all strategic contingency and crisis planning.

   (1) PJHQ is responsible for incorporating offensive cyber into operational plans when tasked.

   (2) Joint Force Cyber Group (JFCyG) will conduct the functional planning and delivery of capability within the cyber domain in support of military objectives.

   b. Cyber targets in support of MoD are cleared for attack by a Target Clearance Board whose membership reflects the level of delegated authority. The novel and, potentially, contentious nature of the offensive use of cyber is such that a continual

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dialogue will need to be maintained between MoD (MSE), the operational level (PJHQ), JFCyG, relevant agencies and allied partners in a coalition context.

5. **Munition Based Targeting.** Physical Munition targeting is the application of military force by air, land, or sea platforms through the delivery of physical weapons whose primary effect is physical rather than psychological and includes the use of direct and indirect fire weapons systems.

6. **Special Capabilities (SPECAP).**

   a. The term SPECAP refers to Special Capabilities, which are a range of compartmentalised capabilities protected as Special Access Programmes (SAPs) and requiring specific codeword indoctrination for access. SPECAP consists of a range of capabilities, actions, and programmes, including (but not limited to) novel effects, electronic and communications capabilities and some elements of cyber. The SPECAP portfolio comprises of UK-only, bi-lateral and Coalition capabilities, the latter through the US Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations (IJSTO) programme. All SPECAP capabilities are LIMDIS and may only be accessed by indoctrinated personnel.

   b. The nature of contemporary operations is such that SPECAP may have utility and should be considered in all planning activity. SPECAP planners, who will be aware of potentially relevant SAP and non-SAP capabilities, will be embedded within formation HQs to advise on SPECAP applicability across the planning, intelligence, operations (regular and discreet), legal and command functions. As the timelines for employing SPECAP can be protracted SPECAP planners should be involved in planning as early as possible to allow them to identify opportunities for SPECAP use and to liaise with MSE to ensure effective and timely integration of SPECAP into plans where appropriate.
Section 2 – Target List Management

1. **Introduction.** The UK employs a Target List Management (TLM) process based on US methodology\(^2\) and similar but not identical to Coalition Partners. The UK is unlikely to conduct unilateral targeting operations and will therefore seek to align closely with the TLM processes of the Coalition it is supporting. Notwithstanding, during the development of targeting contingencies, the TLM process might require bespoke processes to be implemented, depending on the nature of the target set and the Coalition members.

2. **Procedures.** Support to targeting at the strategic level is provided from Defence and through PAGs; this section will describe the strategic process albeit in a way that enables adaptation for use at the operational and tactical levels. Often, operational timelines, expanded or compressed planning, and unique considerations drive commanders to adjust processes. Amended processes are acceptable as long as targets are added to Joint Target Lists (JTL) and Restricted Target Lists (RTL) by authorised target validation authorities and are prioritised and placed on a Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL) by an approved TEA. No Strike List (NSL) management must not be affected.

3. Figure 2.1 illustrates the TLM process described in this section.

\(^2\) US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI) 3370.01B Target Development Standards, dated 6 May 16.
4. TLM begins when an entity is nominated following an FSpecT estimate and/or the delivery of a TAA and TSA.

a. **Target Systems Analysis.** TSA is the foundational process of system-level target development that identifies the relative importance of individual target system components, elements and nodes across the physical, virtual, and cognitive dimensions. It is an all-source process that analyses state and non-state systems to identify the best targeting strategy to move a system from its current to desired future state; it also enables additional, more detailed stages of target development. TSA aids target selection, focusses targeting assessment including post engagement assessment, helps prioritise target materials production and identifies intelligence gaps. TSA also identifies the key vulnerabilities and critical elements that, if attacked, would achieve desired end states. TSA differs from other system analysis techniques through its focus on specific targeting/effects end-states/outputs.

b. **Target Audience Analysis.** TAA identifies targeting opportunities in the cognitive dimension to inform activities in the physical and virtual dimensions intended to change individuals’ or groups’ behaviours. A significant customer for TAA products is MSE StratCom who own the SCAEFs that identify the desired behavioural changes required. The TAA is normally conducted as part of a wider TSA but can also be a standalone analytical product. For example, where intelligence support is requested to identify and characterise the system elements associated with tribal dynamics. TAA may also help estimate the potential secondary effects in the cognitive dimension that arise from activities delivered across the five domains. An example of this might be the psychological effect against a local population subjected to kinetic strike. In common with TSA, the requirement for TAA must be identified at the earliest possible point to ensure a sufficient timeframe for the TAA team to identify potential target audiences.

5. Target lists document part or all of the vetted target intelligence and operational targeting data for selected and validated entity-level targets. Target lists are the primary means by which joint forces coordinate and achieve the commander’s desired effects against targets associated with a directed planning effort.

6. TLM consists of four steps:

   a. **Step 1.** Target Development Nomination (TDN) and NSL Creation.\(^3\)

   b. **Step 2.** Target Development to produce a Candidate Target List (CTL).

   c. **Step 3.** Target validation and Joint Target List production.

   d. **Step 4.** Advanced Target Development, boarding and the JIPTL creation.

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\(^3\) NSL creation is the responsibility for MSE.
7. Steps 1-3 are deliberately agnostic of activity; it is the process of Advanced Target Development (ATD) that produces an action solution that can be considered by the TCB. It is possible that JTL/RTL target could be progressed through ATD by more than one agency to provide different/complementary courses of action (e.g. a network server could be destroyed physically or through cyber means).

8. **Step 1 – Target Development Nomination and No Strike List creation.**

   a. **Target Development Nomination.** The FSpecT estimate and the associated TSA and TAA identify entities for development. TDNs may represent several different target types requiring basic and intermediate target development, as well as source documentation, to qualify for target listing.

   b. TDNs can be submitted for development by any component, Joint Command, Service, or agency. Applicable graphics should be attached to the nomination, including images, photos, screen shots, link diagrams etc, that illustrate any aspect of the entity’s information.

   c. **No Strike Lists.** MSE is responsible for the development of the NSL. The NSL consists of a list of entities whose function is characterised as protected from the effects of military operations under the LOAC, international law, and/or domestic law.

   d. Objects on the NSL are not to be deliberately targeted and should be protected from action using all means practicable; special consideration should be given when assessing the proportionality of targeting objectives where collateral damage to an NSL entity is a possibility. Effects may be permitted to cross an NSL facility boundary, so long as they do not affect the NSL object itself. Guidance will be provided in the TD.

   e. NSLs are formed from a baseline list of target categories including cultural, religious and civil infrastructure, diplomatic facilities, and facilities linked to civilian life support. Additional target categories may be added depending on the nature of, and political sensitivities associated with, each operation. The NSL may also include people, areas or organisations.

   f. During the TLM process it may be discovered that an entity ought to be on the NSL. Should this be the case then the entity is to be suspended from the TLM process until it can be confirmed that it does or does not belong on the NSL.

   g. An entity can only be removed from the NSL on the authority of the SofS or by TEAs nominated in a TD. Requests for NSL removal should be staffed to MSE. Removal may be temporary or permanent, accompanied with caveats, and individual or grouped in nature.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) In Jun 16 SofS approved a request for 90 days removal of some NSL types during the operation to retake Ramadi.
h. If No-Strike entities are used by the adversary for the furtherance of their objectives, they may lose their protected status and may be subject to engagement. However, the procedure outlined at para 8.g. must be followed to remove the entity from the NSL prior to targeting.

9. **Step 2 – Target Development to Candidate Target List.**

a. Target Development to CTL remains effects-focused but activity agnostic, and entities are developed based on the available intelligence. Once basic and intermediate Target Development has been completed, the Effects Focussed Intelligence (EFI) programme objectives have been achieved. Basic and intermediate Target Development products are produced by the Target Development team within the Defence Intelligence Full Spectrum Targeting Mission Team (DI FSTMT) or partner nations in a coalition context. Once Intermediate Target Development (ITD) complete the products are passed to MSE for vetting and validation.

b. **TDN Spreadsheet and Target Folders.** PJHQ JE Targets enter TDNs onto the consolidated TDN list spreadsheet, which includes all target nominations. At the strategic level, the TDN spreadsheet will be held within the relevant LIS\(^5\) Task Based Group folder for that operation and becomes the MoD authoritative database of assessed intelligence related to that target. An associated target folder is generated and populated with the all-source intelligence and imagery\(^6\) required to conduct effective targeting, as well as any related intelligence and information. The target folder is to be retained for seven years for audit purposes.

c. **Basic Target Development (BTD).** When complete BTD will provide sufficient justification to assign an entity a unique Entity Identifier (EID). The standards for BTD are shown below for different entity types:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tgt Dev Element</th>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Virtual</th>
<th>Eqpt</th>
<th>Org</th>
<th>Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>BE &amp; O-Suffix</td>
<td>EID</td>
<td>EID</td>
<td>EID</td>
<td>Unit ID/EID</td>
<td>Target Audience Name, EID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>GEOCOORDS</td>
<td>GEOCOORDS, Last known location</td>
<td>IP address, GEOCOORD, Last known location</td>
<td>GEO COORDS, Last known location</td>
<td>IP address, GEOCOORD, Last known location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Category Code</td>
<td>Function Code</td>
<td>Audience function description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Facility significance remark</td>
<td>Target significance remark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\) MoD AS IS.
\(^6\) The cyber tgt folder will include, where possible, a network analysis detailing access, vector and selector.
d. **Intermediate Target Development (ITD).** ITD requires the analysis and detailed characterisation of a target and completes the characterisation of the entity under consideration to qualify it as a candidate target for vetting. One of the main products of ITD is the Target Intelligence Pack (TIP). The requirements for ITD are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tgt Dev Element</th>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Virtual</th>
<th>Eqpt</th>
<th>Org</th>
<th>Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Tgt significance: Addresses the targets effect to the target system</td>
<td>Completed during BTD</td>
<td>Elaborates on audience significance remark in relation to the specific attitudinal / behaviour change objective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Description</td>
<td>Describes recognisable attributes of the target entity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characterisation</td>
<td>Elaborates on assigned category/functional code(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation</td>
<td>Describes why engaging the target entity should affect the target system</td>
<td>Describes the desired / undesired attitude or behaviour that is being targeted for change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source documentation</td>
<td>List of source data to include details of associated reporting</td>
<td>Describes what would happen if the attitude / behaviour change was successful. Describes why engaging the target entity should affect the target system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collateral Damage considerations</td>
<td>Describes collateral concerns, environmental or population density concerns in the area surrounding the target entity, and second &amp; third order effects on infrastructure and other non-physical entities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Gain and Loss</td>
<td>Describes potential intelligence gains or losses resulting from affecting a target.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. **Target Development Working Group.** A TDWG is convened to enable nominating organisations to familiarise the intelligence and planning staff with potential targets, before they reach vetting and validation using the products of BTD and ITD. This ensures the community of interest is up-to-date and able to respond appropriately to vetting requests and attend Target Validation Boards (TVB). The TDWG marks the transfer of the target entities from ISTE to J3/5,
noting that ISTE continues to contribute to the accuracy of the Target Intelligence Pack and support the remaining process.

f. **Functional Defeat Analysis.** If intelligence and time allows, DI FSTMT may be able to coordinate functional defeat analysis with the assistance of capability experts, Dstl, industry, and governmental experts. This may be conducted for selected targets where detailed target characteristics can be analysed to provide a unique insight into the most efficient method to affect its critical elements.\(^7\)

g. **Candidate Target List.** Upon completion of a TDN review by PJHQ JE Targets (or delegated HQ) and the determination that the target is sufficiently developed, the TDN can be considered a candidate target, eligible for vetting, and may be added to the CTL. This is a separate spreadsheet of candidate targets to be vetted and validated. If the TDN does not pass review, it is no longer a candidate target and is returned to the nominator or developer with feedback on why it did not pass.

h. **Target Vetting.** Vetting is coordinated by the authorised HQ, and allows the engagement of the intelligence community to establish a reasonable level of confidence in a candidate target’s functional characterisation based on the target folder and supporting intelligence. Vetting seeks to avoid dissent on J2 assessments arising during a TCB. Vetting is initiated with a request to DI FSTMT, and the SIAs. Other members of the J2 community, agencies, or SMEs with applicable specialties can be included by invitation. The ten elements considered during vetting are:

1. Target identification and the use of the appropriate naming convention.
2. Target location, including, where possible, mensurated coordinates.
3. Functional characterisation of target, to include the appropriate category or functional code.
4. Target description.
5. Target significance within the target system.
7. Target expectation statement focused on the effect on the overall target system and military advantage to be gained in the three dimensions.

\(^7\) Construction details of potential infrastructure targets are particularly important for the effective targeting of penetrative precision munitions such as Storm Shadow.
(8) Collateral assessment, including the identification of nearest collateral concern (spatially, temporally and by network) by functional description, and proximity from the target.

(9) An analysis of expected gain versus loss regarding issues such as intelligence collection, resource spend, impact on post-conflict reconstruction, impact on own troop mobility, impact on coalition partners and PAGs, and technical equities.

(10) Sourcing.

i. **Target Vetting Responses.** Vetting agencies should respond to the vetting request based on the accuracy of the characterisation from the perspective of their intelligence discipline, and not on any target engagement concerns. The four responses are:

   1. Agreed.
   2. Agreed, with comments.
   3. Abstain (outside the agency’s expertise).
   4. Disagree (with rationale).

j. **Vetting Record.** Votes and comments must be recorded on the TDN and CTL spreadsheets and discussed with MSE at the Joint Targeting Working Group.

10. **Step 3 – Target Validation and Joint Target List production.**

   a. **Validation Purpose.** Target validation is an operations, policy, and legal function. It ensures all vetted targets meet the objectives and criteria outlined in the planning, operational, and targeting directives, and ensures compliance with the legal frameworks and ROE.

   b. **Responsibilities, Boarding, and Recording.** A candidate target does not become a ‘target’ until it is validated by a designated target validation authority: at the strategic level this is ACDS(Ops & Cts), unless formally delegated. At the operational and tactical levels, validation authorities vary, i.e. the Joint Commander or formally delegated to a One Star officer (typically the J3). The candidate targets are normally considered at a TVB or similar review and approval session, to create the JTL. The target folder information will be used to create a target pack for briefing the target validation authority. The standard formats for target packs are contained in the capability annexes to this document and are to be followed at every level to allow swift referral of a target up the targeting chain. Additions, amendments or alterations to the target pack should be clearly annotated by the author, including the date.
changes were made. Validation results, both positive and negative, are to be documented on the TDN spreadsheet. The target folder should contain a statement on the legal implications involved and the overall judgement on whether the target is a valid military objective.

(1) **Transfer to the JTL.** Once assessed as a valid military target and there are no target engagement restrictions, the candidate target is moved from the CTL to the JTL. A separate JTL spreadsheet is produced by MSE, assisted by PJHQ JE Tgts as necessary. The JTL is composed of targets that, if prosecuted, could assist in the achievement of the strategic aim. For co-ordination the JTL should be distributed across the MoD and relevant PAGs to ensure that all potential targeting effects are considered. The subsequent transfer of responsibility for the JTL to PJHQ will be promulgated formally by MSE.

(2) **Targets may be added following direction given in CDS’ Directive to CJO; these might include targets identified during the development of the campaign plan to meet the requirements of Component Commanders. Components can nominate targets at any stage of the operation; however, if they do not fall within an authorised target set, they must be staffed to MoD for validation. Responsibility for further development of the JTL rests with PJHQ, in consultation with MSE, until it is delegated to the Joint Task Force Commander by CJO. Where the operational construct includes individual Component Commanders, they will then identify those targets or target sets on the JTL that need to be prosecuted in support of their component and will submit them to the JTFC. These targets, and additional operational and tactical level targets that are not on the JTL, will be submitted in the form of a Component Prioritised Target List (Mar, Land, Air, or SF CPTL). The CPTL will then be forwarded for coordination and validation by PJHQ/MSE/MoD, to produce the Joint Target List (JTL).

(3) **Transfer to the Restricted Target List (RTL).** If the target validation authority decides that restrictions on the engagement of a valid target are necessary, that target will be removed from the CTL and placed on an RTL, annotated with the specifics of the restriction. These restrictions can range from a nuanced limitation on when, how and with what a target can be serviced, to a specific prohibition on engaging the target due to operational, political, and/or collateral damage concerns. All targets on the RTL are valid military objectives, but their disruption might be sensitive politically, diplomatically, or within a coalition; or have an adverse effect on other military options, the potential for intelligence gathering, or the anticipated post-conflict phase of

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8 This does not include recommendations on attack headings, day/night or episodic considerations derived from the CDE process.
operations. ATD may be carried out on entities on the RTL, but attacks are permitted only following approval by the originator of the restriction. The authority to remove a target from the RTL, or change its status, also rests with the originator of the restriction. Responsibility for the management of the RTL will pass to PJHQ alongside the JTL. The RTL entry includes what the restriction is, how target engagement is restricted, when the restriction was levied, who levied the restriction, why the restriction was levied, what is the duration of the restriction, and, finally, who may lift the restriction. These restrictions do not change the fact that targets on the RTL are valid military targets.

c. **Official Targets.** The JTL and RTL combine to form the database of official targets that have military significance in a particular plan.

d. **Rejected Targets.** If a candidate target has been assessed as an invalid military target, it is removed from the CTL. The rejected candidate target should remain on the TDN spreadsheet but annotated clearly as having been validated and rejected, with the date and rationale.

e. **Target Maintenance.** Targets on the JTL, RTL, and JPTL are to be continually monitored and updated to reflect the latest intelligence. The default intelligence cut-off date (ICOD) for products, including functional characterisation, required at a Targeting Board must be less than 90 days; variations to this will be promulgated in the TD. In practice, much more up-to-date intelligence assessments and products would be expected, and the most recent available intelligence should be included in the target pack.

f. **FSpecT Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Approval.** As a result of the target development process the potential FSpecT plan, derived from the initial estimate, may be adjusted to become an 'executable' plan. The commander's approval of the FSpecT CONOPS must be sought prior to execution; it also provides important context for the subsequent Target Clearance Boards. To reassure the commander that the FSpecT plan is in accordance with higher intent and wider Defence operational activities, it is key that the conceptual link to the higher intent is made clear.

11. **Step 4 – Advanced Target Development, Target Nomination List Production for Prioritisation, Clearance and Engagement.**

   a. **Advanced Target Development.** ATD completes the target characterisations process and occurs after target validation. ATD is not in itself a function of the EFI programme and products will vary in scope and scale depending on the effect being

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9 The post-conflict phase of operations may necessitate that certain targets are placed on the RTL to assist post-conflict reconstruction.
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delivered. As part of ATD the Target Intelligence Pack (TIP) is weaponeered; specific activities are applied to the target. This additional detail transforms the TIP into a Target Pack. ATD provides the information necessary to support the synchronisation of specific actions against a designated target once the desired end state and associated effects has been selected. The responsibility for ATD lies with the customer, but may be supported by DI FSTMT. The elements of ATD are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Tgt Dev Element</th>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Virtual</th>
<th>Eqpt</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weaponneering</td>
<td>Weaponeering^10</td>
<td>Determines the quantity and type of weapons required to achieve the desired effect on the target.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aim point selection</td>
<td>The appropriate JDPI to engage</td>
<td>The appropriate non-lethal reference point to engage</td>
<td>The appropriate JDPI to engage</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collateral Effects Estimation</td>
<td>Collateral Damage Estimation</td>
<td>Collateral effects estimation</td>
<td>Collateral Damage Estimation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Collateral effects specific to each non-kinetic activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **Nomination Purpose.** Once ATD is complete MSE, PJHQ JE Tgts, components, subordinates, and task forces select and prioritise targets from the JTL and RTL, and compile Target Nomination Lists (TNLs) to clear targets for engagement.

c. **Target Clearance Board (TCB).** The TNLS are normally reviewed, combined, and prioritisation verified at a TCB using the target pack. The Board’s output is the Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL) which may comprise one or more cleared targets. Targets on TNLS must be fully-capable of being presented to a board and then immediately prosecuted. Only commands designated in the TD having delegated target clearance authority are authorised to create and maintain a JPTL; otherwise, authority remains with the SoS and the responsibility for creation and maintenance with MSE. At the operational or tactical level, the JPTL will be approved by the JTFC, or appropriate delegated HQ, and passed to CJO for information.

d. **Location Validation.** Mobile and re-deployable targets are subject to the same target development process as any other target, including collateral damage estimation analysis. However, in a fluid operational situation, when this type of target is submitted on the TNL it requires target location validation to avoid wasting strike

^10 Weaponeering will consider issues such as target vulnerability, adversary actions (the effects of actions and countermeasures), characteristics and effects of the engagement capabilities, munitions delivery errors and accuracy, damage mechanism and criteria, probability of kill, weapon reliability and trajectory.
assets against a target that may have moved. The nominating HQ or component is responsible for organising and coordinating the required ISTAR activity and ensuring that target location information is passed to the relevant force elements. The need for location validation must be clearly articulated on the JTL.

e. **The Operational Record.** The decision-making process and results of the TCB must be recorded on a Target Summary Sheet (TSS) and the JPTL promulgated as directed in Part 1, Sec 10, Para 8.c.

12. **Removal of Targets from Target Lists.**

a. **Target Removal.** A target is removed from the JTL, RTL and JPTL when:

   (1) The validation authority determines the target should be removed – restrictions can only be lifted by the originator of the restriction.

   (2) The ICOD has been exceeded. When the ICOD is exceeded, the validation authority must be notified of the expiration of the target’s validity. Once a target has been removed from a JTL, RTL, or JPTL as a result of exceeding the ICOD, it must be re-vetted and re-validated in order to be put back on the JTL, RTL, or JPTL. Note: targets are not vetted through the intelligence community for deletion from a target list.

   (3) It has been prosecuted successfully. Once prosecuted it must be placed on a Prosecuted Target List and the target folder and associated target packs retained by PJHQ JE Tgts for seven years.

b. **NSL Removal.** As described in Para 8.f.

c. **Recording.** Targets removed from a JTL, RTL, and JPTL should be retained on the TDN spreadsheet with a clear statement of why and when it was removed, to avoid duplication of target development effort and erroneous re-boarding.

13. **Target List Naming Convention.** To facilitate rapid retrieval, federated support, and avoidance of confusion, users will name target lists using the operation name, the originating HQ, the list type, and the creation date in accordance with the relevant information management practice.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{11}\) JSP 441.
Section 3 – Targeting Cycle

1. **Overview.** This section describes how the Targeting Cycle is used to support a full spectrum approach to the delivery of effects. Actions may vary from tactical to strategically decisive in nature and the cycle must be applied pragmatically and appropriately to the context. It provides guidance on how each of the core elements of the cycle can be applied, irrespective of the capability, to deliver effect during a campaign. The Targeting Cycle is neither time constrained nor rigidly sequential; it can be used for contingent planning, during all phases of war and is relevant where a competitor may be operating in the grey space, without committing to conflict. All types of action and capabilities should be integrated seamlessly throughout the cycle. Early and thorough consideration of information-related capabilities as integral elements of targeting will improve the commander’s decision making.

2. **Legal, Policy, Capability.** Throughout the Targeting Cycle there is a need to ensure that three factors are constantly considered and reviewed to avoid nugatory work or wasted effort. If one or more of these factors becomes a constraint, then there will be a need to re-visit initial planning and understanding.
   
   a. **Legal.** Is a particular action &/or effect allowed by law?
   
   b. **Policy.** Should a particular action &/or effect be used?
   
   c. **Capability.** Is the means to deliver the recommended action available to be used?

3. **Intelligence Support to the Targeting Cycle.** The delivery of the Targeting Cycle requires considerable, focused intelligence support. This support is directed by the Intelligence Support to Targeting and Effects Programme (ISTP) and is delivered by the DI FSTMT and follows an end state focused intelligence approach, drawn from the wider intelligence community, driven by National Security Council priorities. Annex A articulates how intelligence support to the Targeting Cycle is delivered by the DI FSTMT. Different capabilities will have nuanced demands on intelligence support and these will be outlined in their respective annexes.

4. **Targeting Automation.** Targeting automation is the use of applications, database technologies and computer systems to reduce the timelines and enhance workflows for target development, dissemination and use of information that links national objectives and defence guidance with targeting and its assessment. To optimise support to the Joint force, Defence should work to automate, where possible, the steps in the targeting cycle in support of deliberate targeting while continuing to emphasize due diligence on intelligence analysis.
5. **Automating the Targeting Process.** No one tool automates the entire process. The definition of what is considered a target by automation systems and databases has evolved from only facilities to include individuals, virtual, equipment and organization target types which has further complicated the automation of the targeting process. This occurs on many levels and in many locations simultaneously, yet no single interoperable solution has emerged or been established. To serve such a diverse and distributed user base, targeting automation must conduct efficient bi-directional data transfers for intelligence, operations and plans users of both classified and official networks, multinational partners, targeting tools, and support data exchange and interoperability. The targeting enterprise should seamlessly share well-understood, standardised representations of target intelligence and data and not rely on local databases. Using national databases as a foundation, targeteers also rely on automation tools and processes to facilitate rapid exchange of target intelligence and data among various echelons and organisations.

6. Automation is a critical enabler allowing targeteers to be more accurate and efficient in all phases of the joint targeting process with reliable target intelligence, but automation is not a replacement for human thinking or proactive communications. Ideally, targeting automation should facilitate real-time, virtual, collaborative, and multi-layered security analysis and planning. The key components to targeting automation are common target data standards and data interoperability. These components, in turn, enhance information sharing while providing for the replication of target information between all users, to include multinational partners.
7. **Phases.** There are six phases within the Targeting Cycle. When and for how long each is applied will be dependent on the level of delegation, the phase of operation and the opportunities presented. The targeting cycle is a tool that can be applied in all phases of conflict but is at all times reliant on the commander’s intent and direction to ensure that it remains relevant.

**Figure 3.1: Targeting Cycle**

![Targeting Cycle Diagram]

- **Phase 1. Commander’s intent, end states, and guidance.**
  
  (1) This stage focuses on the desired end states – likely to be a behavioural change by actors within the operational environment, and the commander’s intent, centres of gravity (COGs), constraints, objectives, lines of operation, desired effects and required tasks, which are developed during operational design and planning.

  (2) Analysis of the strategic task will develop understanding of the problem and precipitate the definition of the objectives – the ‘ends’. Work should be agnostic to (but informed by) delivery means. There should be a clear articulation of the measures of effectiveness to inform later work. This phase will rely heavily on foundation intelligence provide by the J2 community.

  (3) This phase will conclude with a staff-led targeting triage board to ensure available capabilities that could deliver effect in support of the end state are considered in a full spectrum setting. This gateway promotes unity of effort and cohesion between capabilities.
b. **Phase 2. Target Development.**

(1) The target development process, informed by ISTEP, comprises of analysis and assessment to identify and characterise potential targets that, when successfully prosecuted, support the achievement of the commander’s objectives and end state. It examines potential target systems to determine the necessary type and duration of action that must be carried out against each target to create the desired effect(s). Target development, at this stage, comprises of:

(a) **Entity Target Development.** This builds on the TSA/TAA and generally occurs in two stages – Basic and Intermediate as described in Sec 2, Para 8.

(b) **Target List Management.** The output of target development are the various target lists described in Sec 2. This will include a prioritisation of targets and actions.

(c) **Target Validation Board.** This phase concludes with a TVB which seeks to cohere activity and prioritise targets, actions, effects and desired end states. The validation process is described in Sec 2, Para 10.

c. **Phase 3. Capability Analysis.** This phase analyses targets on the JTL and recommends the synchronized combination of the most appropriate capabilities and activities that could be applied to generate the desired physical or psychological effects to achieve the objectives. This includes advice on whether the force has the capability to engage the target and, if so, how to mitigate any identified undesirable collateral effects. Analysis will include:

(1) Matching available capabilities and activities to identified vulnerabilities.

(2) Feasibility of utilising a capability.

(3) Estimation of the effects of the attack to ensure unintended effects are considered. There will also be a consideration of the target repair recuperation time after the attack.

(4) Collateral damage and effects estimation will seek to determine the potential for both damage and collateral effects resulting from the attack.

(5) Advanced Target Development as described in Sec 2, Para 11.

d. **Phase 4. Commander’s decision, force planning and assignment.**
(1) When presented with the conclusions of the capabilities analysis the commander will be able to decide upon the capabilities to be used on specified targets to achieve his desired end state.

(2) The ‘means’ of delivering the end state is articulated during this phase and will seek to maximise the efficiency of forces through the application of sufficient force to create the desired effects while minimising collateral effects, duplication of effort and wasted resources.

(3) While the final product of this phase will be the target pack presented to the TCB, there is a requirement to fully understand the relevant authorities contained within the Targeting Directive and ROE authorisations, collateral estimates and impacts, risk and associated mitigation measures, and assurance mechanisms. Proficiency within this phase is paramount to successful execution and ability to assess results.

(4) This phase will conclude with a TCB which will consider each target and associated action as described in Part 1, Section 10.

e. **Phase 5. Mission Planning and Execution.**

(1) This phase takes the results of the TCB and directs the planning and execution of activity; it is largely the responsibility of the operational/tactical commanders. The targeting cycle supports mission planning by providing detailed information on targets, the required MoE and MoP, and the analytical reasoning to support the commander’s decision.

(2) Execution can occur once the engagement conditions stipulated by the TCB, e.g. deconfliction, KLE conditions, casualty estimates etc, have been satisfied. The delivery will be closely monitored to ensure successful prosecution and identify any opportunities for rapid exploitation.

f. **Phase 6. Targeting Assessment.** This phase will seek to measure whether the planned outcomes have been achieved, measured against the criteria set by the TCB and the estimate process. It will seek to inform future iterations of the cycle and the commander’s end-state.

g. For Targeting Assessment to be effective, preparatory work must be done well in advance of the conducting of any activities. This starts with the TAA or TSA identifying and prioritising targets to best exert influence on a mindset or system and thus informs which elements, criteria or conditions should be monitored to inform targeting assessment.

h. The following questions should be asked in this phase:
(1) Were actions against targets conducted as planned?

(2) Were the effects of these actions as anticipated?

(3) If actions were not conducted as planned, or the effects of these actions were not as anticipated, what can be done to address deficiencies?

(4) Was the collateral effects estimation correct and accurate?

(5) What collateral damage or unintended effects achieved may require consequence management?

i. To maximise the effectiveness of assessment, analysts require and must understand:

(1) The Commander’s direction and guidance, objectives and intent.

(2) The TD.

(3) A comprehensive Theatre Information Requirements Document (TIRD) and collection plan.

(4) TSA and other target materials used for target approval.\(^\text{12}\)

(5) Mission-specific information (target, means, delivery time, desired effect, etc) from whichever component delivers an effect.

(6) Pre-attack target status including any denial and deception measures.

j. Key to targeting assessment is understanding the following:

(1) **Measures of Performance (MoP).** The criteria used to assess friendly action and are linked to achieving the desired end state. MoP assess how effectively friendly force elements are conducting targeting and inform measures of effectiveness. MoP allow commanders to judge whether the allocation of adequate resources is adequate to achieve the desired effects.

(2) **Measures of Effectiveness (MoE).** MoE are used to measure results achieved in the execution of assigned tasks and enable commanders to identify the impact of targeting in relation to the mission. Part of MoE is the balance of effort (cost) against the desired end state (benefit). If the desired end state is not achieved, the target may need to be re-engaged using the same means, or another means selected to achieve the desired end state. Unambiguous MoE

\(^{12}\) Electronic Target Folders, Target Packs or TSS
are a prerequisite for assessment. MoE include Measures of Impact (MoI) which are criteria used to assess the changes in a system expected because of friendly non-kinetic tasks. MoI are a vital part of MoE for non-lethal effects.

k. During operations Target Assessment will normally be delegated to PJHQ which may, in turn, delegate the production of assessment material further. Matching the federated targeting enterprise it supports, ISTE can itself be federated relying upon a number of contributing organisation to ensure that Effects Focused Intelligence (EFI) provided meets requirements for timeliness, accuracy, confidence and quantity. An authorised producer will draw all of this contributing assessment together to produce EFI. This lead producer role will most often reside within DIFSTMT but will not always be appropriate; the process, roles and responsibilities for EFI production will be specified in the TD in accordance with information requirements and targeting delegations and responsibilities.

Figure 3.2: Components of Targeting Assessment

l. **Effects assessment.** This component of targeting assessment checks the effectiveness of actions to produce effects to achieve objectives. The MoE should have been directed during the planning cycle. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations.

m. **Combat assessment.** This component of targeting assessment considers the effectiveness of targeting actions to produce effects. It comprises three components:
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(1) **Battle damage assessment (BDA).** BDA is ‘the assessment of effects resulting from the application of military action, either lethal or non-lethal, against a military objective.’ 13 It is conducted in three phases:

(a) **Phase 1 – Confirmation of Effect Delivery and Initial Function.**
This is a quick initial assessment to quantitatively estimate the amount of physical damage or behavioural influence achieved against a target, following the application of a capability.

(b) **Phase 2 – Functional Damage Assessment.** This reviews and amplifies the phase 1 BDA, providing a functional assessment by estimating how much the physical or psychological effect on a target has degraded its ability to perform its intended mission or shifted a behavioural pattern.

(c) **Phase 3 – Target System Assessment.** Phase 3 assesses the effect of the engagement on the entire target system, regardless of the capability or function of the system and is usually conducted at the operational level. This assessment is based on the understanding of an individual target role within the target system and depends on the target systems analysis conducted at the beginning of the targeting process. This assessment of the ongoing effectiveness (or intentions) of a target system provides a major input into the overall combat assessment process.

(2) **Munition effectiveness assessment (MEA).** MEA assesses the means applied in terms of its overall effectiveness to determine and recommend any required changes to the methodology, tactics and delivery parameters to increase force effectiveness.

(a) Kinetic weapons effectiveness assessment—analyses the force applied in terms of its tactics, weapon system, munitions, fusing, and/or weapon delivery parameters effectiveness, to determine and recommend any required changes to how those weapons were applied and what effects were achieved, to increase effectiveness.

(b) Non-kinetic weapons effectiveness—an evaluation of the effectiveness of non-kinetic means of engagement in achieving the desired effect and recommends any required changes to how those means were applied.

(3) **Future targeting and re-engagement recommendations.** These recommendations merge the results of what was done with how it was done to

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13 AAP-06.
provide the commander with recommendations on whether a target needs to be nominated for re-engagement or if a new target needs to be prosecuted.

n. **Collateral Assessment.** A component of targeting assessment, collateral assessment is the matching of the actual collateral effects caused by the action compared to the predicted collateral estimation conducted during ATD. This is necessary to understand fully the consequences of action and will determine what undesired effects may have occurred that require consequence management. This process will also serve to inform future collateral estimations.

8. The phase concludes the Targeting Cycle and informs the start of further cycles as well as progress in achieving strategic end states.

9. **Targeting Assessment and Rebuttal.** Adversaries will seek to use the evidence of an attack to support their own information operations and propaganda. They will often exaggerate the impacts or dispute the accuracy of physical attacks to counter our strategic narrative, attempt to dismantle our moral legitimacy, and weaken domestic and international support for the campaign. They will utilise the speed and ubiquity of the internet to be first with (their version of) the truth. Similarly, while all FSpect activities will be under the scrutiny of the media and human rights groups, any focus on the human suffering and/or collateral damage caused by physical attack could be detrimental to campaign objectives. It is, therefore, essential that mechanisms are in place to facilitate rapid rebuttal of adversary propaganda or inaccurate media reporting. Accurate post mission reporting along with visual, ideally film-based, evidence releasable to the public domain must be made available to the Defence Media Centre through PJHQ as swiftly as possible. The operational HQ is to immediately forward post mission reports, including the associated WSV/FMV, to CDS via Hd MSE for any engagements involving:

   a. The employment of new/novel weapons systems.
   
   b. Pre-planned targets.
   
   c. Collateral damage concerns.

10. These reports will inform the Targeting Assessment at the strategic level and enable rebuttal, quality assurance of procedures, and satisfaction of legal obligations.

11. **Inquiries.** An inquiry may be initiated by the MoD or PJHQ in order to better understand the circumstances surrounding an incident. Such an inquiry could be UK-only or in co-operation with a Coalition HQ. The results of an inquiry should help to inform any rebuttal and subsequent information strategy. They should also help promote a learning culture.

12. **Summary.** The targeting cycle, through the operational staff, will draw on the knowledge of all the potential capabilities that can support the commander’s desired end
state. Subtleties and variations in how capabilities deliver action will influence how the cycle is utilised. These will be explained within the respective capability annexes.
Intelligence Support to Targeting & Effects (ISTE)

1. A sound intelligence foundation is fundamental to enabling the delivery of FSpecT and Defence must get as “far left of the effect” as possible in terms of intelligence understanding and provision.

ISTE Governance.

2. CDI, as the Defence Authority for Intelligence, is responsible for the generation of suitable ISTE to meet Defence targeting priorities.

3. Hd MSE and Hd DI R&T, through the 1* ISTE Meeting (ISTEM), are to:
   
   a. Assure Full Spectrum Targeting contingency planning options, support crisis ISTE requirements and sustain current operational ISTE through the efficient and effective control of available ISTE resource
   
   b. Recommend and prioritise ISTE tasks for initiation and review and direct the balance of targeting effort across Defence, specifically within the DI FSTMT in close coordination with DI Tasking & Coordination (T&C).
   
   c. Act as an informed customer to the Intelligence Support to Targeting and Effects Programme (ISTEP) and, working closely with MoD Integrated Policy & Strategy (IPS) Teams and Partners Across Government (PAG), in order to coordinate intelligence efforts and deconflict requirements.
   
   d. Direct the initiation of TSA/TAA/TP/TD tasking. The ISTEM will also direct contracted TAA tasking in coordination with MSE StratCom and DI FSTMT TAA.
   
   e. Work closely with PJHQ JE/J2/J5 in order that the ISTEM is answerable to the DCDS(MSO).

4. Hd DI R&T is the Targeting Champion within DI and is responsible for the management of the ISTE capability within DI and for its effective delivery by DI. Hd DI R&T is responsible for the delivery of suitably qualified and experienced personnel and doctrine to undertake the ISTE function within DI.

5. Individual Lines of Operation (LOO) will be defined by an ISTE task, proposed by a lead department; normally DI, an IPS, MSE or PJHQ JE/J2/J5.
Intelligence Support to Targeting & Effects Programme (ISTEP).

6. ISTE at the strategic and operational level is directed by the ISTEP and delivered principally by DI teams but also requires input from and coordination with UK or Allied intelligence agencies.

7. The ISTEP will comprise a blend of short, medium and longer-term targeting and effects tasks. Progress will be monitored through the weekly Intelligence Alignment Board (IAB).\(^{14}\) The DI FSTMT are responsible for the provision of targeting & effects focussed intelligence support. For FSpecT to deliver a timely and comprehensive action it is important to identify prioritised Defence tasks\(^{15}\) as early as possible, so that sufficient analysis can be initiated, and appropriate resources apportioned. Basic intelligence (sometimes referred to as Foundation Military Intelligence) analysis and assessment will be conducted by DI in support of Defence priority tasking that will identify priority problem sets and provide candidate areas to develop a baseline understand of the specified problem for further development. When sufficiently mature, a candidate area may be further refined to enable detailed ISTE. Short-notice tasks may emerge because of crisis or emerging operational requirements.

**ISTE Process**

8. **Outputs.**

   a. **Current Operations.** The focus of the ISTEP is support to current operations; targets and effects will be developed through the TLM process, eventually being integrated into operational plans by PJHQ JE.

   b. **Contingent Operations.** The ISTEP provides contingency plans for future operations and the ISTEP may direct the development of contingency targeting plans to different levels of target development maturity. Maintaining targets at an advanced state is resource intensive and the ISTEM, in consultation with the relevant MoD IPS will routinely review the efficacy of contingent target plans.

9. The ISTEM can direct the most appropriate resource, including the MSE Threats team to conduct preliminary analysis of a defined problem set. This will further refine the understanding of the task and develop a robust intelligence baseline understanding from which a TSA can be initiated. The MSE Threats team will normally coordinate the demand for upstream threats analysis in conjunction with DI and such ‘triaging’ of candidate tasks.

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\(^{14}\) DI Intelligence Alignment Board chaired by DI T&C.

\(^{15}\) In accordance with Defence Commitments Direction (DCD) &/or appropriate CDS Planning or Operational Directives.
10. **Effects Focused Intelligence to support FSpecT.** To achieve the required intelligence fidelity, an EFI approach is required. EFI is aligned to the FSpecT Cycle and focuses on providing planners with the intelligence needed to synchronise FSpecT through an informed risk and benefit calculus. EFI focus will be on the analysis of target systems, target mindsets, and target entities and remains ‘activity agnostic’ until a decision has been taken to synchronise a specific effect with a designated target. EFI will be informed by basic/foundational intelligence analysis and may be the result of wider estimate work to focus detailed analysis requirements. Different types of analytical processes occur to deliver EFI and there are several DI teams or external partners that specialise in delivering specific analytical elements. To deliver comprehensive EFI TSA, TAA and Target Development intelligence functions must be available.

11. **Tasking the DI FSTMT.** DI FSTMT tasking should be submitted to the 1* ISTEM for approval. The tasking note should include: a description of the scope; the objectives / effect required; required product classification; what Basic Intelligence support will be provided by DI (or the J2 function of the authorising HQ); the desired distribution list of product; information on current ops and plans that may affect how the adversary functions; a deadline; and the resources to be allocated to the task.

12. **PJHQ and ISTE.** As ISTE assessment matures, operational requirements and coordination with PJHQ J2/J5/JE (&/or the equivalent functions in the authorised HQ) may support the development of ISTE, but the overall tasking will be directed by the ISTEM. The task will be terminated when the customer is satisfied that they have intelligence to make a fully informed risk/benefit decision on both target/effect selection and matching effect(s) to targets.

13. **Target System Analysis.** DI FSTMT will initiate a TSA upon formal direction from the 1* ISTEM. The TSA, as described in Section 2, Para 4.a, is the analytical foundation of all EFI programmes. The requirement for a TSA must be identified as far ‘left of the effect’ delivery as possible to allow the allocation of sufficient time and resources to achieve the desired outcome. The more time, resources, and basic intelligence allocated, the greater the intelligence fidelity. It is important to understand that TSA products are developed to ensure that they address the widest possible range of potential actions and effects. The degree of detail required from a TSA will depend on customer need; whilst it is important to maintain flexibility as the operational environment may evolve, any changes to the TSA work plan will have an overall effect on the fidelity that can be provided.

14. **Target Audience Analysis.** DI FSTMT will initiate a TAA upon formal direction from the 1* ISTEM. DI FSTMT TAA will liaise closely with the nominated task customer to

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16 Effects Focused Intelligence (EFI) is an intelligence concept that aims to emphasise the differences between the General/foundational Intelligence community’s role and the role of the intelligence capabilities within MoD designed to directly support the delivery of effects. It has been defined within this document as ‘the intelligence activity required to directly support the delivery of FSE/FSpecT within an FSA framework’. This concept remains a work in progress and is not to be considered a doctrinal term at this point.

17 The informed risk and benefit calculus weighs the risk of secondary effects impacting the operation in a negative manner as compared to the positives arising from the contribution to designated objectives.
refine the customer requirement and launch the TAA. TAA identifies targeting opportunities in the cognitive dimension to inform activities intended to change individuals’ or groups’ attitudes or behaviours. An accurate TAA cannot be conducted without sufficient Basic intelligence analysis. ISTE specific TAA is produced by DI FSTMT TAA, and this can encompass both the discovery and development of target audiences. Whilst TAA is a process used across the intelligence community and by external organisations to understand populations or groups of people, TAA within DI FSTMT is an all-source process that utilises psychological, anthropological and socio-cultural expertise to analyse state and non-state entities. DI FSTMT TAA is only responsible for conducting BTD and ITD, the responsibility for ATD remains with the authorising HQ delivering the effect. Prior to and in conjunction with operational planning, TAA aims to segment and prioritise potential target audiences for further development. Once nominated as target audiences, TAA assesses the motivators and resistors for attitudinal or behavioural change against specific objectives, and the psychological principles that may best achieve the effect. To enable accurate TAA in line with the Commander’s intent, operational objectives and desired end state, DI FSTMT TAA require close and continual collaboration with the planners and HQ delivering the effect. The requirement for TAA must be identified at the earliest possible point during the planning process to ensure DI FSTMT TAA have sufficient time to identify and develop potential target audiences. Contracted TAA solutions for Defence are also coordinated by MSE StratCom through the ISTEM. It is highly desirable that DI FSTMT TAA are involved with the tasking of contracted TAA to ensure appropriate scope and coverage.

15. **Targeting Intelligence Pack.** The product of ITD, a Target Intelligence Pack (TIP) is an effects-focussed, activity-agnostic body of ISTE assessment which is the responsibility of DI FSTMT to produce. It must follow a standardised format that includes: textual detail describing the target, its function and significance, and an activity-agnostic effect expectation statement; imagery products to geospatially define the target including overview graphic, facility outline graphic, and critical element graphic; and other supporting assessment that may be required. DI FSTMT produce TIPs on a variety of target types which, once complete, are subjected to a Target Development Working Group (TDWG) to allow contributing J2 organisations a comment on content of the TIP. A combination of TIPs on various target types present the authorising HQ with a menu of options from which their FSpect plan is devised. The submission of TIPs by DI FSTMT marks the handover of the targeting process from ISTE to J35.

16. **Target Pack.** Target Packs are a product of ATD and are not the responsibility of DI FSTMT to produce. After vetting and validation, ATD is conducted by the authorising HQ. This includes the assigning of activities to targets in order to achieve intent. It is this additional detail, and a matching against the four criteria of LOAC, that transforms a TIP into a Target Pack. The Target Pack is then subjected to boarding, and activity is conducted against the target.
17. **Targeting Assessment.** DI FSTMT are responsible for providing phase 1 and 2 BDA on UK deliberate kinetic strikes. Additionally, DI FSTMT can contribute to phase 3 BDA only if a TSA has been completed on the target system, if the team has sufficient resource, and if the ISTEM sanctions the task. This is achieved by combining operational detail and intelligence to ensure an understanding of the effectiveness of the actions taken at both the target entity and target system level. This information is then used to update the relevant decision-making cycle to further inform subsequent FSpecT objectives.
Information Activities Targeting

“We typically design physical operations first then craft Information Operations to explain our actions. This is the reverse of Al-Qaeda’s approach. For them the main effort is information, for us it is a supporting effort…” He called that more effective approach ‘armed propaganda.’

(David Kilcullen)

Introduction

1. This Annex provides guidance and procedures applicable to the employment of information activities to achieve military effects; these should be described in terms of the target audience and a change of maintenance of their perception of behaviour. Whilst elements of physical targeting criteria might not fit precisely, the guiding principles apply regardless of the capability being employed. The process of target development and clearance is agnostic of the capability employed and therefore does not change for information activities. The authorisation for employment however may change as information activities can take place in areas and against audiences that are not covered by a TD. In this case the audience and intended effect is defined within the SCAEF and authority is held by Hd MSE.

2. Future Character of Conflict. Current and future conflict is unpredictable, and invariably focused on influencing people. Therefore, understanding audiences, their motivations and behaviours and from that knowing how to apply influence is key to success in conflict. The execution of activities to contribute to the influence of target audiences such as: winning the support of local populations, maintaining allied cohesion, and sustaining domestic and international consent are critical for operational success. Future conflict and deterring conflict demand a shift in targeting focus, from ‘lethal-only’ to Full Spectrum Targeting. Consequently, there must be a parallel shift in the intelligence focus from physical terrain / platforms / C2 targets to understanding the informational and human aspects of the environment.

3. Strategic Communication. We cannot not communicate. Every action (or lack thereof) communicates our intent. Strategic Communication (StratCom) is the practice of delivering the intended message though a holistic appreciation of all our activity. However, what we intend to communicate to audiences and what is perceived may differ.
Effective StratCom aims to close the perception gap\textsuperscript{18} by providing a coherent framework that harnesses all means of communication, lethal and non-lethal, to affect attitudes and behaviours in support of prioritised national objectives.

4. We communicate in a highly competitive, unpredictable and interactive environment. The democratisation of information and the means to exploit it allows actors to exert disproportionate influence, often in competition with our own interests. Many are unencumbered by ethical, moral, or legal constraints, yet enjoy a perceived legitimacy by claiming religious, cultural, nationalistic or victim status, and a mandate of challenging the strong, corrupt, western ‘decadence’ and/or historically ‘oppressive’ imperial countries and values. A failure to communicate effectively cedes the Information Environment\textsuperscript{19} to competitors, allowing them the freedom to shape audience attitudes and behaviours, and define success or failure. StratCom provides an alternative to our competitors’ narratives, themes and messages and is the process of first resort for government and Defence ‘since its elective employment can obviate the need to use force at all’.\textsuperscript{20}

5. **Information Operations.** Information Operations is a staff function used to ‘analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities\textsuperscript{21} to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries… and other approved audiences in support of mission objectives’.\textsuperscript{22} Invariably Information Operations aim to coordinate Information Activities, synchronised with other military activities, to degrade enemy combat operations, hamper enemy decision-making and C2, build support for legitimate authority, undermine support for adversaries whilst maintaining support from the domestic audience, ultimately seeking to change or maintain attitudes and behaviours of target audiences. It is but one of the means by which effects can be created in support of MSOs and will be articulated within the StratCom framework.

6. **Information Activities.**\textsuperscript{23} An Information Activity is ‘an action designed to affect information or information systems’.\textsuperscript{24} These information systems are not limited to CIS and networks – indeed, an adversary commander’s SA is an information system in itself, and as such, it is open to influence through Info Activities (e.g. deception, PsyOps etc) and other military action (e.g. physical destruction). The aim of Information Activities is to directly generate targeted effects within the Information Environment, but such effects can also be achieved through more conventional military means. Information Activities can be performed by any actor and include protection measures. All Information Activities must

\textsuperscript{18} The perception gap is the gap between what is meant and what is perceived.

\textsuperscript{19} AJP-3.10 defines the Information Environment as \textit{an environment comprised of the information itself; the individuals, organisations and systems that receive, process and convey the information; and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs.}

\textsuperscript{20} Dr. Sebastian L Gorka (2015), The Islamic State and Information Warfare: Defeating ISIS and the Broader Global Jihadist Movement; \url{www.ThreatKnowledge.org}.

\textsuperscript{21} Information Activities consist of Media Ops, CIMIC, PsyOps, Key Leader Engagement (KLE), Cyber, SPECAP and counter-command activities including OPSEC, Deception and Electronic Warfare (EW).

\textsuperscript{22} MC 0422 NATO Military Committee Policy on Information Operations.

\textsuperscript{23} Media Ops, PsyOps, Deception, Engagement, OPSEC.

\textsuperscript{24} AJP-3.10
be approved against authorised targets, meet the operational requirement and be conducted in accordance with the authority document (TD or SCAEF).

Understanding the Information Environment.

7. **Understanding the Information Environment**.²⁵ In order to conduct effective Information Operations it is fundamental to understand the nature of the information environment in which operations are to be conducted. The information environment spans the cognitive, physical and virtual dimensions. The *cognitive dimension* seeks to understand the perceptions, beliefs, awareness and understanding of people; the *virtual dimension* seeks to understand how information flows, through which types of media; the *physical dimension* seeks to understand how geography, the populous and civil infrastructure determine where information does and does not reach. Systems in the physical dimension direct the flow of information through the virtual which in turn affect human perceptions, attitudes and ultimately decision-making; these are principally active in the cognitive dimension.

8. **Target Audience Analysis**. TAA identifies targeting opportunities in the cognitive dimension to inform activities intended to change individuals’ or groups’ attitudes or behaviours. Information Operations seeks to achieve a cognitive effect through operations almost exclusively directed against people, therefore attaining an in-depth understanding of Target Audiences is fundamental to identifying the optimum ways and means to achieve attitudinal or behavioural change.

9. **Planning Information Activities**

`The information environment is just as much a part of the battlespace as the physical environment, and commanders at all levels must plan in both environments simultaneously.`²⁶

10. **The Estimate**. Information Operations planning is conducted as part of the operational estimate and not as a separate, distinct activity.²⁷ Information Operations must be considered at every stage of the military decision-making process, it cannot be applied retrospectively. The aim must be to develop a fully-coordinated, synchronised and integrated plan that is part of Joint Action.

11. **Targeted Information Activities**. Information Activities can be highly targeted to achieve specific effects on target audiences.

   a. **Basic Target Development**. Once a TSA and Information Environment

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²⁵ An environment comprised of the information itself; the individuals, organisations and systems that receive, process and convey the information; and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs (AJP-3.10).


²⁷ AJP 5.
Assessment have been completed, Target Audiences can be identified for specific effects. This could be considered Basic Target Development.

b. **Intermediate Target Development.** DI FSTMT TAA team can then be employed to conduct a detailed TAA of that identified Target Audience. The product will consider the social, cultural and psychological factors that specifically motivate or resist the attitudinal or behaviour change of the audience, and highlight potential levers for manipulation, and the psychological principles that may best achieve the desired effect.

c. **Advanced Target Development.** This is the responsibility of the HQ delivering the activity. Messages and delivery methods can then be considered to generate the desired effect.

**Delivering Information Activities**

12. **Characteristics of Successful Information Activities.** The following characteristics should feature when planning and conducting Information Activities:

a. **Coherence.** The effects above must be coherent with the strategic narrative, delivered in the SCAEF by using communication themes and ideas that resonate with the target audience (TA). The central narrative and communication themes must aim to change or maintain the TA(s) (adversaries, potential adversaries and other approved audiences) existing perceptions and behaviour. The desired effects must be coordinated and synchronised at all levels of command and by those enacting it. The second and third order effects of an activity should be very carefully considered as part of the Target Clearance Board process, together with the length of time that the influence activity is designed to have an effect.

b. **Credibility.** To be effective, the Information Activity must create a line of persuasion so that the TA(s) can be successfully supported or manipulated. Existing perceived ‘truths’ (especially where they can be proved) are often the most powerful tools in trying to persuade an individual or group to undertake an activity. In addition, to maintain trust with the TA(s) we must always strive to deliver what has been promised.

c. **Cultural Sensitivity.** Psychological targeting, like all targeting, must deliver the right message to the right audience in the right way at the right time. Resources must be allocated to undertake detailed psychological and cultural understanding of relevant TAs and we must plan and conduct our operations in line with their cultural

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28 A statement of identity, cause and intent around which government, people and armed forces can unite.

29 To be promoted in support of achieving Military Strategic Objectives – not messages per se, rather ‘consistent themes’ that all subsequent messages and activities should reflect. Themes are tailored to specifically reflect the MOD contribution as well as that of wider UK Government.
d. **Behavioural Science.** An understanding of human motivations and the science that underpins human behaviour is fundamental to the successful delivery of desired effects by influence activities targeting the cognitive domain. Defence Intelligence Human Factors (DI HF) provide input to the MSE SCAEF and advice on human group motivations and the design of influence activity to generate the desired effects. Additional specialist behavioural science services can also be obtained by MOD through the MSE StratCom Contractor Framework.

### Assessing Information Activities

13. **Assessment.** Commanders should apply systematic evaluation to measure the effectiveness of activities delivered through Joint Action in meeting mission objectives. Information Activities assessment focuses primarily on the achievement of desired attitudes and behaviours of TA(s). This assessment process indicates the effectiveness of executed information activities (informing which activities need to be reinforced, altered or discarded as appropriate). Although the conduct of assessment will always be challenging, it must be carefully considered by the commander and planned from the outset; include quantitative and qualitative data sets that are selected for their relevance to the activities being undertaken, and crucially, be a repeatable source of information. The consequence of not measuring activity is potentially catastrophic; adverse audience reaction to our activities will be doing our enemies work for them. Comprehensive and accurate assessment requires the allocation of intelligence collection and analytical resources. MoA, MoP, MoE and MoS, as described in the Targeting Cycle (Section 3, Para 4.j), should be considered from the initiation of planning, and feature in CoA wargaming and the commander’s decision.

14. It should be noted that the assessment of effects generated by Information Activities are often difficult to ascertain. Because of the strategic ubiquity of the Information Environment, any effects generated there may well be perceived remotely from the trigger action, and frequently after a lengthy delay. This will make the task of MoE challenging, and commanders will need to consider this in their estimates and to temper expectations of immediate MoE reports.

### Governance

15. **Information Operations and Information Activities Annex to the Targeting Directive.** The Information Operations and Information Activities Annex to the TD must include the following:

   a. **Aim.** A clear aim to ‘regulate the use of Information Operations and Information Activities by UK forces deployed within the stated JOA’.

   b. **Definitions.** Clear definitions detailing which Information Activities the Annex
applies to and any caveats to those activities.

c. **Rules of Engagement.** Rules of Engagement (ROE) control acts that may be deemed as provocative. Such provocative acts may include Information Activities.

d. **Legal Application.** Legal advice must conclude that Information Operations and Information Activities remain within the bounds applicable domestic law, international law and LOAC.

e. **Captured Persons.** Direction on the application of UK Captured Persons (CPERS) doctrine\(^{30}\) to Information Operations and Information Activities must be given to ensure these remain within the bounds of LOAC, International Human Rights Law (IHRL), domestic law and policy. Products derived from Information Operations or Information Activities should not contain images of CPERS, nor should it contain material which would breach these protections.

f. **Adversary Targets and Target Sets.** The Adversary Targets and Target Sets are subject to the ROE in the TD as they relate to Information Activities. CONOPS to use information effects against other individuals and/or groups that fall outside the designated Targets and Target Sets are to be submitted for approval to DCDS(MSO) through MSE or as directed in the TD.

g. **Approvals.** The delegated authority in a Combined HQ for all information effects is to be laid down. Where the effect is intended to reach outside the JOA (or where it is reasonably foreseeable that this will happen unintentionally), or where commanders judge that HMG might suffer serious reputational damage should our involvement be exposed, CONOPS must be referred through PJHQ and MSE to DCDS(MSO) for clearance through a formal targeting board. If an operational commander sub-delegates this authority he must inform CJO and ensure that the nominated deputy is suitably trained and experienced. In addition to prescribed pre-deployment training, all commanders and deputies likely to hold delegated authority should contact MSE and JFC\(^{31}\) to discuss appropriate pre-deployment briefing and training.

16. **Risk Assessment of FSpecT Plan Effectors, Messages and Audiences.** Non-kinetic capabilities have risk assessment specific to each, termed Unintended Effects Evaluation (UEE). The employment of certain capabilities needs to be very carefully considered against the additional criteria of: Probability of Attribution (POA), Probability of Detection (POD), and Capability Gain/Loss (CGL). This will provide the commander with as full an assessment of the relative capability merits in the FSpecT plan. This does not capture risks associated with certain message themes, and of course the multitude of audiences, many of which will be unsupportive, unstable, volatile, immoderate or

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\(^{30}\) Captured Persons (CPERS) JDP 1-10 (2nd Edition).

\(^{31}\) Joint Information Activities Group’s Joint Information Operations Training and Advisory Team (JIOTAT) based at RAF Halton.

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
extremist in nature. TAA provides increasing levels of audience understanding from which Target Audience Sets and general non-contentious messaging can be planned. Socio-anthropology is a specialist scientific area, and therefore specialist advice should be sought before attempting direct human behaviour change messaging.

17. There must be a risk assessment of the possibility of harmful/lethal secondary of the Information Activity taking place. If the assessment concludes that secondary lethal effects are a realistic possibility, then this must be matched against the delegated permissions before authorisation for the action is given.
Offensive Cyber Targeting

1. This Annex is held by MSE. Individuals or organisations wishing to read it should email SO1 Cyber, MSE with a justification for access to the Annex.
Munition Based Targeting

1. This annex provides further guidance on the use of indirect-fire and direct-fire weapons when used for deliberate targeting.

Collateral assessment for munition-based targeting.

2. UK CDE policy remains the responsibility of MSE and any questions or issues regarding this policy should, in the first instance, be referred to MSE Targets branch for the appropriate staffing.

3. Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) supports the proportionality test by which commanders determine whether the expected collateral damage would, in total, be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage anticipated.

4. CDE in support of physical attack is a well-established process with existing tools and methodology giving a degree of accuracy and assurance to support the targeting process. The UK has adopted US CDE methodology which is contained in Enclosures D and E of US CJCSI 3160C – available on request from MSE. Any updates to this policy by the US will be considered by MSE and Dstl who provide a specialist overview to ensure that any changes remain consistent with UK policy. Extant UK caveats to Enclosures D and E of US CJCSI 3160C will be maintained and circulated by MSE and will be included as part of any TD.

5. Legacy BRIMSTONE is no longer in service. However, the Air Warfare Centre (AWC) and Dstl maintain a competency in BRIMSTONE 2 such that specific CDE training and advice can be provided for its employment in pure millimetric wave active radar mode.

6. There are 2 recognised CDE methodologies which offer the best available degree of collateral damage prediction within a reasonable timeframe:

   a. **Formal CDE.** Formal CDE is a simple, logical, and repeatable methodology, conducted by trained CDE analysts in accordance with Para 4.

   b. **Field CDE.** If the window for engagement precludes the conduct of formal CDE, Field CDE may be used as part of a combat engagement. A Qualified Controller, as defined in Table 2, is responsible for ensuring that the Collateral Hazard Area (CHA) is clear of collateral concerns and must take into account target movement and weapon time of flight. Field CDE does not constitute Target Engagement Authority (TEA).

7. Before authorising offensive action, commanders must be satisfied that all methods of CDE have been used either in accordance with the 3160C series or via Dstl. For Pre-
Planned and Accelerated Targeting this delegated level of authority will be articulated in terms of a numerical limit of civilian casualties expected from a single attack (the casualty estimate).

8. **Direct-Fire Weapons.** There is normally no requirement for a formal CDE for engagements with direct fire weapons where the primary risk of collateral damage is presented by the dispersion of munitions in the target area and not from the explosive effects of the warhead. However, some direct-fire weapons effects have been modelled and Collateral Effect Radius (CER) tabulated. Where such information is available it should be used to enhance the analysis of the expectation of collateral damage by the Qualified Controller/Weapon Platform Commander. The TD will include specific additional guidance where required.

9. **Distinction between CER and REDs.** The CER articulate weapon effects in terms of the risk of death and serious injury to the civilian population and damage to structures and are used as a pass/fail criterion. Risk Estimate Distances (REDs) have been developed for assessing the risk of fratricide for Danger Close situations and articulate the specific weapon’s effect in terms of the risk of death and serious injury to an individual; They are advisory and are not used as a pass/fail criterion. Only CERs are to be used in the CDE process.

**Physical Munition Target Clearance Board.**

10. The recommended format for the TCB is at Appendix 1. It is accepted that this will be adjusted to fit specific operational requirements.

**Target Coordinate Mensuration Systems and Location Accuracy.**

11. The accuracy of delivery of physical munitions is defined through the geospatial systems used to generate positional data. The use of coordinate seeking Precision Guided Munitions for pre-planned targeting requires very accurate 3-dimensional positional data. The UK operates several accredited TCM software tools that may be used in the development of these coordinates. The TD will identify those software tools approved for use by UK personnel during the operation.

12. Coordinates can be measured to varying levels of accuracy. The TD will articulate the required accuracy of coordinates, expressed in terms of Target Location Error (TLE) in metres. Standard target location accuracies and the routinely approved associated O-S TCM software/systems are at Table D.1.

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32 CER is based around a 10% probability of death or serious injury to an individual or 1% structural damage to a structure.

33 This is articulated as the percentage risk at a given range from the weapon detonation that an individual (i.e. friendly forces) will be killed or seriously injured.
Table D.1: Target Location Accuracies and Approved Point Mensuration Applications.

13. **US-Derived Coordinates.** Target coordinates mensurated by the US, but intended for targeting UK weapons, may be accepted if they have originated from a National Geospatial Intelligence Agency accredited source. Agreements for specific operations will be promulgated in the TD.

14. **Aircraft-Generated Coordinates.** Self-generation of CAT I or CAT II coordinates from UK aircraft fitted with Advanced Targeting Pods is approved in accordance with Air Warfare Centre (AWC) accreditation. Coordinates measured in this way may be permitted for use in certain circumstances; the agreed processes for specific operations will be promulgated in the TD.

15. **GPS Considerations.** The successful and accurate use of GPS guided weapons requires an assurance of GPS signal coverage and accuracy. GPS signal coverage of the target area should be predicted in the planning phase and confirmed before weapon release. Additional guidance will be provided in the TD where necessary.

**Qualified Controllers.**

16. Qualified controllers are able to make a rapid and valid assessment of the risk of collateral damage in a combat situation as a result of training, intimate knowledge of their own weapon system effects and experience. A working knowledge of the relevant TD and associated ROE profile is essential and implicit in achieving readiness for deployment to a specific Theatre of Operations. Table D.2 lists those qualifications that are accepted as defining Qualified Controllers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Weapon Categories</th>
<th>Training Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Forward Air Controller (FAC) AbFAC, FAC(A) FAC(SF) TACP(FAC) | All Air Weapons and Battlefield Helicopter weapons (all nations) | • FAC Course  
• Currency and competency training as determined by JALO  
• *If applicable - In theatre accreditation as determined by appropriate Coalition HQ*
| Mortar Fire Controller (MFC) A and B | 60mm (Variant M6-895) and 81mm Mortars | • MFC (A) – Mortar Advanced Course  
• MFC (B) – Mortar Standard Course  
• Currency and competency training as determined by Cap GM |
| Close Combat Attack (CCA) Controller | AH weapons (UK only) | • CCA Controllers Course  
• Currency and competency training as determined by HQ JHC/HQ AAC/Cap GM (OS) |
| Fire Support Team (FST) Commanders and Assistants | UKMLRS, 105mm/155mm Arty, mortars and EXACTOR | • Captains Course (Close Support)/FST Commanders’ Course  
• Gunner OPA Level 4 (including Special Observer)  
• Gunner OPA Level 3  
• Currency and competency training as determined by Cap GM |
| Naval Gunfire Officer (NGFO) and Assistants | UK Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) | • NGFO Course  
• Naval Gunfire Assistant Level 4  
• Naval Gunfire Assistant Level 3  
• Currency and competency training as determined by NCHQ and Cap GM |
| CAS in Extremis | All ATP 3.3.2.2 and JCAS MOA compliant airframes | • CAS in extremis briefing |
| Maritime Aircrew | Own Weapon System, NGS | • Currency and competency training as determined by NCHQ or HQ JHC as appropriate |
| AH Aircrew | Own weapon systems | • AH Conversion to Role (CTR) training  
• Currency and competency training as determined by HQ JHC |

34 STANAG 2934 and/or QSTAG 225 compliant coalition mortars.  
35 STANAG 2934 and/or QSTAG 225 compliant coalition artillery.  
36 STANAG 1034 - compliant coalition NGS.  
37 For self-defence only.
### Operational Post Strike reporting.

17. **Mission Reporting.** Post-mission reporting formats, designed to satisfy many disparate requirements, vary across components and levels of command. Regardless of format, it is critical that reports are timely, accurate and satisfy the key information requirements. In respect of physical attack, all post-strike mission reports are to include the data fields shown in Table D.3.

18. **Formatted Messages.** If the format of the post-mission report is mandated as a Formatted Text Message, with fields that do not correspond to the reporting requirements listed at Table d.3, then the required information is to be provided in the free text ‘Amplification’ field of the report or sent as an additional message. Concise and accurate amplification is required to include detailed measures of activity (phase 1 BDA) describing any observed effects on the target and any adversary activity noted in the immediate target area post-strike. If a strike is inaccurate or unsuccessful, the assessed reason is to be reported and, where possible, the assessed location of the ordnance impact noted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Position</th>
<th>Geo-location and brief description of target.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number and Type of Ordnance for Each Aim point</td>
<td>Include fuse setting where appropriate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| ROE Employed | List the specific ROE used in the engagement

**ROE XXX** or **Self-Defence**

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Table D.2: Qualified Controller - Role, Scope and Training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Weapon Categories</th>
<th>Training Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Fast Jet Aircrew            | Own weapon systems                                                                | • Level 1 trained
|                             |                                                                                  | • Currency and competency training as determined by HQ 1Gp                      |
| UAV Aircrew (Reaper only)   | Own weapon systems                                                                | • Level 1 trained
|                             |                                                                                  | • Currency and competency training as determined by HQ 1Gp                      |
| Recce Helicopter (RH) Aircrew | Own Weapon Systems, UK MLRS, 155mm, 105mm, EXACTOR and Mortars (STANAG 2934 and/or QSTAG 225 compliant coalition arty) | • RH Conversion to Role (CTR) training including Air OP
|                             |                                                                                  | • Currency and competency training as determined by HQ JHC and Cap GM          |

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38 For example, MISREP/PMR etc.
| **Targeting Method** | Can **ONLY** be one of the following:
- PPT - Pre-planned Targeting
- AT - Accelerated Targeting
- CE - Combat Engagement
- SD - Self Defence |
| **Target Set** | Which approved target set was engaged? *(from the list in the Targeting Directive)* This **MUST** be completed for any offensive use of lethal force. |
| **Target Engagement Authority (ONLY required for offensive use of lethal force, MANDATORY for engagements under ROE 421, 422, 423, 424 or 429)** | Details of the individual authorising the offensive use of lethal force – **MUST** be either:
- Commander with delegated authority *(for PPT and TST)*
or
- UK MAC and UK Qualified Controller or
- UK MAC and non-UK ‘Qualified’ Controller or
- Non-UK MAC and UK Qualified Controller or
- Non-UK MAC and non-UK ‘Qualified’ Controller |
| **Engagement Controller** | Callsign of FST / JTAC. |
| **Civilian Casualties?** | YES / NO / Not Known *(with additional amplification, including number, where possible).* |
| ** Desired Effect and Result** | Effect intended and whether the effect had been achieved. |

Table D.3: Mandatory Post Mission Reporting Data Fields

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39 In which case, the authority for the use of lethal force will be the UK Weapon Operator (usually the UK Pilot or UK Gun Command Post Officer) who is responsible for making a judgement call with regard to the legality, application of UK Targeting Policy and assessing the expectation of Collateral Damage, to the best of his/her ability.

40 The removal of the ‘imminent threat to life’ is an entirely appropriate ‘Desired Effect’ for an engagement under Self Defence procedures.
# Physical Munition Target Pack Template

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name – from MIDB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE Number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Insert Operation name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK Tgt Set</td>
<td>From relevant Targeting Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility/Tgt Name</td>
<td>Verbatim from MIDB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Unique Identifying Number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aim Points</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>JDPI Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>JDPI Identifier e.g. UA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cat Code</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-ordinates</td>
<td>Measured coordinate for JDPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDE Level</td>
<td>CDE for particular JDPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned TOT (Z)</td>
<td>Day/night or specific TOT if required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapon Type</td>
<td>e.g. TLAM, SS, PWIV (<em>Must include weapon details (mark/version etc.)</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No of Weapons</td>
<td>No. of weapons for that JDPI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Target CDE</th>
<th>CDE call for the whole target – e.g. CDE 3 LOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tgt Board Date</td>
<td>DTG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Target Summary

**Target Description:** A facility target description is a comprehensive description of facility composition, dimensions, layout, and unique features, as well as a description of the number and types of functional areas, and their respective elements. Include any functional characterization.

**Desired Effect:** The purpose of the desired effects remark is to document the action against a facility and/or specific critical target elements to achieve the commander’s guidance and intent, e.g., Disrupt, Destroy etc.

**Significance Statement:** A target significance statement should address target affiliation and importance to the adversary’s target system(s) or the capability it provides to the adversary. It should relay the target’s value above and beyond its function and our expectation. Be realistic about the significance and justify statements such as “this is the only” or “one of two weapon storage facilities in the area.”

**Critical Elements Statement:** Those critical elements of the facility, which if targeted, will achieve the desired end state.

**Gain/Loss:** Any comment on Intelligence and IO Gain/Loss from the proposed action.

**Supporting Intelligence:** This assessment is based on a body of multi-int, multi-source intelligence reporting as recent as DD MMM YY that provides low/moderate/high confidence in the target’s functional characterization.

**Military Advantage:** Why does the attack on this entity confer a military advantage? Include any Intelligence Gain/Loss concerns.

**Distinction:** Demonstrate that the LOAC principle of Distinction applies; e.g., the target is located within a clearly defined military installation.

**Proportionality:** Demonstrate the LOAC principle of proportionality applies; e.g., prosecution of this target is deemed proportionate as there is no expectation of civilian casualties.

**Collateral Concerns:** Highlight any relevant collateral concerns within the target area. Include any details of PoL and PoA relevant to the target. Collateral concerns are not limited to the physical dimension. Any political concerns should also be highlighted.

## Additional Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collateral Data:</th>
<th>ICOD:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nearest NSL</td>
<td>IMINT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nearest Collateral Concern</td>
<td>Target Pack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRSN Issues:</td>
<td>J2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name – from MIDB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE Number</td>
<td>O-Suffix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Imagery to show target area overview, including any relevant collateral concerns.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BE Number</th>
<th>O-Suffix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Imagery to show detail of the target including any critical elements.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BE Number</th>
<th>O-Suffix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Imagery to show detail of the Collateral Damage Estimate concerning the Target.
Serialised relevant J2 Reporting.
Special Forces Targeting

1. This Annex is held by MSE. Individuals or organisations wishing to read it should email SO1 Tgt Pol, MSE with a justification for access to the Annex.
SPECAP

1. The SPECAP Annex is held by MSE. Individuals or organisations wishing to read it should email SO1 SPECAP, MSE with a justification for access to the Annex.
Space Targeting Annex

1. This Annex is still under development. Any questions concerning Space and Targeting should be addressed to SO1 Space, MSE.