

PHILOSOPHY, LOGIC AND COSMOLOGY

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Introduction

Philosophy suffered a period of retrogression in the countries of Central Asia between the sixteenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries. Indeed, the period was particularly sparse in new philosophical concepts, theories and systems. There also tended to be a considerable blurring of what had previously been sharply defined trends.

We see these features manifested in a number of aspects of philosophical knowledge. First, there was an intensification of the trend that had emerged in the preceding era and which led towards a *rapprochement*, blending and fusion of various schools of philosophical and religious thought long established within Islam. For that reason, none of the philosophical or religious movements of the previous centuries such as *mashā'iyya* (Peripateticism), *kalām* (dialectical theology), Ismā'ilism, *ishrāq* (the philosophy of effulgence, Illuminationism) or Sufism remained intact in its original, pure state in the new era. The trend formed part of a movement towards the fusion of philosophical and religious doctrines that sought to eliminate differences and form a single system of thought.

A second aspect of the period was that philosophy, logic and cosmology turned more towards theological Islam than had been the case in previous centuries. Outwardly, this

was reflected in constant and abundant references to the Qur'an, the *hadīs* (the traditions and sayings of the Prophet) and the utterances of religious eminences, and internally by an intensification of efforts to find proof of the truth of philosophical concepts, theories and doctrines in the revelations of Islam. That in turn led to the increasing pre-eminence of mystical and religious elements in philosophical thought. The increased role of mysticism and the canonization of philosophical thought undoubtedly helped to bring about a substantial decline in the role and status of the natural sciences.

A third aspect was that the trend towards an increased role for commentators, which had emerged in the previous era, now became one of the most important distinguishing features of Central Asian philosophical activity. This is demonstrated by the fact that most of the texts on philosophy, logic, ethics, natural philosophy and politics written during the period are actually commentaries on the works of thinkers from previous centuries.

Philosophy

Such development of philosophy as took place in Central Asia in our period was mainly linked with the Isfahan school, which emerged in the sixteenth century and survived until the beginning of the twentieth. Certain ideas from this school of thought remain alive even today. The Isfahan school brought together a large number of philosophers with differing world views over an extended period of time. Some of them, such as Ghiyāsu'ddīn Dashtakī, Mīr Dāmād, Sadru'ddīn Shīrāzī and Hājī Sabzewārī, were inspired by the Illuminationism (*ishrāq*) of Shihābu'ddīn Suhrawardī, while others such as Mīr Findiriskī and °Abdu'l Razzāq Fayyāz Lāhījī looked to the Peripateticism of al-Fārābī (d. 950) and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, c. 980–1037). Still others kept their faith in Sufism, or mysticism, while a further group attempted to synthesize all of the above doctrines. Despite its large number of followers, the glory of the Isfahan school is primarily associated with the names of Mīr Dāmād, Sadru'ddīn Shīrāzī and Hājī Sabzewārī.

Mīr Dāmād

Mīr Shamsu'ddīn Muhammad Bāqir, better known as Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631), wrote more than 20 books and treatises, including *Qabasat* [Rays], *al-Sirāt al-mustaqīm* [The Straight Path], *al-Jam' wa'l-taufīq bayna ra'y al-hākimain* [Harmony and Consensus between the Views of Two Philosophers], the *Risāla fi Hudūs-i °ālam zātan wa qīdamihu zamānan* [A Treatise on the Essential Emergence of the World and its Temporal Eternity] and the *Risāla fi Tahqīq-i mafhūm-i wujūd* [A Treatise on the Investigation of the Concept of Existence].

Central among his essays is the treatise on *hudūs* (creation) and *qidam* (eternity), the *Risāla fi Hudūs-i ʿālam* [Tract on the Creation of the Universe].

The chief message of the last-mentioned work is that there are three dimensions in which creatures or beings are existent (*maujūd*): *zamān* (time), *dahr* (infinitely extended time) and *sarmad* (eternity, endless duration). All beings that emerge and change do so in *zamān*. All stable and inert beings that are not subject to change but that emerge from non-existence are located in *dahr*. To such beings are attributed a soul and the quality of reason. The being that has neither an end nor a beginning, i.e. Allāh or God, is located in a pure dimension, *sarmad*, that is limitless and everlasting. From that standpoint it can be inferred that *dahr* is higher than *zamān*, and that *sarmad* is higher, purer and more majestic than *dahr*. Mīr Dāmād puts the relationship between two beings subject to change in *zamān*, the relationship between a stable being and a being subject to change in *dahr*, and the relationship between two stable beings in *sarmad*. *Dahr* flows from *sarmad*, and *zamān* flows from *dahr*. Accordingly, *sarmad* encompasses both *dahr* and *zamān* without being reduced to either, since it is a superior reality.¹

While many scholars see the doctrine of Mīr Dāmād as a philosophical innovation, the roots of his ideas are in fact to be found in the works of Ibn Sīnā.² The achievement of Mīr Dāmād is that he subjects the concept to a broader analysis than Ibn Sīnā and prepares the ground for the rehabilitation of philosophers following the accusations of abandonment of Islam levelled against them by Ghazālī (1058–1111) and his followers. The metaphysical ideas of Mīr Dāmād are set out in his work entitled the *Jazwa* [Sparks of Flame], in which he divides the system of existence into two levels: the level of beginning (*bad*), or effulgence from the divine essence, and the level of return to the divine source. His works resemble the emanation theories of the Peripatetics with their down-flow and up-flow lines, but adjusted to the spirit of the Illuminative philosophy of Shihābu'ddīn Suhrawardī (see below).

Mīr Dāmād distinguishes two worlds in which beings exist, namely, an abstract world and a corporal world; and he claims that the substance that gives form to the essence of a human being is organized in such a way as to contain within itself the entire world. A person is thus both a microcosm and a macrocosm. According to Mīr Dāmād, the purpose of the two levels, effulgence and return, is the creation of a human being who combines both levels of existence and can therefore both rise to the heavens and fall to the lowest level of existence.

¹ Mīr Dāmād, 1367/1989, pp. 15–29.

² Cf. Dinorshoev, 1980, pp. 122–3.

Another important component of Mīr Dāmād's metaphysical doctrine is his concept of the macrocosmos and microcosmos as a divine book, and the reason and vivacity inherent in all things that exist, including the stable constellations of stars that for him have their own soul and reason. His concept of macrocosmos and microcosmos as a divine book effectively constitutes his theory of knowledge, in accordance with which each thing that exists is a letter or word of that book. The letters and words of the divine book are inscribed in the soul of the human being by a divine pen symbolizing reason. In the words of Mīr Dāmād, divine reason describes the form of things in the soul of the Prophet, and the Prophet in turn describes those forms in the souls of the members of the human species.

Sadru'ddīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Sadrā)

Sadru'ddīn Shīrāzī (1571–1640), the great Isfahan philosopher, commonly known as Mullā Sadrā, continued the line of thinking initiated by his mentor, Mīr Dāmād. He wrote many works on canonical learning and philosophy, the most important and voluminous of which is entitled *al-Asfār al-arbaʿa* [The Four Journeys]. Although he claims that knowledge and learning are achieved through the combination of the methods of the Peripatetics, the mystics and the followers of the philosophy of *ishrāq* (Illuminationism), it is clear from *al-Asfār al-arbaʿa* and his other works that his philosophical system is predominantly based on an Illuminationist and Sufi foundation. Sadru'ddīn's philosophical system is multifaceted. Its essence can be understood through a brief analysis of his writings on the oneness of being, the movement of beings in their substance, divine and human knowledge, and the soul.

Much has been written throughout the history of philosophy on the oneness of existence. Sadru'ddīn, in his work entitled the *Sarayān al-wujūd* [The Flow of Existence], opts for the theory of the oneness of existence (God) and the multiplicity of beings. However, in his most important work, *al-Asfār al-arbaʿa*, he puts forward the concept of oneness of beings that is based on their multiplicity. To explain his thesis he states that he agrees with the Sufi doctrine of the oneness of existence and beings, but not with such interpretation as leads to the fusion (*hulūl*) and oneness (*ittihād*) of existence and beings, since thus construed the doctrine leads to dualism. Sadru'ddīn rejects the version of the doctrine that considers potential beings as illusory (*izāfī, iʿtibārī*) and devoid of real existence. Nevertheless, these explanations were not enough to save the philosopher from accusations of having abandoned Islam and his subsequent exile from Isfahan.

Sadru'ddīn's reflections on the movement of beings in their substance, as expounded in his *Risāla fi'l Harakāt al-jauhariyya* [Treatise on Movements in Substance], are considered to be his original contribution to philosophical learning, as the schools of philosophy

that preceded him, such as Peripateticism, rejected the notion of movement (i.e. change, transformation and renewal) in substance. Movement was believed to be possible only within the framework of quantity, quality, location and position, i.e. accidental categories. Sadru'ddīn, on the other hand, demonstrates that it can also take place within a substance, in which case it involves a change in the essential attributes of the substance, leading to its constant evolution and development. According to him, it is not just accidental categories that are in a constant state of movement, but, indeed, the entire world is constantly subject to movement, change, transformation and renewal. His logical conclusion is that if movement is recognized as possible within accidental categories, then the accidental categories are not inherent qualities of a substance and are not subject to that substance. Sadru'ddīn adopts the Sufi doctrine of the 'world in flux' and the principles of 'All beings strive for perfection' and 'the permanent creation by God of all new phenomena' to back up his argument for the existence of movements in substance.

The fundamentals of Sadru'ddīn's theory of divine and human knowledge may be summarized as follows. First, divine knowledge does not represent the reflection of form in the essence of God, as the Peripatetics claim. Neither does it represent the presence of the forms of objects in the essence of God, as the proponents of the philosophy of effulgence would have it. Divine knowledge is essentially God's vision of form and essence, in the manner of a mirror. God thus possesses absolute knowledge of the general and of the particular, and is therefore capable of giving objects existence by looking into the mirror of His essence.³

Second, human knowledge of things and realities is the result of human beings' reflection on their forms in the mirror of their existence – the soul. Human knowledge is similar to divine knowledge, but with the difference that divine knowledge creates real existence, whereas human knowledge gives rise only to intellectual existence that is governed by reason, the existence of concepts. The human soul is endowed with a creative faculty (*qudrat-i khallāq*) that is similar to the creative force of God. Human knowledge creates the forms of things in the soul which depend for their existence on the soul in the same way that divine knowledge gives rise to an external world that depends for its existence on the divine essence (*zāt-i haqq*).

The essence of Sadru'ddīn's doctrine of the soul is described in his thesis that 'the soul is initially material, but then becomes spiritual'. In analysing that thesis in the context of his concept of movements in substance, he sets out to demonstrate that the soul passes through mineral, vegetable, animal and human phases of development, acquiring along the way the specific characteristics of each category: at the mineral stage it acquires the capacity to

³ Mullā Sadrā, 1315/1937, pp. 308–9.

retain its form; at the vegetable stage it acquires the capacity to nourish itself, grow and multiply; at the animal stage it acquires movement, passion and external and internal sensibilities; and at the human stage it improves its internal sensibilities and acquires reflective capacities.⁴ All of these theories recall quite clearly the Peripatetic ideas of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. The same may be said of Sadru'ddīn's ideas on the theorizing force of the soul or reason. In the manner of the Peripatetics, Sadru'ddīn differentiates between material reason, experiential reason, actual reason and acquired reason. However, unlike the Peripatetics, he canonizes these ideas and imbues them with a significant mystical element.

Hājī Sabzewārī

The ideas and concepts of Sadru'ddīn Shīrāzī were later supported and taken further by Hājī Sabzewārī (1797–1878), from whose pen flowed a series of commentaries and glossaries on Sadrā's essays: *Hāshiya bar'al-Asrār* [Glosses on 'al-Asrār'], *Ta'liq bar'al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya* [Commentary on 'Divine Revelations'], *Ta'liq bar'Mafātīh al-ghayb* [Commentary on 'Keys to Secrets'] and *Hawāshi alā'al-Mabda wa'l ma'ād* [Glosses on 'The Beginning and the Return']. His essays entitled *Manzūma al-hikma* [A Philosophical Poem] and *Sharh'al-Manzūma al-hikma* [Commentary on 'A Philosophical Poem'] deal with all aspects of philosophy, including logic.

Mīr Findiriskī

The Isfahan school included thinkers who followed in the footsteps of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Among them were Mīr Abū'l Qāsim Findiriskī and °Abdu'l Razzāq Fayyāz Lāhījī. Mīr Findiriskī (d. 1640), in his works entitled the *Risāla-i Sanā'ī* [Treatise on the Arts] and the *Maqāla fi'l-harakāt* [Contemplations on Movement], rejected in very decisive terms the theory behind Plato's teachings on luminous and suspended ideas, movements in substance, the unity of reason (*°aql*), the possessor of reason (*°āqil*) and that which is accessible through reason (*ma'qūl*), which occupied a central position in the philosophy of effulgence and the theosophical utterances of Sadru'ddīn Shīrāzī (and Hājī Sabzewārī). When resolving issues on which the Peripatetics and the Illuminationists disagreed, Mīr Findiriskī opted for the position of the former. This shows that he accepted neither the philosophy of effulgence nor Sufi ideas.

⁴ Mullā Sadrā, 1366/1988, p. 230.

Fayyāz Lāhījī

Fayyāz Lāhījī (d. after 1661), in his essays entitled *Gauhar-i murād* [The Essence of Desires] and *Sarmāya-i īmān* [The Essence of Faith], explores all the traditional problems of philosophy: the issue of substance and accident, material and form, visible form and differences between bodies, finiteness and infinity, cause, soul and body, the immortality of the soul grounded in reason, the proofs of the existence of God and His attributes, the imperative for prophecy, etc. In his works we also find a brief analysis of the issues of knowledge and cognition. The manner in which he approaches these issues leaves no room for doubt as to whether he is a follower of Ibn Sīnā. Lāhījī, like Ibn Sīnā, sees God as an essential being and the world as potentiality; he sees substance as a wholly self-sufficient essence upon which accident is absolutely contingent; and he sees the causative determination of phenomena as a consequence of the existence of objects and processes, and believes that the ultimate sphere of cause and effect resides with God. Like Ibn Sīnā, he insists on the theory of the soul as having a beginning by demonstrating the imperishable nature of the human soul as originating in the onset of reason. In the *Gauhar-i murād*, he shows that he also understands the essence of human knowledge in the manner of Ibn Sīnā. Lāhījī writes:

Judgement is a force and a means in which the forms of objects become apparent. . . A form is an element of a thing that is not exactly that same thing, but corresponds to it, like the form of a person in a mirror, or the form of a horse on a wall.⁵

Yūsuf Qarābāghī

The Peripatetic line of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā was also pursued in the seventeenth century outside the Isfahan school. A significant role in this regard was played by Yūsuf Qarābāghī (d. after 1620). In his work entitled the *Haft bihisht* [Seven Heavens], Qarābāghī analyses the problems of existence and knowledge in the same manner as Ibn Sīnā. This is particularly evident in the manner in which he addresses the issue of the relationship between body and soul, intuitive and rational knowledge, etc. However, he distances himself from the Peripatetics in relation to Plato's theory of ideas, and takes up the line adopted by the followers of *ishrāq* and the Sufi tradition. His understanding of the issues of intuition, revelation and effulgence is based on Sufi thought, thus lending support to the idea that philosophical thinking in this period was indeed characterized by a striving to fuse fundamentally different philosophical concepts.

⁵ Fayyāz Lāhījī, [1372/1994](#), p. 53.

Mystical philosophy

The mystical philosophy of Sufism gained widespread popularity during the period from the sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, as witnessed by the proliferation of Sufi orders. The Naqshbandi and Maulawi orders gained the most popularity and influence during the period. The Naqshbandi order, which originated in Bukhara in the fourteenth century, spread during the following centuries to Afghanistan, India, Iran (where it was suppressed), Turkey, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Its most important proponents between the sixteenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries were Ahmad Sirhindī, Miyān Faqīrullāh Jalālābādī and Shāh Walīullāh Dihlawī.

Ahmad Sirhindī

Ahmad Sirhindī (1564–1624), who was designated Mujaddid-i Alf-i Sānī (Reviver of the Second Millennium) by his followers, set out his concept of Sufism in three volumes of letters (*Maktūbāt*). Judging by his writings, he considers the Naqshbandis to represent the only true teaching, and on that basis he advocates a total submission of Sufism to Islam and its *sharīʿa* (Islamic law). The difference between the true and the false believer lies in the steadfastness of their compliance or non-compliance with the *sharīʿa*. He who is a true believer will not contravene the *sharīʿa*, even while in a state of mystical reverie. ‘But he who is a false believer will find obeying the commands of the *sharīʿa* more difficult than climbing Mount Caucasus.’⁶ Sirhindī is uncompromising in his rejection of all forms of innovation (*bidʿa*), considering that Islam represents absolute perfection and that no innovation is required, since innovation leads the public into delusion and erodes the roots of Islam.⁷

In order to integrate Sufism fully with Islam, Sirhindī tries to provide a critical assessment of the Sufi teachings on *wahdat al-wujūd* (the oneness of existence) propounded by Ibn al-ʿArabī and his followers. He sets out to demonstrate in particular that divine unity (*tauḥīd*) is not *wahdat al-wujūd*, ‘as He [God] is not one with anything. He is He – Supreme and All-Holy – and the world is the world’.⁸ Sirhindī cites the weaknesses inherent in the doctrine of the oneness of existence in his arguments for the rejection of that doctrine. The originators and followers of the doctrine consider that what is not God does not exist. At the same time, they argue that that which is not God is the *mazhar* (manifestation) of God. Sirhindī, on the other hand, argues that what does not exist cannot in any way be

⁶ Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, n.d., Vol. 2, Letter no. 95.

⁷ Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, n.d., Vol. 3, Letter no. 23.

⁸ Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, n.d., Vol. 1, Letter no. 31.

construed as the manifestation of God or an argument in favour of the oneness of existence. In rejecting the theory of the oneness of existence, Sirhindī also looks to religion, stating that the prophets never called the people to believe in the oneness of existence, and never denounced as polytheists those who recognize two existences. ‘They appealed[only] to the oneness of God.’⁹ In rejecting the doctrine of the oneness of existence, Sirhindī affirms the concept of *wahdat al-shuhūd* (the oneness of the sight [of God]). The difference between the doctrine of the oneness of existence (which affirms the oneness of God and the manifestation of His shadow as the basis for all other essences) and the doctrine of the oneness of the sight [of God] is that from the point of view of the latter doctrine the shadow of God cannot, under any circumstances, be identical to God Himself.

Miyān Faqīrullāh Jalālābādī

The assertions of Ahmad Sirhindī on the oneness of contemplation, the subordination of the Sufi path (*tarīqa*) to Islam, gnosis (*maʿrifa*) and the truth (*haqīqa*) of *sharīʿa* were taken up again in the eighteenth century by Miyān Faqīrullāh Jalālābādī, who wrote many works, including the *Fath al-jamīl fiʾl-madārij al-takmīl* [The Splendid Beginning in Levels of Perfection], the *Fiyūdat al-ilāhīyya* [Divine Effulgence], the *Jauhar al-aurād* [The Essence of Prayer], the *Barāhīn al-najāh* [Arguments on Salvation] and the *Tarīq al-irshād* [The Path of Admonition]. His position on the teachings of his predecessors with regard to the oneness of existence is, however, somewhat different from that of Sirhindī. In his view, the advocates of the doctrine of the oneness of existence fall into two categories: the monotheists (*muwahiddūn*, sing. *muwahhid*) and the heretics (*mulhidūn*, sing. *mulhid*). In his view, the heretics believe that the Truth (God) is not an essence in itself, separate from the world of spirits and bodies. On the contrary, for them the Truth is the world in its entirety. The relationship between the Almighty and the individual things of the world is similar to the relationship between a general quality and the individual essences that make up that quality. In other words, the world is God and God is the world. There is nothing other than the world that could be called God.¹⁰ According to Jalālābādī, such judgements lead to the conclusion that the world has no beginning, which is the position of the *dahriyas* (atheists), who believe that the world has no creator and that it necessarily exists of itself.¹¹ Unlike Sirhindī, Miyān Faqīrullāh does not consider the teachings of Ibn al-ʿArabī to be contrary to Islam, and indeed he sets out to demonstrate their total compatibility with Islam.

⁹ Ibid., Letter no. 272.

¹⁰ Miyān Faqīrullāh Jalālābādī, 1981, p. 154.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 156.

Shāh Walīullāh Dihlawī

An attempt was made by Shāh Walīullāh Dihlawī (1703–62) to integrate the teachings of Ibn al-^cArabī on the oneness of existence, Ahmad Sirhindī's teachings on the oneness of the sight [of God] and the doctrines of Islam. In his treatises entitled the *Hujjat Allāh al-bālīgha* [The Excellent Proof of God] and the *Faysalāt al-wahdat al-wujūd wa wahdat al-shuhūd* [Explanations on the Oneness of Existence and the Oneness of Sight], he argues that there are no differences, save for rhetorical differences, between Ibn al-^cArabī's theory on the oneness of existence, which is based on the idea that the essential quality of an essence is immutable by force of its divine attributes, and Sirhindī's doctrine on the oneness of the sight [of God], which is founded on the idea that an essence is immutable by force of its divine attributes.¹²

Shāh Walīullāh's metaphysical theory conceives of the existence of two worlds in addition to God: the material world and the spiritual world. The spiritual world is the link between the material world and its Creator. The creative will of God is initially reflected in the spiritual world, and is then materialized in various forms and images. All essences and phenomena are initially reflected in the world of ideas, and then find material form. The spiritual world is free of temporal and spatial constraints. Shāh Walīullāh's judgements reflect certain aspects of the teachings of Plato. Shāh Walīullāh considers the problems of time and place (space). He demonstrates that rather than being two separate and independent categories, time and space represent one category that reflects the temporal-spatial dimensions of existence. According to the philosopher, time and space are inseparable, and it is this inseparability that confers order upon the world. If it were not the case, the world would be seized by such chaos as would render the existence of creation impossible even for a second.¹³

Shāh Walīullāh develops his metaphysical compromise further in his analysis of the issue of will (*jabr*) and freedom of conscience. He believes that will is a necessary component of faith, and stresses that those who do not believe in that principle cannot consider themselves Muslims. From his point of view, the will of God determines the fate of the entire world, and His ordinances have the force of immutable law. Nevertheless, Shāh Walīullāh does not consider the human being to be a mere toy in the hands of fate. Were that the case, it would not be possible to consider a person accountable for his or her actions. Divine equity demands that all human beings should be granted the freedom to avoid evil and to pursue the path of obedience to God. It should be noted that Shāh

¹² Shāh Walīullāh al-Dihlawī, n.d., *Faysalāt . . .*, p. 7.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 29–30.

Walīullāh's intellectual activity was not restricted to Sufi and Islamic metaphysics. He was also interested in issues of economics, politics, society, philosophy, history, etc., though on these his opinions are often of a rather naive kind.

No other notable figures emerged to address other aspects of Sufi philosophy during the period. Most writers restricted themselves to commentaries on their predecessors' works. Noteworthy in this respect are the followers of the Maulawi Sufi order, which was founded in the thirteenth century by the great Sufi poet Jalālu'ddīn Rūmī. They produced an enormous quantity of Persian and Turkish-language commentaries on the poet's *Masnawī*.¹⁴

Logic

No particularly noteworthy developments emerged in Central Asia in the sphere of logic during our period, and no new systems were developed. Developments in the field of logic were mainly restricted to commentaries on the works of logicians of previous eras and accompanying glossaries. Many commentaries were written on the *Shamsiyya* [Enlightenment] by Najmu'ddīn Dabīranī (d. 1277), the *Ādāb al-bahs* [The Etiquette of Discussion] by Adudu'ddīn al-Idjī, the *Ādāb al-bahs* by Shamsu'ddīn Samarqandī (d. 1214) and the *Tahzīb al-mantiq wa'l-kalām* [The Correction of Logic and *Kalām*] by Sa'adu'ddīn Taftāzānī Samarqandī (d. 1390). Among the best-known commentators and glossary writers were Mīr Husayn al-Maybudī (d. 1504), Shujā'u'ddīn Ilyās Rūmī (d. 1523), Muhammad Badakhshī (d. 1517), Muhammad Bīrjandī (d. 1526), Ahmad Kāshī (sixteenth century), Abū'l Fat'h Sa'īd (d. 1543) and Husayn Khalkhālī (d. 1605). Unfortunately, their commentaries and glossaries have not yet been adequately studied and it is therefore impossible to say to what extent they encouraged the development of logic during the period.

Works of a general character that are prefaced with a logic-related introduction include the essays of Fayyāz Lāhījī entitled *Gauhar-i murād* and *Sarmāya-i'imān*, and Sabzewārī's *Manzūma al-hikma* and *Sharh 'al-Manzūma al-hikma'*, all mentioned above. In his works, Lāhījī restricts himself to a summary treatment of such issues as those of a logical nature, type, categorical differences, definition, description, judgement and inference.¹⁵ A more detailed discussion of logic-related issues is contained in Sabzewārī's two works mentioned above.

In defining logic as a legitimate organon, Sabzewārī sees its purpose as guarding against error and delusion. He is more thorough than Fayyāz Lāhījī in his consideration of the

¹⁴ For further details, see Zabihollāh Safā, 1363/1985, Vol. 5, Part 1, pp. 222–8.

¹⁵ See Fayyāz Lāhījī, 1372/1994, pp. 53–66.

issues of logic. In addition to analysing the issues of acquired and non-acquired knowledge (*‘ilm-i husūlī* and *‘ilm-i huzūrī*), nature, type, categorical differences, the general and the particular, the special and the general, the substantial and the accidental, types of logical issues, and the essence of definition, description and understanding, he also provides a more detailed analysis of the issues of judgement, syllogism, induction and analogy. He pays particular attention to the notion of proof, and in particular proof originating from cause, and proof originating from consequence (*al-burhān al-limmī* and *al-burhān al-innī*),¹⁶ etc. Throughout his analysis, Sabzewārī refers to Ibn Sīnā, but only rarely offers any critical comments on his work. This implies that the philosophers of the period in question relied heavily on the achievements of their predecessors from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries, but, unlike them, failed to come up with any new systems.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the period in question saw no fundamentally new philosophical systems emerge in Central Asia, it would not be accurate to say that following the blows dealt to it by Ghazālī, philosophical thinking ceased to exist in the region. The truth is that despite its general decline in the Islamic world, including Central Asia, philosophy survived throughout our period, and indeed began to display some signs of a revival,¹⁷ however feeble.

¹⁶ See Hājī Sabzewārī, [1369/1991](#).

¹⁷ See *Tārīkh-i falsafa dar Islām*, [1370/1992](#), Vol. 4, pp. 45–276.