

# **Framing Social Inclusion Policies**

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James Wolfensohn, as President, addressed the 1997 Hong Kong meeting of the World Bank with a speech entitled "The Challenge of Inclusion," arguing that development is about "bringing people into society who have never been part of it before." In 1995, the United Nations, at the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, also adopted social integration -- the creation of a "society for all" -- as a key goal of social development. The UN Millennium Declaration of 2000 reiterated the significance of social inclusion.

Social inclusion discourse is nearly ubiquitous, but its meaning remains ambiguous. It refers to different things in different national, cultural, and political contexts. It is the objective of a plethora of policies in a wide range of institutional spheres.

This Background Paper seeks to clarify the variable understandings of social inclusion as a policy goal and to develop a broad framework for organizing, classifying, and analyzing social inclusion policies. Rather than an inventory of social inclusion policies and programs per se, the discussion presents broad kinds of policies, tools, and mechanisms that promote social inclusion. Although no formal or comparative evaluation studies have been conducted, the paper will draw upon secondary literature to identify conditions under which such policies may be effective.

### **Overview**

After clarifying the meanings of social inclusion, the first part of the paper discusses why it might be considered a worthy, if unattainable goal. There are in fact many values underlying the objective of social inclusion. Because the meaning and worth of social membership is so variable, the very ambiguity of the term may ironically facilitate reaching a reasonable international consensus to pursue it, despite significant cultural and contextual differences.

The second part of the paper discusses policies aimed at realizing four notions of social inclusion. Social inclusion furthers the ideals, values, or goals of freedom, equality, democracy, and recognition. There are four corresponding conceptions or end points of social inclusion: capability, distributive justice, participation, and human rights. Different policies emphasize these to a greater or lesser extent. Inclusion as capability is the main objective of social investment, human capital, activation, and mobility policies. Inclusion as equality rests upon redistribution policies like minimum incomes and social assistance. Social inclusion as active

participation is promoted procedurally by consultation and active involvement in decision making, such as participatory budgeting, and enabled by desegregation and mainstreaming. Finally, recognition is symbolic and legal. Cultural policies include memorials, apologies, ceremonies, holidays, and the like, as well as recognition of multiple languages, beliefs, and customs. Human rights also recognize people as members of the human community, thus protecting them from violence against their persons and other dehumanizing treatment.

The third part of the paper breaks out one type of social inclusion policy that is controversial partly because it furthers some of these four ideals but may be considered contrary to others. Affirmative action policies are found throughout the world and operate in multiple spheres of life: education (to enhance capability); employment (to redistribute income); politics (to allow excluded groups to participate); and culture (to insure diversity of values, languages, and so on). The concluding section summarizes the framework and revisits the idea of social inclusion.

### **Part One: Defining Social Inclusion**

The Social Development Department's Flagship Program envisions "social inclusion" as part of the World Bank's work for equity, reduced poverty, and sustainable development. It aims to develop a practical policy framework that enables the sharing of information about what promotes social inclusion. To launch its work, the Program adapted the European Union's working definition of Social Inclusion:

*Social inclusion is a process which ensures that those at risk of being left out gain opportunities and resources necessary to participate fully in economic, social, political and cultural life and enjoy a standard of well-being that is considered normal in the society in which they live. It ensures that they have a voice in decisions which affect their lives and access to markets, public services and their fundamental rights.*

Like most working definitions, this one is synthetic and vague about *what* precisely people are at risk of being left out of.<sup>1</sup> There is a profound ambiguity about the ultimate state of social inclusion. Inclusion has multifarious synonyms: integration, cohesion, solidarity, belonging, social capital, and so on. What is the "mainstream"? Not surprisingly, people of action sidestep precise definition for practical reasons. However, if this working definition is unpacked, it points to (1) opportunities and well-being; (2) access to public and private resources; (3)

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<sup>1</sup> For example, the WHO's Social Exclusion Knowledge Network (2008) put together a definition: "Exclusion consists of dynamic, multi-dimensional processes driven by unequal power relationships interacting across four main dimensions - economic, political, social and cultural - and at different levels including individual, household, group, community, country and global levels. It results in a continuum of inclusion/exclusion characterized by unequal access to resources, capabilities and rights which leads to health inequalities." See Appendix for the policy framework based upon this definition. Similarly, the UK Social Exclusion Unit under PM Tony Blair defined exclusion as "A shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown." This definition never explicitly said what does happen when these conditions pertain.

participation and voice in multiple spheres; and (4) rights. These four aspects of social inclusion are reflected in the ideals or “first principles” of freedom, equality, democracy, and recognition, ideals that are the goals of policy.

<u>Goals</u>	<u>Mechanisms</u>	<u>Policies</u>
Freedom	Capability	Equal opportunity, anti-discrimination Social investment: activation, education, health & sanitation Mobility: transportation and communications access
Equality	Distributive Justice	Group or place specific anti-poverty programs, minimum incomes, land reforms
Democracy	Participation	Financial inclusion, seats in boardrooms, public-private partnerships, legislatures; Participatory budgeting, eInclusion, participation in research, access to public space; desegregation and mainstreaming
Recognition	Human Rights	Sovereignty, federalism, land titles; Celebrations, holidays, memorials, official apologies, reconciliation commissions, penalties for hate crimes, multiculturalism/multilingualism

It makes sense to classify policies by their ultimate objectives, values, or first principles.<sup>2</sup> Also, these ideals are the basis of earlier policy classifications. For example, some aspects of social inclusion are best advanced through rights (participation and recognition), whereas other dimensions call for resources (capability and equality). The first two principles are more economically oriented, while the latter emphasize political, social, and cultural spheres, but they are of course interrelated. Each goal emphasizes a given sphere of life (social, economic, political, and cultural), although is not confined to that, allowing for multidimensional relations across arenas. Recognition, rights and capabilities allow one to participate. Participation demonstrates responsibility, in return for which rights are recognized. Recognition legitimates claims for equality. Redistribution of resources in turn facilitates more participation. Following the virtuous cycles of social inclusion demonstrates its multi-dimensional, dynamic character.

Nevertheless, these first principles are not always complementary or reinforcing. Sometimes liberty and equality are in tension. Redistribution may be seen as “passive,” requiring little in return for entitlement, whereas capability is an active process of human development. Representation in institutions allows excluded groups to participate, but positive action and

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<sup>2</sup> A similar approach delineating the “cornerstones” of social inclusion was adopted by Canada’s Laidlaw Foundation (Freiler and Zarnke 2002). Asserting that the idea could not be reduced to a single dimension or meaning, the Foundation identified five critical dimensions:

1. valued recognition of common worth and respect for differences (recognition here);
2. human development of talents, skills, capacities, and choices (capability here);
3. involvement in decisions that affect oneself and engagement in community and political life (participation here);
4. proximity and shared spaces (freedom here);
5. material well-being and adequate resources to participate fully in society (equality here).

group rights seem to fly in the face of equal opportunity. Given the potential conflicts, these principles should remain analytically distinct.

The scale at which the mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion operate also deserves attention. Human rights are naturally international, if not universal. However, activation and participation are often facilitated at the local level where services are delivered and people deliberate face-to-face. Distributive justice and voting are usually national level mechanisms, but both principles may be pursued at higher and lower scales. The issue of appropriate scale also calls attention to the spatial or territorial dimensions of social inclusion. Wherever there are borders, there are likely to be residence requirements for membership and a perception of spatial segregation. Yet decentralization of some aspects of social life (regional autonomy, etc.) can be compatible with social inclusion in a federal state. National sovereignty in most affairs has not precluded, indeed has enabled international agreements and relations. Thus, social inclusion goals may be pursued at multiple levels as well as in multiple spheres of life.

<b>Social Inclusion is:</b>	<b>Inclusion Policies are:</b>
Multi-dimensional, multi-scalar	Joined-up, one-stop-shops, transversal, tailored
Dynamic Process	Connected trajectories, stages
Relational	Target sources of exclusion & the excluded
Active, participatory	Participation, activation, agency
Contextual	Contextual, nationally sensitive

### Characteristics of Social Inclusion

If we break down the working definition, several qualities of social inclusion become evident. First, social inclusion is **multidimensional** in that people come to participate in “*economic, social, political and cultural life.*” Social exclusion tends to be cumulative, cascading from one disadvantage top another, producing what is called the “intersectionality” of statuses. Intersectionality can create role conflicts for persons with combined forms of domination or exclusion (Hill Collins 2000; Jaunait et Chauvin 2012). Intersectionality creates “outsiders within,” such as black or lower caste women, who suffer from exclusion within excluded groups.

However, it is the cross-cutting of dimensions that makes social exclusion and inclusion such useful terms in contradistinction to “poverty.” By looking at disadvantage across spheres, it becomes clear that there are individuals who are wealthy who are nonetheless socially, politically, or culturally excluded. Gay men, people with disabilities, or immigrants may not be socially included, even if they have financial assets.

A considerable amount of social research has considered how various aspects of deprivation are related. Cumulative disadvantage is only partially confirmed. The association between persistent poverty, measured as those below 60% of median income over three years, and other dimensions of deprivation (basic lifestyle, secondary lifestyle, housing, and environment) across some European countries was weak (Whelan, Layte, and Maitre 2002). Muffels and Fouage (2001) found only six percent of the EU population was living in both persistent income poverty *and* persistent multidimensional resources deprivation relative to national standards over three years. The moderate association between persistent poverty and persistent deprivation was higher in southern European welfare regimes and lower in social democratic Scandinavian ones. In Britain, income and unemployment are weakly associated with

sociability and community participation (Pantazis, Gordon & Levitas 2006). Only a minority of the materially disadvantaged have no social support (Tsakloglou and Papadopoulos, 2002; Russell and Whelan 2004). Material deprivation and income poverty differ because of social support (Nolan and Whelan 2010). While poor people and the unemployed more often live alone, contact with neighbors or organized activities, for example, are not restricted by lack of resources or employment. Social isolation is not directly caused by unemployment, as the effect depends upon cultural patterns of household structure and local sociability, and conversely, sociability did not affect how long it took the unemployed to get a job (Böhnke 2008; Gallie et al., 2003).

The multidimensionality of social inclusion underlies the European Union's multiple indicator approach to measuring the concept. The Lisbon Process committed member states to the "Open Method of Coordination" as a "soft law" procedure to fight social exclusion. However, the common measures that member states agreed at Laeken to monitor and report to the Commission in their National Action Plan pertain mostly to labor market and material poverty, with the afterthought of a few health and education indicators (Atkinson & Marlier 2010; Atkinson et al. 2002). In fact, the 2005 Joint Report on Social Exclusion underlined "the need to better capture the multi-dimensional nature of social exclusion." With the exception of national variation and the Roma, the EU does not consider ethnic, tribal, caste, racial, or religious origins as disqualifying identities for participation. Furthermore, symbolic boundaries are hardened by spatial ones, whereas access facilitates, if it does not guarantee mobility. Even apparently universal welfare states have eligibility rules that keep people out of places, institutions, credit, or risk pools, hampering their opportunities and protections in life. Measures of the many dimensions of social, legal, political, and cultural exclusion are underdeveloped.

### **European Union's Primary Indicators of Social Exclusion**

(broken down by age and gender)

#### **INCOME**

At Risk of Poverty (household size- and composition-adjusted disposable income relative to 60 percent of nationally equivalent median income with OECD equivalence scales, before and after social transfers) by economic activity; household type; housing tenure.

Income inequality (top 20-percent-to-bottom-20-percent quintile share ratio)

Persistent at-risk-of poverty (share of the population below the poverty line for current year and at least two of three preceding years)

Relative median poverty risk gap (ratio of median income of those at risk of poverty and the at risk of poverty threshold)

#### **EMPLOYMENT**

Regional cohesion (coefficient of variation of employment rates among territorial regions Long-term unemployment rate (share of 15-64 year olds in active population who were unemployed by ILO definition for 12 months or more)

Share of children and working age adults living in jobless households

## EDUCATION AND HEALTH

Early school leavers not in education or training (proportion of 18-24 year olds with only lower secondary education and not in education or training in the prior four weeks)

Life expectancy at birth

Self-defined health status (as bad or very bad) by bottom and top of income distribution

The indicators are “multidimensional” measures in the sense that they break down low income or workless households by age, gender, work status, household structure, housing tenure, region, and duration (see Table).

After 2005, social inclusion was somewhat downgraded as an EU goal, secondary to growth and jobs which would “feed in and feed out” of a streamlined OMC on social protection and inclusion. Since the EU adopted *Europe 2020*, with five objectives on employment, innovation, education, climate/energy, and social inclusion, the latter is discussed in terms of a single “headline” indicator of target for the next decade. The member states adopted a goal of lifting 20 million Europeans out of “poverty” by 2020. (Recent EU documents do single out particular groups who are especially at risk of poverty, such as immigrants, the Roma, the homeless and people with disabilities). However, the plan allows the states to define “poverty” in relative income terms (at-risk-of-poverty as 60% of national median income), or as severe material deprivation (lacking 4 or more out of 9 necessities<sup>3</sup>), or as jobless households.<sup>4</sup> Permitting states to choose how they measure poverty in meeting the poverty reduction goal is a clue to the less than perfect correlations among these three indicators (not to mention the others). Empirically, the relative “at-risk-of-poverty” indicator is only moderately related to employment and other official measures.

## LAOKEN INDICATORS OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION

	Primary indicators	Secondary indicators (Tertiary are national level)
Low income	By age and gender	Low income rate by threshold
	By work status	Low income rate by fixed threshold
	By household type	Low income rate before social transfers
	By housing tenure	Gini coefficient
	Low income amounts	Persistent very low income
	By work status	
	Persistent low income	
	Depth of low income	
Work	Regional cohesion	Long term unemployment share

<sup>3</sup> Cannot afford to pay for at least four of: to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; to keep their home adequately warm; to face unexpected expenses; to eat meat or proteins every second day; to go on holiday away from home for a week once a year; to have a color television set; a refrigerator; a car; a telephone.

<sup>4</sup> The indicator “very low work intensity households” refers to the number of persons living in a household having a work intensity below 0.20, which is the ratio of the total number of months worked to the total number of months that could have been worked. The UK is the highest in Europe on this indicator.

	Long term unemployment rate	Very long term unemployment rate
	Jobless households	
Education	Not in education or training	Low educational attainment
Health	Life expectancy at birth	
	Self-defined health status	

Recent work on social policy more generally tends to emphasize outcomes or performance indicators.<sup>5</sup> For example, the Millennium Development Goals contain time-specific, quantified targets among which are social inclusion objectives (e.g., reducing extreme poverty, promoting gender equality, reduce the slum population). The “new public management” approach stresses “evidence-based” policy that tracks progress towards quantifiable goals without much attention to the mechanisms by which policy accomplishes them. **Mechanisms** are institutionalized processes or recurrent sequences of social interactions that mediate between cause and effect, in this case, the rupture of social bonds.

This brings us to the second characteristic: **dynamics**. “*Social inclusion is a process.*” Social exclusion processes set in motion “vicious cycles” of reinforcing problems and cumulative disadvantages that progressively rupture social relationships in many institutional spheres of life (Room 2006). Social inclusion policies are designed to break those cycles, and turn them into virtuous circles towards full participation. Instead of simply tracking aggregate cross-sectional indicators, the increasing availability of panel or longitudinal data sets are allowing more quasi-experimental, random assignment, before-after assessments of policy (Silver 2007). For example, two Laeken indicators build in duration: the persistent at-risk-of poverty (share of the population below the poverty line for current year and at least two of three preceding years) and long-term unemployment.

A third characteristic of social inclusion is that it entails **active** participation of the excluded and excluders. On the one hand, the excluded should “*have a voice and participate fully*” in their own inclusion, in order to prevent “adverse incorporation” on unfavorable terms that perpetuate their subordination. Activation programs encourage participation in training, capacity building, and employment. Positive action promotes participation in once closed institutions. On the other hand, individuals often deliberately engage in exclusionary, discriminatory activities. They reject, shun, stigmatize, segregate, imprison, and aggress against excluded people because of their group membership rather than their individual character.

The active nature of social inclusion also draws out the fact that it is a social **relationship** between excluders and excluded. “The real importance of the idea of social exclusion,” Amartya

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<sup>5</sup> A joint effort of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN Secretariat (Atkinson and Marlier 2010), in collaboration with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) explores practical strategies for promoting social integration and inclusion. At a 2007 Expert Group Meeting in Paris, “Creating an Inclusive Society: Practical Strategies to Promote Social Integration,” most attention was given to measuring the multiple dimensions of social inclusion and developing the indicators “to monitor the progress of interventions aimed at fighting poverty and social exclusion and promoting social inclusion.” However, the actual interventions were not presented. Although recognizing that indicators should take into consideration “the historical, cultural and contextual backgrounds of one’s own society,” the report only offered common indicators offered as “practical tools for evidence-based policymaking, impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation in the area of social inclusion.” Procedural and institutional aspects of social inclusion policies are stressed over the content of those policies.

Sen wrote, “lies in emphasizing the role of relational features in the deprivation of capability and thus in the experience of poverty” (2000, p. 6). First, social exclusion “constitutes” a form of capability deprivation, in the sense of Adam Smith’s observation that, in 18<sup>th</sup> century England, without a linen shirt, one could not appear in public and participate in the life of the community without shame. Social inclusion is relative to social standards of what participation means. Second, “instrumentally,” exclusion from social relations sets off a dynamic process causing other capability failures. However, Sen stopped at social inclusion as capability (or a means to capability). “The case for seeing social exclusion as an approach to poverty is easy enough to establish within the general perspective of poverty as capability failure” (2000, p.5). Capability is about individuals developing themselves and attaining valued functionings. Individual fulfillment may depend on social institutions and values, but the focus remains at the personal level. Poverty and freedom are individual attributes, and social relations themselves – politics, recognition, representation, and so on – are not part of capability analysis, but are central to the social inclusion approach.

By pointing to social relativity or the “*standard of well-being that is considered normal in the society in which they live,*” the working definition of social inclusion the World Bank project is using highlights its **context-dependency**. This insight transcends the familiar debate over absolute versus relative poverty lines, or poverty vs. deprivation. Different societies define membership differently, based upon their histories and constitutions (Silver 1992). They actively transmit national identities in schools, the military, and other institutions. They have different institutional impediments and assistance to full participation. Social exclusions vary across societies. Cleavages on some dimensions may be more salient in some countries than in others. For example, racially homogeneous countries like Poland do not confront the challenges of racial exclusion found in Brazil, South Africa, or the United States. Religion may not divide Germans or Americans as much as it does Indians or Egyptians. Economic, status, and power disparities may divide self-conscious groups in civil society, but they also exist between unorganized social categories like generations or regions or all those ineligible for certain kinds of social protection. The unevenness of types of social exclusion calls for remedies that are specific to context.

### **What inclusion is not**

The tendency to treat “social inclusion” as the opposite of “social exclusion” may reflect a desire to sound positive, to focus on social objectives rather than dwell on the past. However, pursuing social inclusion without fighting social exclusion frees “the mainstream” from looking in the mirror. Many people absolve themselves from responsibility for past injustices, refusing to acknowledge that they benefit from perpetuating existing exclusion.

Social inclusion should not be seen as the logical antonym of social exclusion. There are several reasons for this. First, different mechanisms and agents produce social exclusion and inclusion. Keeping people out may have a different motivation than actively including them. Often, social exclusion (banishment, shaming, or incarceration) is a penalty, sanction, punishment for transgressing group norms and is thus used to maintain social order. Excluding outsiders can build internal cohesion. Sometimes exclusion is a form of discrimination or an expression of outright hostility, the desire to distance oneself, one’s associates, or one’s culture from contamination, dishonor, or stigma that comes with contact. Furthermore, excluding outsiders from access may bestow advantages on insiders, so they have no interest in social inclusion.

Opening up the door to membership and providing access does not necessarily produce social inclusion. Some effort or outreach may be necessary to bring outsiders in. Most people do not deliberately and actively exclude outsiders, but do nothing proactively to encourage inclusion. Institutions work impersonally to exclude people. Insiders take for granted many barriers that outsiders experience as exclusionary. Moreover, the rich often choose to exit, withdraw, or exclude themselves from the rest of society (for example, by living in gated communities). The consequence is less social integration, but it may not be intended as social exclusion.

Conversely, just because doors are opened does not mean that outsiders will come in. To say that social exclusion is “relational” means that of the two parties, one is an agent of exclusionary action, the other its victim. This implies an important caveat: exclusion must be involuntary. The excluded must want to gain access to the mainstream, and on equal terms. Since rejection may encourage self-reliance, it might be a mistake to take the self-segregation of excluded groups at face value, since hunkering down in one’s own culture may be a form of dual closure or reactive group formation (Barry 2002). What is sometimes seen as “self-exclusion” is a reaction to adverse terms of incorporation. “Adverse incorporation” is a perverse expression of social inclusion that, by operating where there are local monopolies, may perpetuate rural poverty (du Toit, 2005; Hickey and du Toit 2007; Hickey 2008). Forced labor or a starvation wage is not an invitation to participate. Similarly, the price of admission may require relinquishing valued identities and practices to assimilate into the mainstream. Social cohesion may be based on demands for conformity or intolerance of difference. Reconciliation after a past of exclusion, denigration or persecution also calls for symbolic acts of contrition and expressions of respect of outsiders’ common humanity and acknowledgement of past wrongs. In sum, social inclusion is not the opposite of social exclusion, and may have some “downsides.”

This distinction means that it may be necessary to pursue *both* anti-exclusion and pro-inclusion policies. For example, eliminating discrimination and insuring equal treatment may combat exclusion, but social inclusion calls for something more, sometimes even treating members of different groups differently. Negative rights – freedoms from – are different from positive rights – capabilities or freedoms to. To accomplish real empowerment and equality, equal treatment is not always enough. Sometimes policy must give priority, preference, or distinction to those who have historical or other handicaps. For the sake of inclusion, we might dedicate the best seats on buses or nearby parking spaces to people with disabilities. We might recognize that different does not have to be lesser; for example, comparable worth policies equate the skills and qualifications of men and women working in segregated occupations to arrive at a fair “comparable” wage until women are no longer trapped in certain sectors. Affirmative action and mainstreaming, as I will discuss in some detail, also recognize and accommodate substantive differences in the name of social inclusion.

## **Part 2: A Framework for Social Inclusion Policies**

Having defined and elaborated on the qualities of social inclusion, I now turn to a classification of policies designed to promote it. To repeat, the policies considered are not those that combat social exclusion, but rather those that (1) enhance capability, outlaw discrimination, and activate individuals; (2) redistribute resources to equalize group, cumulative, or multiple inequalities; (3) encourage active social participation; and (4) symbolically and legally recognize groups that were once excluded, invisible, or denigrated. Inclusion as capability is the main objective of social investment, human capital, activation, and mobility policies. Inclusion as

equality rests upon material policies like minimum incomes and social assistance. Social inclusion as active participation is promoted procedurally by consultation and active involvement in decision making, such as participatory budgeting, and enabled by desegregation and mainstreaming. Finally, recognition is insured with multicultural policies and demonstrations of solidarity as well as human rights.

As these examples illustrate, inclusion policies can be initiated at many levels of scales. Individuals may be targeted for personalized sets of interventions given their unique problems. Groups may be targeted for recognition and representation. Local communities may be targeted for inclusion by providing spatial access or communications infrastructure. Regions may be included through redistributive cohesion policies, targeted investments, or compensatory aid to places losing their economic base. Poorer nations may be recipients of foreign aid or loans from richer countries. Human rights, trade agreements, public health measures, and security for embassies or international travel include most everybody.

Social inclusion policies usually address more than one dimension or type of exclusion. A key aspect is “joined-up” governance, in which multiple agencies address a combination of problems, tailoring a program to personal needs. Case workers focus on a comprehensive, related set of interventions to fit the individual. Service recipients go to “one-stop-shops” instead of moving from office to office. Bureaucratically, this breaks down traditional program “silos” and encourages “interagency cooperation” and “transversal” policy. Many of the interventions are arranged in sequences, as individuals move through progressive steps towards full social participation. Exclusion processes are preventatively nipped in the bud.

Social inclusion policies do not just target excluded individuals. Since exclusion is a relationship, both parties are objects of policy. Exclusionary behavior – discrimination – must be policed and punished. Exclusionary institutions must be opened up. Rules that treat individuals on the basis of group averages – insurance risks by race, for example – should be illegal. Exclusionary cultural assumptions, such as appropriate behavior for women or monolingual ballots, should be challenged. These barriers to participation vary by context, of course, but inclusion policies cannot just place the onus of change on excluded individuals. They have enough problems to worry about.

Social inclusion policies often insist on active participation of the excluded. Activating people to reknit their social bonds through training, job search, employment, or civic engagement is inclusionary and develops capabilities. However, this takes time and effort. While opening up exclusive seats of power to diverse representatives has symbolic value and provides group “role models,” it may not lead to substantive policy changes or improvements in the material well-being of most excluded group members. Participation in local associations may even sap people’s energy. Therefore, opening institutions to enable voluntary participation may be more inclusive than “workfare” which coerces participation in return for transfer payments.

The next four sections discuss social inclusion policies in terms of their primary objectives. However, this is a loose classification scheme. Any given policy may serve more than one inclusionary goal or ideal.

## **1. Social Inclusion Policies Promoting Capability and Freedom**

The World Bank’s working definition of social inclusion contains within it at least four principles or goals that policies may promote. The first goal is freedom. As Aristotle argued, “an impoverished life is one without the freedom to undertake important activities that a person has reason to choose.” In Amartya Sen’s (1993, 1999) terms, poverty is not about income. It is

about the lack of freedom to achieve one's capabilities to function in one's own society and to choose the "functionings" – ways of doing and being – that one values. "The capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose a collection" (Sen, 1993: 31). The capabilities are absolute (at a minimum, people shouldn't starve, be homeless or ill, or lack clothing and other basics needed for social participation), but the resources to meet individual goals or enable activities are relative, varying across societies in light of cultural expectations, institutional structures, and resources (Sen 1983). The UNDP's Human Development Index builds directly on Sen's thoughts about capabilities. The Human Development Index is a multidimensional scale composed of not only material income, but also education and health (life expectancy).

Human development is about cultivating capabilities, including participation in socially expected relationships. Sen argued that, in contrast to poverty, the idea of "social exclusion" is "relational." It addresses the social nature of "capabilities" and the socially relative nature of functionings. In different societies, of course, there are different "ways of doing and being" that are necessary for capabilities, for living without shame and participating in the activities of the community. Enhancing capabilities rests upon the freedom to choose a socially valued set of life activities. People need to be healthy, well fed, safe, and have opportunities to learn. Social rights and the rule of law are essential to freedom, as are capabilities based on health, education, and social relations.

### **Equal opportunity and anti-discrimination policies**

It cannot be assumed that markets are open and competitive. Without policies that structure markets, monopolies may arise in which insiders seek rents at the expense of outsiders.

Freedom is about eliminating barriers to access: Equal opportunity rests upon enforceable anti-discrimination laws. Often, enforcement is the responsibility of the victim of discrimination, the very person whose capabilities are weak. Creating public institutions that monitor potential discrimination – Equal Opportunity Commissions or census agencies – and providing free legal clinics where wronged people can seek justice are valuable in guaranteeing equal treatment. They should not be excluded from these protections even if they lack formal citizenship, as undocumented workers are easily victimized. Access to justice or standing in courts insures equal opportunity.

Anti-discrimination laws have been enacted virtually everywhere and most countries have signed on to the Universal Declarations of rights. While such international pronouncements are valuable, it usually falls to nation-states to enforce these commitments. Evidence of discrimination is needed to punish it. Sometimes tracking and publicizing trends in group disparities alert the public to potential statistical discrimination. Increasingly audit studies and other data collection tools can gather the evidence for support complaints heard by equal opportunity commissions or tribunals. Class actions in which entire categories sue and are awarded huge damages have proven effective in altering employer behavior generally. Punitive damages must be high for deterrence.

For years, little was done in the European countries to enforce anti-discrimination laws, but they began to get serious after 2000. Two EU directives were passed with the force of "hard law," meaning Member States are committed to act under the Treaty. Article 13 EC is the basis of both. Directive 2000/43/EC of June 20, 2000, "Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin," prohibits racial discrimination in employment (access to jobs, pay, conditions, benefits), education, social

security, health care, and access to public goods and services and provides rights of redress and sanctions for discrimination. The directive, which came into force in July 2003, shifts the burden of proof from the complainant and protects against harassment and violence. Directive 2000/78/EC on employment equality bans discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, age, disability, and sexual orientation. It requires members to bring national laws into accord with this prohibition by December 2003, with an additional three years for disability and age legislation. In late 2000 the European Council launched a five-year Action Program to Combat All Forms of Discrimination, supporting national legislative measures, mobilization of relevant actors, and the exchange of information and good practices through database construction (See Silver 2006).

In 1997, the European Union established the Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia in Vienna. It is charged with enforcing the 2000 Racial and Employment Directives as well as the Charter on Fundamental Rights. Its annual reports provide Member States with objective, reliable and comparable data at European level on racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in order to help them take action. The data covers racism and xenophobia with respect to free movement of persons within the Community; media and other means of communication; education, vocational training and youth; social policy, including employment; free movement of goods; and culture. The reports show that ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities, immigrants, and refugees are vulnerable to racist crimes and discrimination in all the member states and that racial incidents and xenophobia are increasing.

In the new Millennium, the European Union has focused its anti-discrimination efforts on the Roma, Europe's largest (10-12 million) minority, especially in the Eastern European accession countries. The group is famously excluded, with high poverty and unemployment rates and recourse to child labor. In addition to residential segregation, Roma face educational discrimination. Roma children are often sent to special schools as if they are developmentally disabled, which only contributes to the drop-out rate and perpetuates the cycle of poverty. In response, the European Social Funds are supporting a variety of targeted efforts to reduce discrimination, segregation, and exclusion of this target group. In May 2012, the Commission issued Communication 226 on "National Roma Integration Strategies: a first step in the implementation of the EU Framework."<sup>6</sup> It set a target goal of having all Roma children complete at least primary school and have access to quality education and advised Member States to: eliminate school segregation and misuse of special needs education; enforce full compulsory education and promote vocational training; increase enrolment in early childhood education and care; improve teacher training and school mediation; and raise parents' awareness of the importance of education.

Finally, beyond gender, race, and Roma, a "fourth anti-discrimination directive" was proposed in 2008 to make sure that disabled people and other minorities, such as gay people and pensioners, get full access to services, including transport. The bill has been stalled at the first reading stage for the past four years, blocked by the argument the EU Treaty does not give Brussels the competence to pass laws on social problems. The Council is divided, largely because of the potential costs of implementation during the economic crisis.

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<sup>6</sup> The Framework is in an earlier 2011 Communication "An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020", COM(2011)173. The 2012 Communication cites the World Bank's report Economic costs of Roma exclusion (April 2010) [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTROMA/Resources/Economic\\_Costs\\_Roma\\_Exclusion\\_Note\\_Final.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTROMA/Resources/Economic_Costs_Roma_Exclusion_Note_Final.pdf)

## **Mobility**

Another route to social inclusion is to move to where the opportunities are. Freedom of movement enhances capabilities, whereas the inability to move can result in spatial exclusion. Barriers to exit deny people access to opportunities. Some states deny citizens the right to travel out the country, withholding passports or visas, while others restrict domestic travel.

Internal migration is very common in India and China. Approximately 30 percent of the Indian population are internal migrants, 70 percent of whom are women. Migrants face denial of basic entitlements including access to subsidized food, housing, drinking water, sanitation and public health facilities, education, and banking services and often work in poor conditions devoid of social security and legal protection. In 2011, UNESCO and UNICEF launched the “Internal Migration in India Initiative” to support the social inclusion of migrants in the economic, social, political and cultural life of the country. The goal is “to dispel the growing misunderstanding and prejudices affecting internal migrants while recognizing positive contribution to the economic, cultural and social development of both source states and destination states. The Initiative calls for reforms of existing inter-state migrant legislation to cover access to and portability of social protection of migrants, their right to the city and the special vulnerabilities of children and women migrants.

One of the greatest sources of inequality in China is the hukou residential registry system, which impedes migration from the countryside to the cities. When Chinese people move to urban opportunities despite prohibitions, they end up excluded from social rights like health care and education in their destinations. Bonded labor also prevents people from moving.

Some barriers to movement are literally physical obstructions. Walls surround privileged communities, keeping people out, or walls imprison people in compounds, camps, or ghettos. Zoning or lack of credit also excludes some people from moving into nice neighborhoods or suburbs where the jobs are. Physical barriers impede spatial access of people with disabilities from buildings and public facilities. Opening the gates thus promotes social inclusion.

The desire to move often arises because people live in spatially excluded places cut off from access to a range of essential resources. People may not feel the need to move if the friction of distance can be reduced. Thus, programs that connect places by providing transportation, roads, pipelines, sewers, telecommunications, and other local infrastructure are socially inclusive. For example, Indian girls often miss school because they walk long distances to fetch water or have no private toilet. Hydraulic connections indirectly enhance capabilities. Other programs may sponsor temporary mobility, sending a rural representative to study medicine, agriculture, or engineering and bring their skills back to the village. Indeed, one might describe these programs as serving the right to stay put. By attaching remote areas and bringing resources to excluded places, people can avoid leaving their cherished ancestral land.

Being forced to move is also exclusionary. Too often, indigenous and poor people are displaced from their homes for the sake of development, renewal, or improvement. Even if there is a net social benefit to building roads or dams, extracting raw materials, or modernizing housing, displacement should be minimized and fair compensation provided. Compensation should preserve communities, not only reimburse individuals. Tenure rights, such as security from eviction, are becoming the subject of increasing scrutiny around the world. Rapid urbanization has created slums in cities throughout the world. Although public efforts to upgrade or renew these areas may promote social inclusion by providing access to decent sanitation, infrastructure, and transportation, they also threaten the hard-won homes of the poor. Urban renewal sets gentrification in motion, imposing costs on the poor while benefiting the

more affluent. Forcible relocation without just compensation and pricing residents out of their own housing are expressions of spatial exclusion.

### **Activation**

The most important policies for cultivating capabilities are those that foster investments in human capital, especially education and health. Increasingly, European welfare states are leveraging such investments with minimum income, social assistance, and unemployment benefits, pairing social rights to responsibilities to participate. These “activation” programs have long operated in the Nordic welfare states and are at the origin of the EU’s new “social investment” approach to social protection reforms (Esping-Andersen 2002). The Open Method of Coordination applied to the streamlined “social protection and social inclusion” agenda has diffused the activation approach throughout Europe, but without the same fiscal and institutional complements to the policy (Serrano Pascual 2007; Sztandar-Sztanderska, K. 2009).

There are some big differences between conditional cash transfer programs that require social investments in health and education in return for social assistance, and European activation policies. This is because the unemployed are not the only object of policy. All the institutions work together to keep people employed. Activation rests upon a whole range of human services, usually public, that do not exist in the low capacity states of the Global South. Scandinavian welfare states include high-tech employment services and labor exchanges, as well as support for geographical mobility to job rich parts of the country. There are lifelong learning policies that insure that the jobless are quickly retrained for jobs in demand. There are services to support workers’ family demands, such as high quality day care, and benefits allowing for “flexsecurity” like job-sharing, full benefits for part-time work, and parental leaves. Early childhood education facilitates later learning and productivity. Universal medical care means workers and their families are healthy and more able to adapt to changes in the market.

Following the Nordic lead, Continental Bismarckian welfare states that tied social insurance benefit levels to occupation and contributions are shifting to more universal, less generous, tax-financed benefits. To activate the unemployed, benefit durations are shortened, replacement rates reduced with time, and more employment services are provided. By increasing job searches, the unemployed are expected to find and accept employment, even at lower wages than before. Topping up low wages through earned income tax credits, mini-Jobs, and wage subsidies or reduced social charges to compensate employers for lower productivity should “make work pay.” Flexible measures to prevent unemployment, such as Kurzeit or shortened hours, keep workers from being laid off in downturns. In good times, contributions to fund are collected, later to be distributed as wage subsidies that keep workers in their jobs.

To assist the unemployed move back to work, there has been a revolution in Employment Services around the world, altering the mix of incentives and sanctions (Kuddo 2012). On the one hand, public employment services have deployed new technology to create better job registries that match skills to openings (although they have been accused of “profiling”). The “One-Stop-Shop” became a popular service delivery system during the 1990s as advanced welfare states reformed and integrated social assistance, unemployment benefits, and employment services. For example, in 2002, the UK consolidated its “Jobcentres,” which matched the unemployed with employers, and its Benefits Agency, which operated social security unemployment benefits. Reformed in 2012 and placed on-line at a government website, Universal Jobmatch, the Jobcentres Plus reduced the administrative fragmentation of the activation process.

On the other hand, private employment services have contracted with governments to place the unemployed in jobs. While they report relatively good results and the competition with government has spurred innovation in the public sector, these privatize arrangements sometimes offer a flat fee per placement. This creates an incentive to “cream” off the easiest to employ clients, boosting the apparent placement rate. There are also “Job Clubs” in the nonprofit sector that support jobseekers.

A central feature of the new activation regime is the individual action plan or insertion contract. With a personal case worker or job coach, jobless people are urged to consider their capabilities, develop a long-term plan to enhance their human capital and job prospects, identify the work supports needed (e.g., child care), and engage in a job search. This “trajectory” reverses the process of social exclusion, and sets people on a pathway to social inclusion. Although the requirement to search for work in return for benefits is increasingly enforced, some countries for some recipients are more “enabling” (Nordic, Social Democratic, human resource development) than “demanding” (Anglo, liberal, “work first” punitive workfare) in the activities considered obligatory (Eichhorst & Honle-Seidl 2008; Barbier 2004). Instead of the “stick” of time-limited ungenerous benefits in return for low-wage jobs, the “carrot” of required participation in training or education programs may improve human capital, wages, and productivity.

Unfortunately, the economic crisis has produced a potential “trilemma” of tradeoffs among “Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint” for the social investment states (Iversen and Wren 1998). Yet until 2005 at least, OECD countries were making it more difficult to claim and stay on benefits, but were not reducing the level or replacement rates of benefits. EU-SILC data suggested that welfare states had indeed been able to avoid the social service trilemma: social spending was kept under control, wage inequalities remained largely unchanged, while employment rose significantly. European governments may have found a way out of the supposed trilemma by lowering social protection for those who remain outside the labor market, externalizing costs on outsiders and keeping poverty rates high (Cantillon 2011). However, since the Euro crisis, it is difficult to tell if these trends have continued.

Even in emerging market economies and developing countries, incentives are being offered to participate in training programs, establish new businesses, or engage in public works projects (Kuddo 2012). Thus, job creation programs to increase labor demand in socially useful or innovative activities complement the mainly supply side “capability” enhancement programs. For those considered “most distant from the labor market,” welfare states have developed “job readiness” programs that are supposed to move the unemployed along a trajectory towards regular employment.

### **Sectoral Concerns: The Social Economy and l’insertion par l’activite economique**

Not only are welfare states reorienting towards “social investment” but civil societies are also innovating in ways to promote the social inclusion of the long-term unemployed. Nonprofit initiatives around the world are experimenting with new institutions that serve communities – building public works, launching local businesses, renovating housing – while providing employment and income for the jobless.

Social enterprises are especially creative in devising solutions to exclusion. Social entrepreneurs, like the founder of Barefoot College in India, are bringing skills and new technologies to many rural areas. For example, it offers a rural solar electrification program for

inaccessible, remote and non-electrified villages. It trains someone local, provides the infrastructure, and collects a small fee for service from villagers who use it.

Even transnational social enterprises offer multidimensional activation programs. One is a partnership between a private lingerie company, the state government's Tamil Nadu Empowerment and Poverty Reduction Project, and the World Bank called Pudhu Vaazhvu (New Life) to employ women from impoverished backgrounds sewing bras while they also receive English instruction, personal grooming lessons, and a nutritional morning drink. At home in the villages, women's self-help groups elect participants and monitor the program. These panchayats train women in the skills needed for the livelihood that they choose, like dairy, weaving, goat rearing and pottery. Outsiders act only to connect trained youth with companies or to find markets for the products made by the self-help groups (Ramadurai 2012)

In Europe, many social enterprises are low-tech, labor intensive, and "green." With subsidized temporary contracts for long-term unemployed workers, these social enterprises engage in organic farming, craft beer brewing, housing renovation, and garbage recycling. The companies rarely make a profit and often sell their wares or services to local communities. However, the point of these "enterprises d'insertion" is to serve social purposes, especially job readiness and fighting the social exclusion and isolation of long-term unemployed workers. Once reconnected, they have greater chances of finding a job. Social inclusion outweighs the economic rationale.

Thus, it is valuable to consider which sector – public, private, or nonprofit, or partnerships among them – has initiated the inclusion policy (see Seeleib-Kaiser 2008). Different sectors have different motivations and crosspressures, work under different regulations and fiscal conditions, and are accountable to different constituencies. Sectors are also crosscut by scale: Service providers at the local level can upscale by forming international NGOs or federations that lobby governments, feeding information in, benefitting from more centralized information and resource redistribution.

### **Integrating Immigrants**

It has long been assumed that labor migrants will acquire language skills in their new country by "osmosis." Linguistic and other forms of cultural assimilation may result from long term contact with the native population.<sup>7</sup> However, excluded groups who live in segregated areas have minimal contact with the host society and are cut off from valuable information about job opportunities, not to mention legal requirements. Living in ethnic enclaves can contribute to social exclusion.

More recently, states have become more proactive in integrating newcomers. Germany, after decades of treating "guest workers" as foreigners, recognized that the guests were not returning and were building "parallel societies" in their midst. After reforming their citizenship laws to make naturalization possible, citizenship tests were instituted. In one sense, these tests are new exclusionary barriers. In another sense, they are an incentive to acquire cultural competence. The government devoted funds to offering immigrant "integration" courses, especially language and civics instruction. These new skills enhance capabilities.

Although the EU has no legal competence in matters of immigration and does not protect migrants from discrimination under the Racial and Employment Directives, it did adopt

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<sup>7</sup> Hannah Arendt's distinction between "pariahs" and "parvenus" is instructive in this context. Pariahs may retain dignity and self-respect, but the parvenu, however great the conformity, will remain socially excluded and not "one of us." Social inclusion rests with the insiders, not only the newcomers.

Common Basic Principles on Integration of third-country nationals in 2004. It identified priority dimensions of integration in employment, education, nondiscriminatory access to services, and knowledge of host society's language, history, and institutions. The EU defines "integration" as a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States, adding that "Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union" (European Commission 2003). The seventh Basic Principle is that "frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens." The 2005 Common Agenda for Integration called for local action to increase migrant participation in all spheres. The European Social Funds are giving financial support to migrant and ethnic integration programs through the PROGRESS (2007-13) program for employment and solidarity, diversity and antidiscrimination efforts, and a new European Integration Fund (2007-13) created to help governments enable newly arriving non-EU nationals to integrate into European society. The Fund supports the capacity of EU States to develop, implement, monitor and generally evaluate integration strategies, policies and measures, and for exchanges of information and best practice, as well as cooperation in and between EU States. One of the headline targets of Europe 2020 is to raise the employment rate of the prime age population, one that can partly be achieved by better integrating legal migrants.

As for indicators of immigrant inclusion, an international team of researchers devised a "European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index" to assess the extent to which immigrants have rights and obligations comparable to full EU citizens (Geddes and Niessen 2005). The index is based upon almost one hundred indicators, grouped into five policy areas. The multiple policy areas are ordered by progressive stages that immigrants take towards full citizenship, reflecting a multidimensional, dynamic social inclusion framework: 1. Labour Market Inclusion, 2. Family Reunion, 3. Long Term Residence, 4. Naturalization, and 5. Anti-Discrimination Measures. As the authors observe, "Inclusion requires more than just access to the labour market. Work is not enough – for immigrants to be included successfully into society, they need to feel secure, and to feel that their contribution over time is valued" (Geddes and Niessen 2005, p. 14).<sup>8</sup>

## **2. Social Inclusion Policies Promoting Distributive Justice**

Activation is not appropriate for those long removed from the labor force. Before they can even begin a training program, members of very excluded groups need to satisfy some basic needs: food, shelter, health care, security. In this section, I discuss redistributive policies that place a material safety net under the most disadvantaged groups such as the homeless. These include anti-poverty programs, minimum income and social assistance programs; progressive taxation; asset redistribution and land reform. Regional cohesion and rural development programs also help to equalize living conditions and quality of life across space.

Historically there is an important difference between exclusion and poverty (Silver 1992). In the policy field, however, the difference has often simply been translated into targeting especially disadvantaged groups among the poor. It is sometimes assumed that people with multiple problems are the neediest and should get priority. For example, rather than selecting a single headline indicator, Ireland defined poverty as the number of those who are *both* at risk of

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<sup>8</sup> However, the index only looks at inclusion from the perspective of the labor market and civic citizenship and neglects cultural integration and political participation.

income poverty *and* suffering from material deprivation, reducing the number of poor people it needs to assist by 2020 (Walker 2012). It also assumed that targeting saves money. However, the evidence suggests that targeting in fact “leaks.”

The comparative study of welfare states both in the OECD countries (Esping-Andersen 1990, 2002) and in the Global South (Gough & Wood 2004) is already well developed and does not require rehashing here. The distinctions among social policies, especially those aimed at poverty reduction, are well known: universal vs. means-tested; insurance vs. assistance; transfers vs. taxes, and so on. Social protection obviously contributes to social inclusion (Palme et al 2009). Countries with the most generous and effective minimum incomes tend to recognize that social safety nets prevent the unemployed from becoming so demoralised and excluded that they are incapable of participating in active inclusion measures and effectively seeking work. Across 26 European countries, the higher the social assistance benefit level, the lower the material deprivation. However, there was no clear additional effect of public services or active labor market policy on material deprivation (Nelson 2012). There is a clear trend towards activating benefit recipients in return for support. The current downturn is only increasing demand for minimum income benefits, but recipients are unlikely to find work (Immervoll 2012). In Poland there are growing conditions placed on social benefit access, but insufficient local service capacity to integrate recipients into work (Frazer and Marlier 2009; Sztandar-Sztanderska 2009).

Given that both poverty and severe material deprivation rose after 2009 due to the economic crisis, it is unlikely that the 2020 target will be reached any time soon. Therefore, the Commission has proposed a new Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived to help the hungry, homeless, and materially-deprived children escape poverty. These groups lack the energy and basic goods needed even to start on the road to social inclusion through training, counseling, or work. The fund is intended to assist at least 4 million Europeans and will be financed from the Cohesion Policy budget, replacing the agricultural surplus food aid to most deprived people of the Community. These people are “too removed from the labour market” to benefit from the European Social Fund, the main instrument of the “social investment” model of Social Europe used to support employability (“Growth and Jobs”), fight poverty, and promote social inclusion.

Comparing social policy across the very different contexts of the OECD, East Asia, and South Asia, de Haan identified a productivism-welfarism distinction in addition to Esping-Andersen's triad of Social Democratic universalism, Continental conservative corporatism, and Anglo-American liberalism (DeHaan 2011). Gough too has classified social welfare regimes in developing countries, identifying informal security regimes in Latin America, insecurity regimes in Africa, as well as productivist regimes in Asia (Gough & Wood 2004).

Haggard & Kaufman (2008, 208) contrast three regional welfare regime types and examine how they vary across democratic and nondemocratic states. In services to enhance capabilities, such as education, there is a universal trend towards decentralization, student choice, and accountability. Social insurance pools were traditionally limited to public, middle class, and organized workers, but with neoliberal shocks, underwent reforms. In health, Latin America is privatizing services, but East Asia is expanding public health insurance and Eastern Europe still has a universal public coverage guarantee. Pensions are privatizing in Eastern Europe and especially Latin America, with total privatization in Chile and Mexico, while East Asia is expanding a minimum public pension benefit. Most significantly for social inclusion, newly democratic middle income countries in East Asia and Eastern Europe are establishing or expanding unemployment insurance. In the latter, early retirement disability and family

allowances were used as a last resort, but were not redistributive. However, authoritarian Malaysia and Singapore took a more liberal approach to safety nets.

In contrast to these regions, Latin America had limited unemployment programs, but under the influence of the World Bank, these countries, whatever the regime, instituted targeted anti-poverty programs that simultaneously contributed to human development. In the 1990s, social funds were created to finance public works in poor communities that provided a rapid economic stimulus. Also, “conditional cash transfer” programs provided income supplements to poor families if they use health clinics and send children to school. First came Mexico’s PROGRESA; then Colombia’s Familias en Accion; Chile’s Subsidio Unitario Familiar; and Brazil’s Bolsa Escloa (under the workers party, Bolsa Familia).

Conditional Cash Transfers contrast with the idea of a Basic Income Guarantee or Citizens Income. Advocates argue that a basic income has lower overall cost than current means-tested social welfare benefits. In India, there is widespread support for rights-based approaches to tackling poverty, obligating the state to guarantee a subsistence to all citizens. India has recently instituted laws and schemes to support the ability of the most vulnerable to access their rights (Mehta et al. 2011). These include the 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (now known as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act – MGNREGA), which obliges the state to guarantee 100 days of paid employment each year to chronically poor rural households while providing sustainable infrastructure to rural areas. There have been some abuses in governance, however, with local officials withholding job cards or skimming funds. The 2006 Forest Rights Act protects access to land for India’s most vulnerable tribal populations. The 2009 Right to Education Act guarantee free education, making it compulsory for children aged 6-14. There are also currently plans for a Right to Food and a Right to Health. Similarly, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety-Net Program, established in 2005, is a government and World Bank initiative to shift millions of chronically food-insecure rural people from recurrent emergency food aid to a more secure and predictable, and largely cash-based, form of social protection. The program reaches some 8 million very poor people, paying or work on public works projects for six months a year. It also offers direct grants to those who are unable to work, and to pregnant or breastfeeding women. In 2012, the program expanded to enable households to build more assets, and to improve their access to financial services.

## **Targeting People and Places**

Most EU member states operate national rights-based minimum income programs schemes but they are hard to compare social assistance across countries because of a cross-cutting array of other means-tested benefits (Immervoll 2012).<sup>9</sup> Even if these other benefits are not counted, there is evidence that on average, only 18% of the European population that is not working and is at risk of poverty is actually enrolled in social assistance. This is true even though the rolls are growing. There is a general tendency to move the long-term unemployed from insurance rolls to social assistance where, in return for lower benefits, they are urged to rejoin the labor force at lower wages or take work readiness programs. European minimum income programs are often insufficient to lift people above the poverty line, but they do reduce material deprivation.

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<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, there is some comparability in total cash income reported in the MISSOC database. ([http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/spsi/missoc\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/missoc_en.htm)).

The problem is that the eligibility rules make these programs exclusionary. On the one hand, they are stigmatizing and the increasing pressure to look for work discourages take-up among the eligible population. Work First policies or “Diversion” into activation schemes keep people from enrolling in the programs. On the other hand, even minimum income programs considered universal for those who meet the means-test in fact exclude a lot of very poor people categorically. Eligibility conditions vary significantly across countries. The most common eligibility conditions relate to age, residence, lack of financial resources and willingness to work. In some countries, minimum income schemes exclude significant groups experiencing poverty such as homeless people, refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and Roma. Then they implicitly exclude those who do not have heterosexual families. Sometimes income tapers are too sharp, acting as work disincentives.

There is a debate as to whether targeting actually refocuses resources on the poor because of poor coverage and low benefit levels. Most agree that conditionality saves public funds relative to social insurance, while activating recipients. However, targeting may be regressive. It may also miss as many as  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the poor. Furthermore, institutional capacity is needed to distribute aid. Benefits may have an effective record of placing recipients in jobs, but targeting does not do a good job of covering the entire eligible population. Simulations on countries like Venezuela, Mexico, and Jamaica, Cambodia, Ecuador, and Madagascar suggest narrow geographic targeting reduces poverty more compared to non-targeted transfer schemes like food subsidies (Baker and Grosh 1994; Elbers et al 2007). In sum, “combating social exclusion with programmes that exclude a high number of the socially marginalized does not look like a successful formula for reaching the poor” (Dutreyj 2007, 7). “Advocates of targeting are correct in arguing that more resources should be given to the poor, but when actual help becomes only a likelihood of being helped (which can be very low), it is better for most of the poor to receive a small benefit than risk not receiving any aid at all.”

Some argue that disadvantaged places should be targeted for assistance, rather than devoting a lot of resources to administering and policing means-tests. Moreover, sometimes it makes less sense to intervene on the supply side when the problem is insufficient local demand for workers. Finally some places like France target places because it is not possible to name the true target groups (“ethnic non-EU migrants”). Regional cohesion and rural development programs also help to equalize living conditions and quality of life across space.

### **Multidimensional Continuum for the Homeless**

Social exclusion is a multi-dimensional process. One dimension can lead to another over time. A social exclusion perspective calls for thinking dynamically about the origins and consequences of social disadvantage. As scholars learn more about the mechanisms that produce social exclusion, especially with longitudinal data, it will become possible to intervene before downward spirals begin. Interventions to prevent the accumulation of disadvantages can be an effective way to fight social exclusion. Prevention is obviously preferable to having to start the inclusion process from a condition of multidimensional disadvantage.

Social inclusion calls for a dynamic sequence of multiple interventions. While the ‘activation’ of social assistance recipients is the prototype, it is clearly applicable to the most disadvantaged populations. With a range of supportive services delivered in sequences and tailored to the individual’s needs, ex-offenders, military veterans, and patients discharged from hospital can be prepared to re-enter the community along a similar trajectory, with periodic follow-up assistance from parole officers, social workers, therapists and other helpers. In the case

of the 'continuum of care' for the homeless, people living in shelters move into transitional housing, prepare for jobs, go through drug or alcohol treatment, reunite with families, and ultimately, find a permanent home, perhaps with long-term supportive services to help them stay housed (see Box).

### ***Opening Doors: Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness***

A joined-up transversal program delineating a monitored sequence to multidimensional social inclusion

The US Interagency Council on Homelessness is an “independent establishment” within the executive branch initially authorized by the 1987 McKinney Act and reauthorized under the 2009 HEARTH Act. It monitors, evaluates, and makes recommendations to improve the effectiveness of federal activities and programs for people experiencing homelessness; disseminates best practices; and provides financial, professional and technical support to state and local governments and public and private sector organizations assisting the homeless. The Council also coordinates agency programs among 19 Departments and agencies (U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, Corporation for National and Community Service, General Services Administration, Office of Management and Budget, Social Security Administration, United States Postal Service, and the White House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives). At every level of government and with the private sector, these interagency partnerships coordinate and tailor sequences of services that address the multiple needs of those already excluded from stable housing and to rapidly return those at risk of homelessness to stable housing situations. These partners work with advocates, service providers, and people experiencing homelessness to achieve the goals of *Opening Doors: Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness* (IACH 2010, [http://www.usich.gov/opening\\_doors/](http://www.usich.gov/opening_doors/)). Special subgroups of the homeless, such as veterans, youth, families, and women, are targeted for special housing and services. The plan includes the goal to end veterans and chronic homelessness by 2015 and child, youth, and family homelessness by 2020. Transversal interventions include coordinating mainstream housing, health, education, and human service programs; increasing access to affordable housing and permanent supportive housing; expanding opportunities for meaningful and sustainable employment; planning for transitions out of foster care, hospitals, and criminal justice systems.

### **3. Social Inclusion Policies Promoting Active Participation**

Social inclusion is democratic and rests upon active participation in all spheres of life. Being part of society should give all members an equal say and an equal vote. Minorities will willingly acquiesce to majority rule if they know they can freely persuade their fellows and potentially rule themselves one day. Formal political democracy rests upon a vibrant civil society in the broadest sense. Civil society is guaranteed through constitutional rights to freedom

of speech, assembly, and association. Civil and political rights of citizenship are democratic mechanisms that express and reinforce social inclusion.

However, the capability to participate does not guarantee influence over collective decisions, no less secure victory. Social inclusion does not necessarily address inequality. Too often, it is assumed that designing institutions for participation, representation, and free expression will automatically translate into redistributive policies. In this section, I discuss social inclusion policies to promote the participation of excluded groups.

### **Inclusive Markets**

It is a polite fiction of economics that markets are free and open in the absence of government meddling. Institutional economics, however, recognizes that laws structure markets and government insures fair competition. There are eligibility rules that limit or rank creditworthiness or even access to savings instruments. Large proportions of the world are excluded from formal banking that could save them money, even when the government creates incentives, like the US Community Reinvestment Act, to locate in poor areas (Blank and Barr 2009). Thus, there is need for policies promoting social inclusion in markets.

Some groups have difficulty establishing businesses because they are excluded from credit or property ownership. Even in the Global North, obstacles exist to full participation in markets. Aside from access to credit, regulations and a lack of management and marketing skills also exclude the poor from starting businesses. While women have made great strides in the labor market, they still comprise a very small proportion of the chief executive officers of corporations. Recently, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy have all passed gender quotas for seats on boards of directors, although in Germany, the gender quota has divided the government. Under pressure from the European Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding, the European Commission approved a directive in November 2012 that, by 2020, 40 percent of the seats on the non-executive boards of large, publicly traded companies should be held by women. The directive has serious sanctions, forcing German companies to hire women instead of directors on other boards who are, historically, men. Egon Zehnder International reports that, in mid-2012, 12.8 percent of board members in Germany were women compared to 8.7% two year earlier (Teitz 2012). In contrast, Norway has become a leader in the advancement of women, even though most women work in public sector social services. Ten years ago, then Economy Minister Ansgar Gabrielsen called for market-listed companies to fill 40 percent of the seats on their corporate supervisory boards with women and, despite opposition from business, the Norwegian parliament enacted a law requiring the firms to fulfill the gender quota within five years. The sanctions for not doing so were strict, to the point of forced liquidation of the company. The rationale is that “if half of the population is excluded, we simply don't have the best people” (Reimann 2012).

The best known success story for integrating women of the Global South in markets is, of course, the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. Despite being an outside third party, Grameen's agents managed to cultivate the vertical as well as horizontal networks needed to overcome the various collective action problems and market failures that exclude the poor from investment capital. Microfinance, community and cooperative banks, and rotating credit circles were certainly found throughout the world before the 1990s, but they were precarious. With the assistance of Grameen Bank, Banco Sol in Bolivia, and other microfinancial institutions and

with support of the World Bank, the “social capital” or “trust” approach to small loans has proliferated (Dowla 2006).

However, accumulating research in Asia, Latin America, and Africa suggests that microfinance institutions have not reached the “core poor” (Weiss & Montgomery 2005). The assumption that poor women can attain financial self-sustainability and empowerment simply by participating in lending groups is questionable. One evaluation of seven micro-finance programs in Cameroon found that norms, networks, and associations may not serve the interests of the poorest women, contributing to their continued exclusion (Mayoux 2001). Although women’s microcredit groups do not formally exclude extremely poor women, distance, physical isolation, and adverse relations with donors, lenders, and rural power brokers can have the effect of excluding women traders in remote areas from access to credit (Howson 2013). For this reason, microfinance can entail “adverse incorporation,” a perverse expression of social inclusion that, by operating where there are local monopolies, may perpetuate rural poverty (du Toit, 2005; Hickey and du Toit 2007; Hickey 2008).

Some argue that access to finance reduces poverty less through social capital or groups, and more through economic growth per se (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2007). The new institutionalist approach has shifted policy away from microfinance and building local financial institutions to serve poor people towards a more “inclusive” approach to making markets work for the poor. The World Bank’s *Finance for All?* (2008) report advocates greater service provision for the unbanked, but tends to consider only reaching the income poor. It does not address other mechanisms of financial exclusion, such as unequal wealth, education, distance, biased contractual and informational frameworks, and gender discrimination (e.g., requiring a husband to co-sign a loan) (Mendoza and Thelen 2008). Not only should markets reach the poor, but access to basic goods and services should also offer some human development.

The shift in discourse to financial inclusion is part of the broader idea of ‘inclusive markets’ (Mendoza and Thelen 2008). Development through inclusive markets should consider the relationships and mechanisms leading to economic exclusion and poverty in the first place (Johnson 2012). For markets to become accessible to the poor, women, rural inhabitants and other excluded groups, social institutions must remove socio-economic, demographic, geographic, and sometimes cultural obstacles to participation. For example, since the mid-2000s, African countries have expanded financial access through mobile phone-based payment services. There are countless community-based programs that pool the capital of the poor. The cooperative movement not only organizes producers for common marketing and transportation (e.g., dairy, fresh produce), but also consumers who buy shares in markets delivering fresh food.

## **eInclusion**

The eighth Millennium Development Goal calls for a partnership with the private sector “to make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications technology.” The extent to which this goal is met is monitored with several quantitative indicators, such as telephone lines, cellular subscribers, and internet users per 100 population. Access to the internet makes it possible to knit new social bonds and thus, facilitates social inclusion.

Internet access extends the scope of the market. Increasingly, remote villagers are selling traditional handicrafts worldwide, creating trade networks across vast distances. At the Barefoot College, a school in the northwestern state of Rajasthan that provides professional training for

rural women, the mobile phone allows even illiterate entrepreneurs to compete in the marketplace. Just as access through roads and transportation, the “information highway fosters new relationships.

New technology connects isolated people to public services. Rural village dwellers can obtain information about water resources, health care, schooling, and other information that can save lives. The Indian government and two Indian-born high tech entrepreneurs announced a plan called Aakash to build a \$50 tablet computer with touch screens, powered by Google’s free Android software. The government will distribute the computers to millions of poor schoolchildren, although it is not clear whether tablets achieve better learning than lower teacher to student ratios or better teacher training.

There is also evidence that access to technology empowers women by giving them access to support beyond the local traditional village power structure. Some claim “mobile phones significantly decrease tolerance for wife beating and husbands’ control issues, and increase women’s autonomy in mobility and economic independence” (Roy 2012). Domestic violence is inhibited when abusers know they are being watched. Nevertheless, the gender gap in education and power in the household creates a gender gap in phone access. Many rural women lack the necessary proof of identity and address required of mobile phone users, while urban working women’s low wages are a barrier to access. Similarly, internet access requires devices to connect – from cheap mobile phones to tablets – and the basic skills, indeed, computer literacy. Thus, digital participation rests upon capabilities and the distribution of resources too.

Finally, internet access facilitates political participation and the formation of associations among hard to identify minorities. The rise of social media, for example, has been credited with making possible new forms of political and democratic participation such as the Arab Spring demonstrations. When people are excluded from voting and formal participation in government, they may still participate through freedom of speech and the right to assembly, provided they have access to public space. The excluded can directly demand to be heard simply by occupying open spaces in which to form publics. From Tiananmen Square to Tahrir Square to Zuccotti Park, recent years have witnessed profound and articulate expressions of ordinary citizens who mobilized through alternative means of communication. However, exclusion from the public realm through anti-loitering, anti-demonstration, censorship, and other restrictions represses the voice of the people. Without a space for participation, there can be no democracy.

### **Participation in Governance**

Democratic participation is a marker of membership, citizenship, inclusion. In a free civil society, inclusive movements, industrial (as opposed to craft) labor unions, international NGOs, and open communications media are means of empowerment. It is impossible to imagine achieving greater democratic without a participatory mechanism for the excluded as well. Virtually all social inclusion policies call for the participation of excluded groups and a wide range of stakeholders. “Maximum Feasible Participation,” a slogan from the American War on Poverty in the 1960s, has become a global buzzword (Leal 2007). The European Union’s social inclusion discourse repeats the mantra to “mobilize all the key actors through a participatory approach.” The European Anti-Poverty Network participates in discussions about the Joint Ex/Inclusion Reports. The World Bank produces work expressing the Voices of the Poor. The OECD calls for “Building Community Capacity,” pointing to participation of and special schemes for indigenous populations .

Inclusion in governance is the order of the day. In new ‘governance’ arrangements, public and private elites meet to solve problems through consensus. Such extra-governmental partnerships mobilize the skills and resources of actors beyond the state, increasing capacity and efficiency in pursuing specific goals.

“Good governance” complements the neo-liberal project (Craig & Porter 2005). Liberty and free markets rest on social order, the rule of law, stability and predictability so the “Washington Consensus” often assumed that more transparent, accountable, and participatory procedures would promote development. While it is true that bad governance impedes development and that development improves governance (Kurtz and Shrank 2007), there is less scholarly consensus that improving governance alone is sufficient to promote development or reduce poverty. One need only think of NIMBY protests to realize that participation is no panacea for social exclusion. Furthermore, the participation of excluded voices is only one aspect of good governance. The World Bank recognizes that stability and peace, rule of law, control of corruption, and government and regulatory effectiveness are equally important (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005).

Governance mirrors the neo-corporatist arrangements in industrial relations, where peak organizations represent the interests of the “social partners” in wage and social insurance negotiations. However, those negotiating parties are elected and accountable to their members. In contrast, the participation of “representatives” of excluded groups are often self-appointed spokespersons, indeed, NGOs of do-gooders who are themselves not excluded at all. However, it is unclear how democratic such participation is and how supportive participants are of the policies. It is possible that the true “stakeholders” were excluded once again. Can it be assumed that individuals with a given disadvantage – say, their disability – are thereby “qualified” to speak for all members of a category or group? Can someone with a physical handicap adequately represent a homeless mentally ill person? Can a rich Dalit speak for the vast majority of ex-untouchables? Who gets to choose the representatives of excluded groups? And to what extent do they bargain, reach consensus, and compromise in the interests of their ‘constituents’? What if they ‘sell out’ the group instead of remaining loyal? Co-optation of upwardly mobile leaders from excluded groups is a familiar danger. How can members of excluded groups hold these supposed representatives accountable?

Rather than claim governance forums are democratic and representative, it is more precise to call them “consultative.” Including such organizational leaders in program design or policymaking discussions may legitimize the resulting social inclusion strategies, implying that if excluded groups have participated in the decisions, they also buy into the strategies of inclusion. Government may ‘mobilize all actors,’ benefiting from the savoir faire of stakeholders, but use them for its own purposes (e.g., reducing costs, maintaining order, etc.). Influential parties often tolerate the claims-making of powerless groups and then go on to pursue their own self-interest. Participation of excluded groups in such decision-making is usually superficial. Usually elite stakeholders are invited, with only a few token disadvantaged people who are easily outvoted and ignored. However, having a say does not mean others will listen or be persuaded to your point of view. Access and voice do not ensure influence. Power imbalances and taken-for-granted paternalism on the part of service professionals, NGO leaders, or government bureaucrats can silence people with less education or more emotional than rational styles of expression (Taylor 2007). Research from around the world has found limited influence of community participants on decisions; decentralization is followed by recentralization of power

(Hickey and Mohan, 2004). There is a well-known bias in civic participation towards more educated and affluent groups.

To overcome this bias, poorer, less educated citizens may have to be treated differently in order to have equal say, both because their power resources are unequal and because, without adopting a misplaced essentialism, they often have different needs, such as meeting at hours or in venues that do not impose hardships on workers. To get everyone involved may require outreach, affirmative action, or quotas. Government should provide resources and opportunities to engage at every stage -- deliberation, decision making, execution, and monitoring as well as agenda setting to begin with.

To be sure, it is better for everyone to consult excluded groups before they start pushing them around. Symbolic representation of groups in itself is a game-changer. Especially at the local level, citizens affected by policies are legitimate stakeholders who deserve to be heard before making decisions that will affect their lives. However, simple consultation of the weak is a weak form of participation. Working in social inclusion programs is more directly beneficial. These programs redistribute jobs and other resources to excluded groups. The perils of public-private partnerships also include problems for governments. Precisely because excluded groups may have different interests, governments working in partnerships with them may face principal agent problems, with groups hijacking the agenda or using resources for their own goals. There are also moral hazards with partnerships, since private activities are hard for states to monitor. Benefits from the state can also displace the goals of voluntary associations, making them dependent upon government financing and undermining their autonomy and flexibility and reducing their accountability to their constituents.

Socially inclusive community participation is sometimes seen as a way to hold local governments accountable for results and to mobilize private sector resources for public objectives (Blakely 2010; Newman 2001; Blair 1998). Decentralization or devolution of power is supposed to empower citizens relative to the state and tailor public services to local needs. For example, New Labour in the UK promoted small New Deal for Communities schemes to tackle multiple deprivations in some of the most deprived neighborhoods in England over 10 years. Yet, the evaluations are mixed ([http://extra.shu.ac.uk/ndc/ndc\\_evaluation.htm](http://extra.shu.ac.uk/ndc/ndc_evaluation.htm); Blakely 2010). In terms of governance, therefore, policies should be coordinated across levels: both national when the problems are broadly shared and more local when they are concentrated.

Citizen participation in monitoring the effectiveness of policies is often best achieved from a position of independence. Sometimes statistical agencies or academic institutions take charge of reporting performance indicators. Armed with such information, excluded groups can call agencies to task. Thus, social inclusion may rest upon giving outsiders the means to dissent when outcomes are inadequate, whether they are outcomes of government policy or of partnerships. In the search for consensus, minority voices are sometimes squelched. A loyal opposition is good for democracy.

Consultative bodies usually exclude disinterested parties who may have a valuable independent perspective or may become interested in the course of deliberation. Participatory governance or direct democracy cannot replace electoral democracy in which all citizens have an equal say and majority rule resolves conflicts. With all the attention to participation of the excluded, it is easy to elide governance and policy-making procedures with the policies themselves. Inclusionary policies are supposed to produce social inclusion. But is it fair to expect those who need to find work also to participate in policy making?

## **Participatory Budgeting**

Just as inclusive markets and communications remove barriers to participation, so too does inclusive governance. In mature democracies, some express concern about declining voter turnout and civic participation. Some forms of citizen participation, like lodging complaints, voting on referenda and plebiscites, answering opinion polls, or signing petitions, are more passive than others, like attending hearings or town meetings or demonstrations and other activities of consumer or voluntary association movements. Rising unemployment also inhibits labor market participation, as do so-called “passive” social protection and income transfer programs, which is why activation or motivating people to work are considered social inclusion policies. Analogously there are also “activation” policies in the civic and political realm.

For example, migrants face barriers to civic participation including their uncertain or temporary legal status, different language, lack of access to information, and long hours spent working or commuting. However, outreach activities by local institutions -- schools, places of worship, places of work, and ethnic associations – send a message of welcome to newcomers and provide opportunities for engagement. Some localities involve all residents in urban decision-making processes through representation, translation services, and openness to volunteers. UNESCO defines civic inclusion as the connection that migrants feel with the larger urban community in which they live and is based upon local involvement with the city, whether at the neighborhood, metropolitan, or even transnational scale. Examples of good practice include practical and advising activities of the Integration Departments in large German cities, funded by the European Integration Fund and administered by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF).

The World Social Forum has called for more direct, democratic public involvement in decision-making at the local and national government levels. Some places – Switzerland, California, Brazil – have a long tradition of citizen initiatives and direct democracy. Referenda can be proposed from below as well as above, as in France. In addition to elections on propositions from ordinary people, public campaign financing is another inclusive device to encourage citizen participation in politics.

Despite the efforts of NGOs and the World Bank to cultivate “social capital,” the evidence assessing top-down approaches to enlivening “civil society” is mixed. Community organizing and community development in depressed areas sometimes fail (Gittell & Vidal 1998). Poor people have multiple and interrelated disadvantages, impeding their ability to draw on social capital to ameliorate poverty. Without attention to politics and power relations, increased association and public community participation may not benefit the poor. In places like Africa, social relationships, collective action, and institutions “structurally reproduce the exclusion of the poorest” (Cleaver 2005).

Attempts to reform local government to increase direct democracy are quite recent, and are so far not systematically evaluated (Geert Bouckaert, Joris Voets, & Dries De Herdt 2010). But there are some assessments of one of the most active forms of civic participation, citizens or participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting is a democratic process in which community members directly decide how to spend part of a public budget. Community members and budget delegates meet to identify and weigh spending priorities, develop spending proposals, and vote on which proposals to implement.

Participatory budgeting furthers social inclusion in several ways. It aims to deepen democracy, increase transparency, and promote greater efficiency, thereby increasing citizens' trust in government. It empowers ordinary citizens and builds community around common


goals. By providing selective material incentives, participatory budgeting may mobilize and give voice to previously excluded and disaffected citizens, fostering new participation (Fung and Wright, 2001). Participatory budgeting takes place alongside formal politics, which means that non-citizens and minors can be involved in making decisions that affect them. It may encourage greater accountability, transparency, efficiency, and legitimacy of local government (Postigo 2011; World Bank 2004). It directs more resources to disadvantaged communities and increases capacities by educating ordinary people about democracy and finance.

Most accounts of participatory budgeting locate its origins in Porto Alegre in 1989, where tens of thousands of people decided how to spend up to a fifth of the city budget, redirecting resources to improve the favelas. From there, it spread to over 240 municipalities in Brazil and to other Latin American cities, such as Montevideo and Mexico City. In the new millennium, it diffused around the world, reaching over 1,200 cities by 2007 (Lerner and Secondo 2011; Goldfrank 2007; Goldfrank and Schrank 2009; Shah 2007). Variations on participatory budgeting can be found in Berlin as part of the Soziale Stadt programme, Durban where local communities have a voice in determining how budgets are spent in their communities as part of the Integrated Development Plan), and São Paulo, where besides territorial and thematic representatives, there are quotas for socially vulnerable segments—Afro Brazilians, senior citizens, children and adolescents, youth, the GLBT community, women, indigenous groups, the homeless and people with disabilities (Silver, Scott, and Kazepov 2010). Participatory budgeting has been supported not only by the left, as in Brazil, but also by right-wing local governments (in Spain, for example). The Participatory Budgeting Project helped implement the first participatory budgeting process in the US in Chicago's 49th Ward and, in October 2011, in New York City, where residents decide how to spend discretionary ward funds. The World Bank is even piloting a participatory budgeting program in municipalities of Albania, a country that lacks transparency and good targeting of its public funds.

The redistributive effects of participatory budgeting, while important, are modest. Typically, only a small share of the city's total budget, usually for public works, is involved in participatory budgeting, so 'it does not dramatically reduce poverty (especially in terms of income) on its own . . . Even in the relatively small number of municipalities that succeeded in improving local service provision with participatory budgeting, low incomes and joblessness remain serious problems' (Shah, 2007: 6) Also, citizens themselves rarely initiate participatory budgeting. Rather, the state, politicians, or political parties are usually credited with establishing opportunities for ordinary people to decide how to spend small amounts of public funds. And despite its promise, participatory budgeting is often accused of democratic deficits (Silver, Scott, and Kazepov 2010). The process rests upon voluntary participation, rather than institutional interest representation or random selection. There are structural impediments to inclusion of the least powerful, so the "public" is self-selected rather than representative (Lerner and Secondo 2011). Meetings may be formally open to all, but illiteracy, language barriers, fear of retaliation for criticism and other obstacles lower attendance. Even in the case of participatory budgeting in Brazil, which is considered a model for direct citizen participation, leaders of civil organizations make up a large share of delegates and become dominant in successive rounds of the process. Selective incentives may be needed to overcome such collective action problems. Empowerment remains a challenge as more educated, articulate, and organized interests usually dominate deliberation. This may create pressure for social conformism and stifling minority views. The forums may be captured by well-organized, partisan interests which coopts and politicizes the

process, rather than encouraging “rational” deliberation (Goldfrank 2007). Those holding less strong preferences and alternative interests are under-represented.

Inclusion is especially significant to the results. In a study of three Italian cities, for example, an active opposition, outward communication with civil society and the administration, and effective participation contributed to success (Bassoli 2012). It is useful to have media publicity, outreach campaigns, and seats assigned for disadvantaged groups for inclusion to overcome uneven turnout (Shah, 2007: 10). Participatory budgeting appears to work best where there are timely results and recognition for participation, so people can see that it works. It also helps to have popular pressure to adopt it in the first place, which may prevent special interests from capturing the process.



SOURCE:

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTPCENG/0,,contentMDK:20509380~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:410306,00.html>

### Participation in research

Defining social inclusion as full participation in the society in which one lives often takes for granted that policymakers enable participation only *after* inclusion programs are instituted. It

is an odd inversion, since excluded groups lack the power to determine the terms under which they will be included. Thus, beyond formal citizenship rights it has become an increasingly accepted maxim of social inclusion policies that excluded groups targeted for intervention should have a say in decisions that affect their own welfare. This means including “voices of the poor” (Narayan 2000) -- to cultivate social capital, community development, or public-private “partnerships” is part of a broader movement to encourage civic engagement. Whereas politics is partisan and contentious, participation is cast as consensus building.

Consider professional social researchers, such as we who read papers like this. We might ask whether the subjects of our research, who socially vulnerable, poorly educated, or politically weak, had a role in defining the kind of knowledge we collect about them. One assessment, giving a voice to young mothers in care, found that their social inclusion in the Advisory Committee and payment for helping to disseminate the findings of the research was unsuccessful. The young women “authored their own stories and spoke authoritatively of their experiences,” but they ultimately remained research subjects and could not overturn the power dynamics that respected professional knowledge (Dominelli 2005).

### **Desegregation and Mainstreaming**

Social inclusion is relational. It rests upon interaction between different kinds of people. But participation is precluded when institutions and spaces are segregated. There are many policies designed to break down the separations.

Residential desegregation aims at social inclusion or “integration.” It is a policy that has been very difficult to enforce in a free housing market that allows people to exit a place voluntarily. On the one hand, institutions and individual still engage in discriminatory practices like redlining loans, real estate steering, and large lot zoning (Massey and Denton 1993). On the other hand, there is a worldwide tendency towards “gated communities” in which affluent populations wall themselves off or move to newly built enclaves beyond the reach of the poor. These enclosed enclaves exist in French, Chinese, Latin American, post-Communist Europe, South African, Nigerian, Middle Eastern, as well as North American contexts (Bagaeen and Uduku 2010).

Can anything be done short of nationalizing housing? First, courts can order remedies to residential desegregation. Findings of discrimination rest upon audit studies or field experiments, which make discriminatory behavior in lending, renting, buying, and selling transactions more transparent. Matched “testers” with the same qualifications who differ in a single protected characteristic present themselves to potentially discriminatory agents (Pager and Shepherd 2008). A finding of disparate treatment implies discrimination. Sometimes the agents are exposed or even prosecuted. However, this is a costly procedure. It is usually easier to reform institutions and short-circuit exclusionary mechanisms. One approach is “inclusionary zoning” that mandates or offers subsidies for building socially mixed housing developments. Another is to adopt a social mixing policy in public housing. Outlawing large lot zoning or giving bonus height restrictions are a third approach using urban planning devices.

Not only are residential spaces segregated but so too are institutions, from schools to professions. Too often, the special concerns of groups in all policy spheres, rather than segregating the concerns of women, children, seniors, and others in their own policy “ghettos.” One set of inclusionary policies “mainstream” marginalized groups who have received special programs in separate, often residentially segregated institutions. I discuss mainstreaming further as a form of affirmative or positive action. Institutions are legally required to make reasonable accommodations so excluded individuals can participate in “normal” programs and

“mainstream” institutions in order to realize their equal rights. For example, making it possible for handicapped children to attend regular schools, instead of being segregated in special education institutions, increases their capabilities and participation, as well as recognizing them as full citizens. Whether they are excluded because of negative attitudes, low expectations, fear, statistical norms of lower productivity, or anticipated costs, adults with disabilities have very high unemployment rates too. Simple workplace accommodations and vocational rehabilitation would help. In December 2006, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity (CRPD) of persons with disabilities, and of January 2012, 107 countries have ratified the Convention, 80 being developing countries. This Convention redefined disability from a social welfare problem to a human rights issue, addressing the rights of persons with disabilities, to education, health, work and employment, and to an adequate standard of living and social protection (WHO & World Bank 2011; Mete 2008; Yao and Moore 2003; Trani and Loeb 2010). The WHO estimates 10 to 15 percent of adults in the world have a disability (functional or activity limitation). The Council of Europe has recently developed an “Action Plan to promote the rights and full participation of people with disabilities in society” for 2006-2015.

Mainstreaming will not produce full participation if included groups are still stigmatized. Marginalized groups have mobilized to improve their access to resources, transform their legal status, or challenge stereotypes (Lamont and Mizrahi 2012). Thus, resources and capabilities aside, participation and recognition are connected. For example, to address the stigma of children with special needs who are mainstreamed but shunned in school, there are also programs that allow the disabled to have their own community of friends and “a place in the world” (Nocera 2012). Another group of people whose members face obstacles to “re-entry” into society are ex-offenders and ex-substance abusers in recovery. Stigmatized individuals find it difficult to be accepted in the mainstream without hiding their past or current deficiency. Sometimes, because of sex offender registries, they cannot conceal their stigmatized identities. Because the public so often excludes them and refuses to finance their support, it is often the third sector -- churches and nonprofit agencies – that operate the training, employment, housing and health programs for populations trying to regain a foothold in the mainstream.

Mainstreaming is a process, and few would suggest that institutionalization is better than social exclusion in ordinary life. Prisoner re-entry programs create a pathway to reknit social bonds. As the US prison system expanded over the last two decades, private providers, mostly nonprofits, manage supervised residential facilities and services for a period of time during which parolees readapt to mainstream life. This “halfway-house” model can help inmates and others released from institutions return to society.

However, people with disabilities should not be forced to integrate into the mainstream. Resisting social exclusion in “normal” institutions, some groups prefer to build their own community institutions and cultures. The deaf, for example, have their own language and do not necessarily aspire to join the hearing world. Is this self-determination or self-exclusion? Nevertheless, the first principle is that mainstream institutions should be open and inclusive to those who wish to participate.

#### **4. Social Inclusion Policies Promoting Recognition and Rights**

In this section, I consider a disparate set of policies that recognize excluded people as full members of the national and human community. Sometimes this recognition is purely symbolic, expressed in words and practices. Other times recognition is expressed in the law, such as

explicitly mentioning a group that is protected. Permitting marriage of same sex or inter-racial couples, for example, admits them to the community.

Recognition confers a sense of identity and dignity, respect, even honor. This relational conception of identity is summed up in the African phrase “Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,” a person is a person because of other people (Volf 1996). Treating someone as invisible, without voice, is a form of symbolic violence. Humiliation and torture are only possible against those whom we exclude from humanity (Margalit 1998). Every society institutionalizes principles of recognition, including an (1) ethics of care or love: family and friendship provide intimate, emotional recognition of individual uniqueness; (2) legal rights: universal recognition as a rights-bearing, autonomous subject, requiring everyone to recognize fellow human beings; and (3) communitarian solidarity: social esteem or recognition in a specific community of shared values for one’s particular social contribution and constitutive value (Honneth 2007 p. 139).

### **Symbolic Inclusion**

The value of symbolic recognition as a full member of a society should not be discounted. Even in the cultural realm of leisure and sport, the visibility of minority athletes playing for national teams signals that the society values its diversity and the talents of all its members. The arts offer another way in. The Burakumin of Japan perform their drumming on leather drums, emphasizing the beauty rather than impurity of their tanning work. Movie portrayals of stigmatized groups like the homeless or street workers humanize them and increase public sympathy for their plight.

Public relations work to improve a group’s image aims at social inclusion through cultural means. Representation of minority voices in school textbooks or in the news symbolically embraces the group. One good practice identified is the Roma Internship Program for Reporters and Editors in Hungary that aims to increase the positive presence of Roma in the media. Ten-month internships at the public television and radio offer professional skills and mentors to help them learn to address emotionally painful situations (PAMECUS 2009).

Fighting stigma and signifying social inclusion can take place individually or collectively.<sup>10</sup> Symbolic gestures by leaders, like Gandhi who put on homespun in solidarity with Dalits, change attitudes by rising above their own group origins to bond with the entire nation. The sociologist Emile Durkheim long ago argued that participation in group rituals enact the collective conscience, reconstruct collective memory, and build “moral density” or social integration. Inclusive celebrations send a message that everyone belongs. In the United States, there are Annual Citizenship Day ceremonies for recognizing newly naturalized United States Citizens. “All Americans are Irish on St. Patrick’s Day.” All Americans mourn the loss of Martin Luther King. African-Americans fought hard to make his birthday a national holiday that all will commemorate.

Symbolic gestures of recognition in the form of expressions of humility and official apologies carry considerable weight in societies that strongly value honor. At the end of WWII,

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<sup>10</sup> Stigmatized groups and victims have mobilized to improve their access to resources, promote a transformation of their legal status, or challenge stereotypes of them with the such cultural tools as collective memory, group identification, problem framing, institutional settings, and personal accounts of exclusion. Individuals respond to stigmatization variably by internalizing, covering/hiding, repairing, confronting, assimilating, adapting, or managing the self (Lamont and Mizrachi 2012). People may change their names or convert to a new religion, like Dalits becoming Christians, to disguise their origins.

the Japanese Emperor Hirohito let it be known to General MacArthur that he was prepared to apologize formally for Japan's actions during World War II—including an apology for the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor -- but he was cruelly rebuffed. Since the 1950s to the present, however, Japan continually and repeatedly apologizes for its occupation and war crimes in Burma, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, and Korea. In particular, the demand for an apology for the “wartime comfort women” is a moral, symbolic, and emotional issue. Despite repeated Japanese expressions of humility, remorse, and regret, especially in the 1993 Kono Statement, this war crime still seems unforgivable. It is a wound that festers in the bilateral tensions between South Korea and Japan over some contested islands. Japan has also paid reparations, although perhaps not as much as expected, through a fund for Asian women’s projects “to express the national atonement on this issue.” So far, Japan has not officially compensated South Korea’s few hundred surviving former sex slaves, now in their 80s.

In the Americas, there have been calls for official apologies and reparations for the slavery of Africans. In 2012, for example, Jamaica reinstated a reparations commission to consider whether the country should seek an apology or reparations from Britain for its role in the slave trade. The demands are also gaining steam in the United States. Twenty five years ago, the US Congress apologized to Japanese-Americans interned during World War II. The US apologized to native Hawaiians for the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. In 2008-09, the House and Senate passed resolutions apologizing for slavery and recognized the “injustice, cruelty, brutality and inhumanity of slavery and Jim Crow.” In 2010, the United States Congress quietly offered its first bipartisan “apology to Native Peoples of the United States”... “for the many instances of violence, maltreatment, and neglect inflicted on Native Peoples by citizens of the United States” and “...recognizes that there have been years of official depredations, ill-conceived policies, and the breaking of covenants by the Federal Government regarding Indian tribes.” It expresses a commitment “to move toward a brighter future where all the people of this land live reconciled as brothers and sisters, and harmoniously steward and protect this land together.” It is a simple act of recognition.<sup>11</sup>

There are additional mechanisms of reconciliation after wronging the citizens of another country or victimized groups. Constructing memorials and solemn ceremonies of remembrance at those places aim to reknit social bonds. Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto laid a wreath at the Indisch Monument to apologize for treatment of the Dutch women as sex slaves during World War II. The construction of a memorial to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust in Berlin took fifty years and many reparation payments before forgiveness of genocide could be broached. The war crimes trials after World War II also had a major symbolic and educational impact, contributing to the democratization of Germany. Occasionally there have been domestic criminal trials of former heads of state, such as Alberto Fujimori of Peru, for human rights abuses as part of regime change and national reconciliation.

National reconciliation for past abuses of a minority by a majority often allows pluri-cultural nation-states to cohere. Constitutions too often embody peaceful agreements between former enemies, as in the post Civil War amendments to the US constitution. The South African Government of National Unity established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission come to terms with the violence and human rights abuses from all sides of society under apartheid. Based upon the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No 34 of 1995, the

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<sup>11</sup> The apology does not provide a legal basis for lawsuits, however.

Commission has three committees for: Amnesty; Reparation and Rehabilitation; and Human Rights Violations. It also created a Register of Reconciliation for ordinary South Africans to participate. Member of the public are able to express their regret at allowing human rights violations and to demonstrate their commitment to reconciliation on a morally accepted basis.

Around the world, indigenous peoples have been murdered and disinherited, their families were wrenched apart by colonial settlers, and are now demanding their rights. The Australian response to its history of inhuman treatment of aborigines is especially instructive here because it came just as the New Labour governments of Rudd and Gillard launched the social inclusion agenda. These leaders have an explicit vision: “a socially inclusive society is one in which all Australians feel valued and have the opportunity to participate fully in the life of our society.”<sup>12</sup> Social inclusion, explained Dr. John Falzon, a member of the Australian Social Inclusion Board, is “about all of us recognizing that we have so much in common and that some of us, indeed, many of us – some quite visible, some invisible – are being left out or pushed out. More to point, it’s the job and responsibility of all of us to make sure that no one gets left out. This is about us as a collective, not about some minority or small group.”

Just as I have classified social inclusion policies into four goals of capabilities, equality, participation, and recognition, the Australian social inclusion agenda promises to insure all Australians have the resources, opportunities, and capability to:

- Learn by participating in education and training;
- Work by participating in employment, in voluntary work and in family and caring;
- Engage by connecting with people and using their local community’s resources; and
- Have a voice so that they can influence decisions that affect them.

As the Box inset indicates, the Australian Parliament officially recognized the historical exclusion of indigenous aboriginal people from their homes and the separation of the Stolen Generation of aboriginal children from their families. Since the apology, officials symbolically refer to “the Indigenous custodians of this country” and to the longstanding effects of “the dispossession of Indigenous Australians.”

The Australian social inclusion framework acknowledges social, cultural, or national differences and accommodates specific needs and rights of minority groups. PM Kevin Rudd’s apology was cemented with the establishment of aboriginal sports and alcohol programs as well as set-asides of jobs in mining, defense and public works for aboriginal and long-term unemployed workers. Community Development Employment Projects promote work readiness in remote areas with emerging and limited economies. Also, the Indigenous Employment Program expanded to include more support for employers, especially small and medium businesses, including training and mentoring. An industry-led initiative, The Australian Employment Covenant, aims to place and retain 50,000 Indigenous people in “covenant” jobs within a two-year period. Australia also targets aboriginal people within universal programs. For example, targeting may include a different, culturally sensitive intervention, such multicultural competence in health care or bilingualism in public life. Group-specific indicators track the conditions of Indigenous Australians, who exhibit significant disadvantages in life expectancy, child mortality, access to

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<sup>12</sup> For more on Australian social inclusion, see Silver 2010, Povinelli 2002, and <http://www.socialinclusion.gov.au/>

early childhood education, educational achievement, and employment outcomes (How Australia Is Faring 2012). As Part 3 discusses, this approach resembles affirmative action programs.

### **Official Apology to Australia's Indigenous Peoples**

We apologise for the laws and policies of successive Parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on these our fellow Australians.

We apologise especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country.

For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry.

To the mothers and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of families and communities, we say sorry.

And for the indignity and degradation thus inflicted on a proud people and a proud culture, we say sorry...

We today take this first step by acknowledging the past and laying claim to a future that embraces all Australians.

A future where this Parliament resolves that the injustices of the past must never, never happen again.

A future where we harness the determination of all Australians, Indigenous and non-Indigenous, to close the gap that lies between us in life expectancy, educational achievement and economic opportunity.

A future where we embrace the possibility of new solutions to enduring problems where old approaches have failed.

A future based on mutual respect, mutual resolve and mutual responsibility.

A future where all Australians, whatever their origins, are truly equal partners, with equal opportunities and with an equal stake in shaping the next chapter in the history of this great country, Australia.

– Prime Minister Kevin Rudd 13 February 2007

### Part 3: Affirmative Action

<u>Goals</u>	<u>Affirmative Action Sphere</u>
Freedom, Capability	Education, mainstreaming
Equality, Distributive Justice	Employment, contracting
Democracy, Participation	Political offices, consultative councils
Recognition, Human Rights	Cultural diversity

Affirmative action is a key social inclusion policy. It is pursued for the sake of rapid achievement of substantive equality of results, in contrast to formal equality of rights. It is a social inclusion policy because it aims to increase access of an under-represented group to education, employment, political power, and public services. It also aims to open and diversify all the major spheres and institutions of the society. Affirmative action aims to prevent, overcome, or compensate for previous and ongoing discrimination. Access and representation may also promote “substantive equality” by redistributing resources. Here I emphasize the salutary impact of affirmative action on the recognition of excluded groups.<sup>13</sup>

The means used in the pursuit of affirmative action vary. “Soft” affirmative action entails recruitment, outreach, orientation, and welcoming. Excluded groups are encouraged to apply for education or occupations in which they have been historically underrepresented. Universities, employers, political parties, and bureaucrats are required to open up their search and selection processes to previously excluded candidates. Dedicated internships or training programs can introduce young minority group members to sectors where the group is historically underrepresented. Soft affirmative action necessitates the rethinking and revision of admissions tests for universities or skilled jobs.

In contrast, “hard” affirmative action usually entails preferences or quotas with targets proportional to a group’s representation in the population. Such differential treatment appears to violate norms of equal treatment of individuals. However, affirmative action rests upon experience. Equal opportunity under conditions of structural inequality is insufficient to reduce group disparities. Adopting positive action signals a willingness to open up monopolized positions to qualified members of excluded groups so that over time, social diversity seems normal.

A virtue of affirmative action is that it declares a society’s recognition of diversity and its commitment to inclusion. It is a moral declaration of national identity, atoning or compensating for a violently and legally enforced form of exclusion at odds with a nation’s self-conception: e.g., slavery, apartheid, genocide, dispossession, or untouchability. Targets or goals for representation at the national table are expressions of national reconciliation in the face of historical injustice. *We* include as a way of affirming collective responsibility for prior exclusion. The ideals, goals, or first principles that justify affirmative action can be found in political

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<sup>13</sup> As Jaffrelet (2006) has noted for India, the impact of affirmative action has been more political, especially for representation of Dalits in North India, than socioeconomic.

philosophies on the “politics of recognition” (Taylor 1992), “differentiated citizenship” (Young 1989) and the “multicultural rights” (Kymlicka 2001, 2007).

Some intentionally inclusionary policies take account of the specific situation of members of disadvantaged groups. They treat different people differently, or institute apparently neutral policies that favor the excluded group in practice (e.g., parental leave) in order to make equal opportunity real. For example, in Lommers Case (C-476/99), the European Court of Justice justified preferences to women in nursery places that did not exclude men for improving equal opportunities for women, who were more likely than men to withdraw from the labor market to raise children. Differential treatment or reasonable accommodation of difference may thus be necessary to achieve equality. Substantive preferences promote distributive justice.

The comparative PAMECUS (2009, p. 29) study tried to distinguish between positive (affirmative) action and general policies to promote social inclusion, or what is called here “redistributive” programs. For example, there are measures which loosely benefit disadvantaged groups as traditional elements of national social welfare policy, rather than positive action. State pensions for older persons seem less compensatory in nature than a basic entitlement or social right based on equal citizenship. On the boundary between social policy and positive action is social assistance to persons with disabilities or to single parent, aid that encourages them to take up employment. The PAMECUS authors argue that measures which are closer to positive action than social inclusion have the following characteristics: they are targeted at a well-defined social group; they seek to redress disadvantages in a specific setting, such as access to education or employment; and they are subject to periodic review. Positive action need not be time-limited, but one should not assume it will continue indefinitely.

There are even liberal rationales for affirmative action policy. Since market competition has not eliminated discrimination or equalized groups as theory suggests (Becker), market failures call for public intervention. Affirmative action is a means of ensuring equal opportunity. There is nothing about neoliberal regimes, class inequalities, and homogeneous citizenship that cannot accommodate the recognition of limited rights for particular groups (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009, Hale 2002, Povinelli 2002). Diversity in education also develops multicultural competence; being conversant with other cultures may also expand the scope of market trade.

But generally speaking, those wishing to maximize freedom and individual capability oppose affirmative action’s recognition of group-based or special rights and consider it “reverse discrimination.” Liberals often assume that, with formal equality of opportunity, the market will reward capability. This ignores the many institutional and social deviations from meritocracy. The “legacy” preference in American university admissions is a familiar counter-example. Diverse forms of “merit” – from physical prowess to artistic talent – have long warranted admission to higher education, jobs, and power. Individuals are diverse, and society should recognize myriad expressions of excellence.

Affirmative action policy is controversial wherever it has been instituted. The scholarly literature has therefore addressed normative issues more than empirical impacts. As discussed below, affirmative action seems to be more effective at promoting symbolic recognition or political representation of disadvantaged groups than distributive justice or poverty reduction.

However, affirmative action policies exist for a range of institutional spheres and therefore, may contribute to all four social inclusion goals identified (see Table). Affirmative action begins in limited spheres, typically, education and public employment, where the state can easily influence results. Under pressure, it is slowly extended to spheres, like private employment or government contracts, where the state might reasonably argue that the public good has precedence over private rights. Nevertheless, the state's reach into civil society is often limited or at least requires a court's constitutional approval.<sup>14</sup>

### **EU Positive Action**

Since the 1980s, the EU outlawed gender discrimination. All of the member states of the European Union have enacted anti-discrimination laws, but they have not strictly enforced them. Rather, aggrieved individuals must bring suit against employers or the State which can be expensive and daunting. However, rulings in the European Court of Justice, amendments to the EC Treaty of Amsterdam, and the EU Racial and Employment Directives of 2000 have pressured member states to enforce their laws and enabled positive action programs. Recognising that existing legal provisions on equal treatment affording rights to individuals have been inadequate for the elimination of all existing inequalities, Council Recommendation 84/635/EEC suggests that Member States “should adopt a positive action policy designed to eliminate existing inequalities affecting women in working life and to promote a better balance between the sexes in employment, comprising appropriate general and specific measures, within the framework of national policies and practices, while fully respecting the spheres of competence of the two sides of industry.” The Council recommended measures to counteract the prejudicial effects on working women of prejudicial attitudes, behavior, and structures based on traditional gender roles, and to encourage the participation of women in occupations and sectors where they are under-represented and at higher levels of responsibility in order to achieve better use of all human resources.

The permissive phrasing of Article 23 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) defines the parameters of the EU's “positive (affirmative) action” policies for women. It ensures equality between men and women “in all areas, including employment, work and pay, without preventing measures providing for specific advantages in favor of the under-represented sex.” Also, Article 141(4) EC was inserted in the Treaty of Amsterdam to make it easier for Member States to adopt positive action.<sup>15</sup> The Council's call for positive action referred

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<sup>14</sup> US constitutional law distinguishes between the use of racial classifications to *exclude* members of minority groups and their use to *include* them (Tegeler 2007). The US Supreme Court applies more stringent standards of “strict scrutiny” of any potentially exclusionary treatment of protected classes. Affirmative action programs must be of compelling public interest and narrowly tailored. On these grounds, the Court has increasingly narrowed the scope of affirmative action in higher education, most recently hearing the case of *Fisher v. University of Texas* (2012) challenging the extent to which race may be considered in admissions. In Sweden, too, the Supreme Court held in 2006 that a program in Uppsala Law School reserving ten percent of seats to students with a foreign background constituted unlawful discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin.

<sup>15</sup> Article 141 (4) EC Treaty reads: “With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member

explicitly to Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207/EEC. Article 2(4) Directive 76/207/EEC allows measures to remove obstacles to equal opportunities and to ensure equality of representation and/or result. Beyond Article 2 (4), the ECJ Kalanke case C450-93 set the EU precedent for positive action by allowing priority to women with equal qualifications as men in hiring into sectors in which they were underrepresented. The Abrahamsson case C405-98 permitted preference for a candidate of the under-represented sex over a substantially equivalent competitor of the opposite sex. Directive 2002/73/EC (Article 2 (8)) authorises Member States to maintain or introduce positive action measures to ensure full equality in practice between men and women (see Bell, Chopin, and Palmer 2007).

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has in practice allowed only a few positive action measures designed to remedy specific disadvantages women face in the labor market. Cases involving any derogation from an individual right, such as equal treatment of men and women, must reconcile the principle of proportionality and the principle of equal treatment as far as possible with the requirements of the equality goals. In line with neoliberal thinking, measures to give automatic and unconditional preference to one sex are not justified. Rather, the Court *permits* positive action measures to improve the situation of women in working life, but there is no Community definition of positive action, which can take very *different forms*.

The EU defines two types of discrimination: (a) direct discrimination, where one person is treated less favorably than another in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin; and (b) indirect discrimination, where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice puts minorities or women at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. Indirect discrimination cases appeal to the proportionality principle. The prohibition against indirect discrimination is very circumscribed, but aims to address institutional racism and sexism in which discriminatory intent is not at issue. It allows for deliberate positive action favoring women as a remedy for the male bias of institutions, or when the practical application of apparently neutral rules harms any protected group. Indirect discrimination on gender grounds is difficult to prove (under Article 119, now 141 EC) because it requires statistical evidence that differential treatment by a specific employer is systematic and structural, not random or occasional. Many states and enterprises do not collect this information.

In the United States, the idea of “comparable worth” or “pay equity” is that men and women should receive equal pay for work that involves comparable skills and responsibility or that is of comparable worth to the employer. When men and women work in different occupations, there is no man comparable to a woman to show there is gender discrimination. To make the comparison, jobs must be rated by skill, experience, and other objective valuations. This is

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State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.” Declaration 28 concerning Article 141(4), annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam, states: “when adopting measures referred to in Article 141(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Member States should, in the first instance, aim at improving the situation of women in working life.”

costly on a small scale, but has been collectively bargained and adopted as a policy in state government employment in the United States.

In sum, while direct discrimination violates principles of formal equality, indirect discrimination refers to substantive equality with respect to the reference norm and rules of treatment, or as ECHR Article 14.1 puts it, “full equality in practice.” Yet, positive action measures are not well developed and are rarely pursued in Europe, even within the narrow confines of ECJ case law (European Commission 2005).

### **National Affirmative Action Policies**

Like all social inclusion policies, affirmative action is context-specific. The target groups that benefit from affirmative action – a.k.a. reservations, quotas, or positive discrimination -- vary across countries and the spheres of life in which it applies. National affirmative action policies usually target specific groups that were historically discriminated against. In South Africa and the United States, racially defined groups receive greatest attention, and Brazil is now beginning to recognize race in university admissions. In India, “scheduled” castes and tribals are constitutionally singled out. In Northern Ireland, there is a 2000 statute establishing equal hiring quotas to address the historical underrepresentation of Catholics in the police.

While the target groups and national circumstances differ, there are some similarities in the social relationships between groups and in the policies designed to improve them (Weiner 1983). The phrase “affirmative action” is found in at least nine countries’ constitutions (Bolivia, Fiji, Montenegro, Namibia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). Whatever they are called, some legal version of positive action is applied in Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and the United States. The European Union permits it in some forms.

Some states that insist on “color blind” policies find ways to circumvent labeling prohibitions. This has been called “indirect affirmative action” (Sabbagh 2011). In France, where positive discrimination in favor of ethnic groups violates the constitutional equality of citizens, territorial targeting of socioeconomically deprived areas plays the same role as a preferential policy. In addition to targeting disadvantaged neighborhoods for employment and training programs, public housing, and local services, the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, an elite university, has partnered with schools in these neighborhoods to recruit their ablest students. As in France, East European accession countries tend to refer to any positive action legislation in generic socioeconomic terms, as targeted at “disadvantaged groups,” rather than naming the Roma per se. In Hungary and Slovakia, the collection of ethnic data is strictly regulated by law and resisted. Programs that explicitly focus on the Roma respond to special measures and funds from the European Union and demographic pressures on the labor force. One successful positive action measure in Slovakia created Roma teaching assistants, which apparently improved education (PAMECUS 2009). Nevertheless, there has been some convergence among liberal countries toward color-blindness and imprecision in the law, partly because affirmative action’s goal is to eliminate the significance of race for class, place of residence and other outcomes, not to institutionalize it (Sabbagh 2011).

Affirmative action benefits historically disadvantaged groups, whose average member is poorer, less educated and healthy, and less powerful than the average member of the dominant group.

These groups include African-Americans, Roma/Sinti in Eastern Europe, Afro-Brazilians, Blacks and Coloured in South Africa, Burakumin in Japan, and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India. Malays, the disadvantaged majority of the Malaysian population, also benefit from preferences. Some scholars object that reservations to reduce caste mistreatment should be distinguished from affirmative action to address American racism (Gupta 2001; Deshpande and Darity 2003).<sup>16</sup> However, the policies to redress group disadvantage do belong to a broadly similar family of public intervention.

The argument about redressing unjust exclusion has also been extended to categories of people who were traditionally seen as different from or exceptions to the “male breadwinner,” namely, women, sexual and religious minorities, and people with disabilities. In these cases, equal treatment impedes equal opportunity and ignoring special needs is unjust. Marginalized groups who have received special programs in separate institutions should be “mainstreamed” in normal programs and institutions in order to realize their equal rights.<sup>17</sup> These people need “reasonable accommodation” to insure substantive equality and full participation in society -- in public schools, public transportation, and workplaces -- without imposing “disproportionate hardship” on others. The social benefits of including them outweigh the reasonable costs required to do so (e.g., days off to care for sick family members or to celebrate holidays, handicap-accessible workplaces, separate bathrooms). Such superficially “special treatment” -- taking disability or gender or other differences into account -- is in fact a mechanism to reduce even greater special treatment, which constitutes indirect discrimination or social exclusion. Equal treatment is unfair. Accommodating the protected characteristics allows those people with disabilities who possess the relevant skills to study or work to become capable. In the process, social diversity and productivity are enhanced.

### **Assessing Affirmative Action**

Positive action is usually assessed in terms of increasing representation of underrepresented or excluded groups from various realms and institutions of social life. When representation is proportional to group size, it is often supposed that the policy has been successful and is no longer necessary as compensation for past disadvantage. Representation in positions of power

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<sup>16</sup> From an Indian perspective, race is about immutable skin color, which is less of a signifier in caste, which is more complex than black or white, Brahman/non-Brahman. The Indian Constitution also expected the end of caste reservations, because people can change their caste. A politics of race can only invert racism (e.g., black nationalism) or aim to represent racial groups (i.e., affirmative action, quotas, reservations). Whereas American affirmative action is cast as “compensation” for historical slavery, Indian reservations supposedly help all of the society by including talent in the lower castes and tribes (Gupta 2001). The rise of Dalits in Indian government employment is evidence of declining untouchability, but some argue that these measures had limited socioeconomic effects (Jaffrelot 2006).

<sup>17</sup> In EU social inclusion policy discourse, “mainstreaming” has two meanings. One is procedural. It refers to promoting equality by mobilising all areas of law and policy activities towards a goal, such as gender equality, rather than relying only on specific or sectoral measures. The other meaning, as in this context, is substantive.

and responsibility is a form of symbolic recognition and is thus valuable in its own right. A society declares and embraces its diversity when qualified members of previously excluded groups assume privileged, powerful positions.

There is a vast literature on the normative implications of affirmative action and the philosophical debate over individual vs. group rights, but surprisingly few evaluation studies of the outcomes of these policies. Success is evaluated with overall societal trends in group inequalities, rather than with long-term panel studies assessing program effects in particular. Indeed, During the Clinton Administration, there was an affirmative action review that focused on the socioeconomic progress made by minorities relative to white men (Stephanopoulos and Edley 1995). Since closing the gap had stalled along some dimensions, the review concluded that the programs' impacts were ambiguous. Everyone agrees that affirmative action does not reach the minority poor who needed help the most. There is some positive evidence from affirmative action in health and education (PAMECUS 2009). For example, the more physicians of color, the better the medical care in minority communities. Business people often report that their customers prefer co-ethnic service people and that hiring minorities allow tapping into new markets. Mentoring minority US Army officers had positive outcomes on morale and reduced turnover (Payne and Huffman 2005). There is evidence that affirmative action in education has redistributive effects, even if the benefits are not evenly distributed in the disadvantaged group (Bowen and Bok 1998). There is some evidence regarding the value of racially diverse classes for promoting informal interracial social interaction and academic learning (Gurin et al 2002).

In the Netherlands, after much immigration, the police instituted positive discrimination in hiring in the 1990s. The intention was to assign minority officers to communities with the same cultural background. While recruitment efforts over two decades changed the ethnic composition of the workforce, it was ultimately balkanized with ethnic brigades responsible for their "own" communities, doing little to integrate the police force.

In India, quotas can be traced to early 20<sup>th</sup> century colonialism, but were enshrined in the Constitution after Independence in 1949. Following the Dalit advocate, B.R. Ambedkar, fixed shares of the seats in higher education, government jobs, and state and national legislatures were reserved for the "Backward Classes" of "Scheduled Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes." Over fifty years, reservations have diversified the castes represented in universities, public employment, and especially politics at all levels of government (Galanter 1991; Deshpande and Darity 2003). However, the socioeconomic disadvantage of Dalits remains (Guru and Chakravarty 2005). Intended to be temporary, the reservations were extended in the 1990s, based upon a 1980 evaluation by the Mandal Commission. Up to 49.5% of all jobs in central government services and public undertakings were reserved for SCs, STs, and a poorly-defined category of 'Other Backward Classes' (OBCs) (Shah and Shneiderman 2012).

Nepal's Maoist-led government has adopted a "social inclusion" agenda and is planning an affirmative action program. It builds upon the Indian example, but in a country at least as socially complex, given the diversity of regional, caste, ethnic, indigenous, religious, and linguistic dimensions of Nepali society. Dalits are again at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder in one of the world's poorest countries (Shah and Shneiderman 2012). A draft

constitution provided for ethnic federalism, but it was not ratified in 2012, leaving the future uncertain.

In South Africa, partly because of ANC ties to business and organized labor, the Employment Equity Act 1998 legally requires employers in private firms with over 50 employees to ensure that their workforce is representative of the South African population, with specific reference to ethnic origin, gender, and disability. Affirmative action in private and public employment has helped black men and women enter the middle class. There has been improvement in the wages of working Africans and, as black business people have won government contracts and directorships in companies, “Black Economic Empowerment.” Weaknesses remain: affirmative action policies have not reached much into poor rural areas. Schools are plagued by racial tension, violence against girls, a lack of multilingual instruction and declining test scores (Piron and Curran 2005; Nattrass and Seekings 2001). Politically connected “kingmakers” may also use affirmative action as patronage.

China’s state-sponsored preferential policies (youhui zhengce) dates from the inception of the People’s Republic in 1949, but since the mid-1980s, affirmative action for both individual members of 55 ethnic minority groups and for minority regions expanded as an explicit PRC policy. Minority regions are large and are rich in natural resources, so preferences in infrastructural subsidies insure the areas’ allegiance to the state. Preferences also promote social cohesion between urban areas and the poor rural areas with few educational resources where 90 percent of minorities live. Affirmative action in higher education admits tens of thousands of ethnic minority students a year whose examination scores alone would not have secured them entrance. The number of minority students in higher education rose from 36,000 in 1978 to 1.367 million in 2008, at an average yearly increase rate of about 12 percent. This is not yet parity, as minorities are 8.4% of the population but still only 6.7% of college students (2012). Some argue that higher educational preferences for Chinese minorities have not led to a high rate of academic failure, nor to tensions between the Han, who comprise 90 percent of China’s population, and minority students (Sautman 1998). There have been cases of abuse when Han students claimed to be minorities to gain admission, or Han applicants living in minority-dominated areas receive extra points (Hu 2012). While ethnic minority people would like to see affirmative action in Chinese higher education strengthened further, the government has indicated that it plans to make changes to the policy. Marketization is changing the system, and some provincial governments reduced the premium ethnics can claim on the exam. Currently, China is publicly debating whether to keep minority preferential policies. Some feel it is unfair to favor ethnic city-dwellers, as the main exclusionary cleavage in China today is the urban/rural divide.

In Malaysia, disproportionately poor native Malays (61% of the population) receive preference over ethnic Chinese (30%) and Indian (8%) Malaysians in public employment, scholarships, education, land, share ownership and business permits. After the race riots of 1969, the New Economic Policy in 1970 and its successor, the New Development Policy of 1990 created reservations for Malays and intergroup cooperation has improved. There has been progress towards the targeted objectives of improving national cohesion and removing ethnic income inequalities. Malay representation in technical and professional occupations soared from 47% in 1970 to 64.3% in 1995 (Piron and Curran 2005). As a result, inequality is widening among

Malays, making affirmative action less effective in combating poverty within the group. According to the 10th Malaysia Plan, in 2009, the average Malay family earned 38% less than Chinese households. Affirmative action has also created Malay businesses, especially in the construction industry, but they still lag behind the ethnic Chinese and Indians, finding it hard to secure bank loans due to anti-Malay prejudice. Although they represent about 60% of the population, Malay ownership of corporate equity is only about 22% (BBC News, 7 November 2011). Another problem is that Malay companies receive government contracts through affirmative action, but then sub-contract the work to a more productive non-Malay firm for a profit. This has given rise to “Ali-Baba” firms. Ali refers to the Malay, fronting for Baba, a Chinese or Indian company. These partnerships were allowed in the hope that Malay business people would obtain skills and expertise from the Chinese and Indian firms, but some feel it discourages Malays from becoming self-sufficient. Despite Chinese and Indian resentment of Malay favoritism, they use “Ali Baba” deals to game the system. The government has pledged to crack down on this practice with tougher laws, transparency, and enforcement to make the system harder to manipulate.

Affirmative action in Brazil had to await the elections of left-wing governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and the first Brazilian woman, Dilma Rousseff. It is largely confined to education, but increasing racial consciousness suggests it may spread. Since 2001 more than 70 public universities have introduced racial admissions quotas. In 2012, Brazil’s Supreme Court confirmed that universities like Rio de Janeiro’s may set aside up to 20% of seats or award admission points for black or mixed-race students. Federal scholarships are also available to black private university students who pass the admissions exam. Another 25% of university places are reserved for a “social quota” of pupils from state schools whose parents’ income is less than twice the minimum wage, who are often but not necessarily black. These policies are meant to compensate for the long-term effects of historical slavery and persistent discrimination against blacks. There is still a huge racial achievement gap due to the poor quality of public schools on which students of color largely depend.

Affirmative action for women may be the most common form of affirmative action. Gender discrimination is pervasive worldwide, and international rights groups have pressured governments to pay special attention to the exclusion of girls and women from many spheres of social life. In the European Union, women set the precedents in anti-discrimination law and positive action policies for other groups.

Today, reserving political and legislative seats for women is a widespread policy. The World Economic Forum’s annual Gender Gap Report ranks countries on five dimensions of gender inequality: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. Women’s representation in political office, as on other dimensions, is highest in the Nordic countries, while a developed country like France ranks 63<sup>rd</sup> in the political sphere, just below Ethiopia. In 2000, France passed “Parité” or Equivalence legislation that mandated an equal number of men and women candidates on political party lists. In fact, the parties were fined for noncompliance. Moreover, parity in candidacies is no guarantee of election. Nevertheless, there has been some progress. In 2012, the percentage of women elected to the National Assembly rose to 26.9%, from 18.7% in 2007 when Sarkozy was elected. More

historic is that, for the first time, the government of Francois Hollande has equal representation between men and women in its 34-member cabinet.

Political affirmative action for women is also policy in the Global South. In Eritrea, for example, 30 percent of seats are earmarked for women, who can also contest for the other 70 percent, while in South Africa, women make up about 30 percent of parliamentarians (Piron and Curran 2005). In India, women as well as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes enjoy reservations in politics, education, and public employment. For instance, some law schools in India have a 30% reservation for females. The social inclusion of Indian women in politics has been remarkable, thanks to a 1993 constitutional amendment that mandated that women serve as leaders (pradhans) of one-third of randomly selected gram panchayats (village councils responsible for local infrastructure and other decisions). This quota system has improved general perceptions of women's abilities, improved women's electoral chances, and raised educational attainment of teenage girls (Beaman et al. 2009). A Women's Reservation Bill, extending this quota to Parliament and state assemblies, was passed by the Upper House in 2010, but so far not by the lower House.

In sum, despite some drawbacks, members of once excluded groups have increased their social inclusion through the device of affirmative action.

### **Criticisms**

Opponents of affirmative action make a well-rehearsed set of objections. They may also be protecting their interests. However, the emotionality of the debate derives from moral and cultural, not simply economic reasoning. Criticisms rest more upon judgments of worthiness, purity, and fairness than rationality.

#### **a. Leaky targeting and creaming**

Internal group diversity is a source of concern for distributive justice, since individuals within groups may not have equal opportunities. Earmarking opportunities based upon group membership allow previously more qualified members of target groups to monopolize the positions set aside. This also violates norms of meritocratic equity insofar as deserving members of a majority group may be crowded out of the remaining open positions.

Thus, the policy is an inefficient way of promoting socioeconomic parity between groups, because the more advantaged "creamy layer" enjoys privileges but the average member of disadvantaged groups is untouched. Since affirmative action only benefits the advantaged members of disadvantaged groups, some call for restrict reservations to those with a "double disadvantage," the poorest members of disadvantaged groups, or "class-based affirmative action." For example, admissions to higher education in the state of Texas takes the top ten-percent based upon high school grades, which helps those from poorer school districts. Rio de Janeiro's admission policies supplements color-based seats for Afro-Brazilians with seats for students from the more disadvantaged public schools. "Supernumerary positions" such as new universities with different admissions rules may be necessary to satisfy other groups' demands (Weiner 1983).

#### **b. Locking in a divided social structure**

If pursued too aggressively and inflexibly, affirmative action may perpetuate a pre-existing social structure that was not of minority groups' making. Any social category given legal imprimatur is less likely to blur over time, cementing a multicultural society with long historical memories of injustice. Political parties institutionalize the promise to pursue reservations for their supporters. Proportionate representation, however, perpetuates caste identities in public life, rather than uproot them, as expected. However, in both societies, empowering Blacks and Dalits, both of whom were mistreated, has produced these policies and insures they continue (Gupta 2001). But if pursued too aggressively and inflexibly, affirmative action may perpetuate a pre-existing social structure that was not of minority groups' making. Social categories given legal imprimatur are less likely to blur over time, cementing a multicultural society with long historical memories of injustice and vengefulness. Backlash movements of upper castes, whites, and other threatened groups may form (Weiner 1983). Reservations create a new us-them dualism, selectively mobilizing a society politically on some dimensions of identity and not others.

Affirmative action also encourages additional groups to seek recognition and their own positions. In India, the communities receiving preferences has risen over time, and now "otherwise backward classes" are competing for reservations. The criteria for claiming protection hark back to colonial anthropology and are hotly contested. There is only a court-imposed limitation that the total number of reservations for college or public service must be less than fifty percent. Brazil has disadvantaged indigenous peoples claiming rights, as well as people of African heritage. Latino-Americans followed the lead of African-Americans, whom they now outnumber, in pursuing affirmative action positions. In the US, each group preference is subject to strict scrutiny under the law, balancing public interest with individuals rights.

Affirmative action for groups that were historically singled out and mistreated in a given country has encouraged its extension to social categories that previously had no corporate identity. In the OECD countries, social movements have made disability and sexual orientation illegitimate grounds for exclusion. Thus, more and more competing interest groups arise, impeding cooperation among the disadvantaged for redistribution on class grounds. Some argue that affirmative action has prevented governments from doing anything more to reduce inequality.

Affirmative action programs must necessarily recognize social categories, but once in the law, categories tend to harden social boundaries and essentialize identities. They can also promote group competition. Therefore, affirmative action policies must also be adaptable. They are not the only sources of change in group relations. A newly educated generation of minority groups will come of age. A generation of minority role models symbolizes capability and falsifies stereotypes. Over time affirmative action normalizes diversity or, in its absence, calls homogenous institutions to account. Friendships and intermarriages intertwine groups, create crosscutting loyalties, and – as Barack Obama exemplifies – mixed identities. Ethnic parties or racial voting blocs do not like these changes to their ready-made constituencies, but social inclusion encourages groups to negotiate, compromise, and retreat from us-them dualistic thinking.

### c. Questioning qualifications

Token representation of formerly excluded groups can produce social isolation, as members of privileged groups shun newcomers and question their qualifications for admission. Being a beneficiary of affirmative action then become a form of stigma. In India, one hears the argument that reservations for Dalits have “lowered the standards” of university admission, setting up its beneficiaries to fail when they must fairly compete with more qualified classmates. Able members of minority groups may question the value of their own achievement in a context of group preferences, damaging self-esteem. Some even claim that group preferences reduce the incentive for members of excluded groups to work hard, making inequality of merit a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Lingering beliefs that the beneficiaries of affirmative action are undeserving also affect members of dominant groups. Some flee the very institutions where the policy has increased the representation of the once excluded, robbing them of talent. In South Africa, affirmative action appointments of black civil servants ahead of whites, Indians, and mixed-race people with seniority have supposedly hurt morale and productivity (Piron and Curran 2005).

#### d. Monitoring and Enforcement

Administrative capacity is often needed to monitor and enforce anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies. While India has had quotas in place for much longer and has made more progress – at least in political representation of Dalits -- than other countries, it lacks an official monitoring agency to insure that reservations are enforced. Consequently, some reserved positions do not go to scheduled castes. France has a watchdog institution, l’Observatoire de la Parité entre les Femmes et les Hommes, that monitors equality and non-discrimination, professional equality, personal and family life, violence against women, as well as political parity. However, on legal and moral grounds, France does not collect statistics on race or second-generation migrants (“ethnicity”), making it difficult to study and complain about discrimination (Simon 2010).

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reviews complaints and brings lawsuits on the part of aggrieved parties and protected classes. In the United States, excluded groups, individually but also as a class, find it easier to bring lawsuits. There is a general tendency for the public sector to implement affirmative action better than the private sector, perhaps due to transparency. The availability of trustworthy government statistics by race, sex, and other protected statuses facilitates enforcement. Indeed, there are fewer lawsuits on the grounds of sexual orientation partly because of the absence of reliable statistics on gays and lesbians. Gender is the most widely monitored and targeted dimension of social inclusion, while sexual orientation the least (PAMECUS 2009).

Rather than a special watchdog or statistical agency, the judiciary may insure the fair application of reservations. South Africa requires employers to report annually or biannually on the composition of their workforce to the Commission for Employment Equity. But in addition, courts have upheld South Africa’s 1996 constitutional provision for substantive equality among citizens, especially in public employment. Section 8(3)(a) states “society will regard any measure designed to achieve adequate protection and the advancement of people who were disadvantaged by past discrimination as legitimate.” To guard against reverse discrimination

suits by whites, a protected person asserting this right must show discrimination was unfair and that the main aim of affirmative action is to promote equality.

In the EU, experience shows that enforcement of the Race and Employment Directives at national level still puts the burden of proof on individual victims to challenge (allegedly) discriminatory behavior in the courts. This enforcement mechanism dates from the earliest gender antidiscrimination directives from the mid-1970s. Victims face financial, time, and emotional obstacles in bringing discrimination cases, and retaliation for complaints is common. This is a reason why pro-active positive action is more effective than individual enforcement of civil rights through litigation.

Yet affirmative action cannot be effective without sanctions for ignoring it. In some settings, courts can order compliance. In others, administrative penalties can be assessed. For example, there are quotas on employment of the disabled in France (6% of the workforce) and Austria (1:25 employees), but also loopholes allowing employers in France and Austria to pay a fine instead of complying. In the US, the Mt Laurel decision on desegregation allowed towns to pay into a New Jersey state fund for affordable housing instead of building it on their own territory.

#### e. Sunset procedures when exclusion mechanisms continue

Some countries and groups support affirmative action as a temporary social inclusion measure, allowing disadvantaged groups to “catch up” and close the representation or socioeconomic gap with dominant groups. They rely on a sort of liberal expectancy or optimism that public intervention will become unnecessary after groups reach parity or equality, allowing free markets to insure opportunity and fairness. Timetables are provided for meeting group representation targets, but once met, do these special provisions sunset?

First, meeting numerical targets for representation is different from promoting group equality. For example, proportional representation of groups in government seats has a virtuous demonstration effect. It also provides an excluded group role models to emulate. However, token representation does little to address the continuing minority status and weak political clout of the group in political life. Most troubling is that rising inequality within a disadvantaged group may leave average socioeconomic status and the gap between groups unchanged. For example, the rise of a black middle class has been accompanied by rising and cumulative disadvantage among poorer African-Americans, stalling progress on racial disparities in the US.

Second, meeting numerical targets at one point in time does not mean this gain will be sustained. In a liberal society with freedom in the private sphere, affirmative action cannot intervene in all social relationships, allowing preference to re-establish itself. American experience shows that serious enforcement of the civil rights laws and the institution of the affirmative action could not prevent the white middle and upper classes from an “exit” strategy. They vacated the public schools and moved to their own segregated suburban communities. They introduced new qualifications for top positions where discretion in evaluation was greater. Similar self-exclusion processes occurred in post-apartheid South Africa.

Ending affirmative action programs prematurely may produce adverse effects. In California, a ban on racial preferences resulted in a notable fall in African-American college enrollment and a

rise in Asian-American admissions at the “elite” selective public universities (Hinrichs 2010). In Japan, there was also regression at the end of a territorially targeted affirmative action program in Osaka favoring the socially excluded Burakumin caste for public employment (Tsumaki 2012). This long-term social inclusion project had reduced poverty and exclusion of the group, but when the program ended, the younger Burakumin could not get jobs, and the ones who had them moved to more affluent areas, causing neighborhood solidarity and income to decline. In contrast, in India, where one-third of randomly selected village council heads were reserved for a woman, there was still a salutary effect of the policy on female representation even ten years after the withdrawal of the reservation. In village councils required to have a female chief councilor in the previous two elections, women were more likely to stand for, and win, elected positions (Bhavnani 2009; Beaman et al. 2009).

If a society decides that preferences should end when representation or disparity targets are met, it is prudent to devise procedures to maintain the hard won social inclusion.

### **Summary**

Promoting social inclusion with affirmative action programs is thus a promising but risky proposal. These programs do increase the representation, access and participation of excluded groups in a wide range of social institutions. However, policy assessments rarely consider the counterfactual of what would have happened in the absence of such policies. Furthermore, most socioeconomic and political disparities between protected classes and the majority persist. Parity is the exception, not the rule.

Social inclusion is supposed to be a consensual goal, one that could be undermined by associating it closely with controversial affirmative action policies. Criticisms include the imprecise targeting of the programs, assisting the easy-to-help creamy layer instead of those locked in poverty and social exclusion. The legal definition of social categories and labels that portray the social structure at one point in time may become obsolete, as social boundaries shift and groups intermingle and move socially and geographically. The law institutionalizes an older set of cleavages, reinforcing old conflicts. These policies need to specify what they want to accomplish and the indicators to know when goals are met. Even then, it is not clear that the programs should be dismantled, as older prejudices and preferences may reassert themselves. At the very least, monitoring agencies should track indicators of group disparities over time for evidence of continuing discrimination. Affordable legal recourse should be readily available to victims of social exclusion, and penalties for discrimination should be strict and effective.

Affirmative action may contribute to the social inclusion goals of recognition, democracy, and even equality, but it falls afoul of the principle of liberty and free cultivation of personal capabilities. Perhaps this is why the hottest controversies over affirmative action focus around differing conceptions of “merit” and “qualifications.” Social exclusion is monopolistic. Eligibility criteria ration limited positions. Positional goods cannot be redistributed or opened to all without changing their essential value (Hirsch). Open admissions in universities are criticized for “diluting standards” and impeding education through larger class size. Entrance examinations for skilled occupations are designed first and foremost to maintain quality and protect the public, not promote social justice. The labor market should be free and competitive, allowing individuals to test their relative abilities regardless of origin or group. This notion of

equal opportunity is a consensual principle and grounds for social inclusion in many societies, one that conflicts with distributive justice for historically excluded groups.

### **Concluding Observations**

This paper has proposed a framework for analyzing social inclusion policies. It is imperfect by definition, however, because the whole point of a social inclusion perspective is to acknowledge that many spheres of social life are intertwined. Hence, policy makers should not have to choose between inclusion and poverty reduction; exclusion has negative distributive consequences and inclusion in markets promotes employment and business formation. There is no need to choose between inclusion and growth; opening up exclusionary institutions frees up markets, increases trade, shares wealth, and promotes innovation. Social cohesion contributes to peace and social order, which is good for economies, not to mention citizens. The framework rests upon four desirable outcomes, goals, or ideals. However, some policies maximize liberty, while others emphasize equality. There are tradeoffs between recognition and equal treatment. Corporate representation seems less democratic than elections based on equal votes. There are tradeoffs among the benefits of social inclusion.

It is often tempting to target policies only on the excluded, as if mainstream institutions and full-fledged citizens have no role to play. But ultimately, since we help produce exclusion through preferential relationships, we all have to participate in social inclusion. We all experience social exclusion at some point in life. One need only reflect upon Robert K. Merton's classic insight that "We are all, of course, both insiders and outsiders," depending on the context. "When insiders are outsiders, they can often have special perspectives and insights taken for granted." Thus, we should reach out and invite excluded people to join us, as we had once wished. We should commemorate the victims of exclusion and recognize our collective history, both shameful and proud, but ours.

I do not intend to sugarcoat social inclusion. It sounds more positive than exclusion, but it has downsides. The integration of newly included groups is fraught with potential conflict, at least initially. Indeed, there is some evidence that more diverse societies are more fragmented, prone to segregation or have less social capital (Putnam 2007). Desegregation and greater contact across racial and ethnic groups may work in some contexts but not others (Maly 2005). Adverse inclusion is oppressive. Assimilation entails a loss. Inclusion sounds good – but on whose terms?

Under which conditions do groups have a right to voluntary self-exclusion or sovereignty? Long oppressed minorities often turn to nationalism or emigration. Indigenous peoples insist on the right to govern themselves in their own land. Multiculturalism may impede a life among one's own. But it is often not the excluded groups that exit society. Increasingly those with resources opt out of their responsibilities to their fellow citizens. Elites perpetrate violence on their people and escape accountability. It is important to consider not only how to include outsiders, but how to keep the insiders in, responsible for one another. Social boundaries are valuable, but need to be open, porous, and welcoming.

## **APPENDIX: The WHO's Social Exclusion Knowledge Network's Analytical Framework for SEKN Country Case Studies of Policy Appraisal (2008), pp. 201-203.**

Social Exclusion was adopted as a framework for analyzing and addressing health Inequalities. The framework treated exclusion as a social relationship of power, and examined exclusionary processes in four inter-related dimensions - social, economic, political and cultural – as drivers of health inequalities. Excluded groups have differential access to the resources required to protect and promote their health.

The SEKN recommended action to promote and protect human rights that in turn will reverse exclusionary processes and promote social cohesion.

Several notable aspects of the approach:

Given the ambiguity of the term “social exclusion,” the framework only used it when more precise and informative descriptors of the phenomena to be targeted, such as food insecurity or racism, were not available.

The framework focused on multi-factorial relational processes driving differential inclusion and conditions of extreme exclusion, rather than solely on ameliorating the conditions experienced by the groups labelled as ‘social excluded’.

The framework included all four inter-related dimensions of exclusionary processes - social, political, cultural and economic – when developing, implementing and evaluating policy and action.

The framework was explicit about the primary aims of policies and action aimed at reversing exclusionary processes and promoting full and equal inclusion should be to:

- Provide full and equal membership of social systems.
- Provide universal access to living standards which are socially acceptable to all members of a society, including access to the same level and quality of health and educational services, safe water, sanitation and ‘decent work’, as defined by ILO.
- Respect and promote cultural diversity.
- Address unequal inclusion as well as situations of extreme exclusion.

The country teams collected the following Descriptive and Explanatory information:

### 1. DESCRIPTION of the country context

Provide a ‘picture’ of social exclusion (or a specific element of this) in the location where a policy/action is being developed and/ or delivered. The location may be international/national or local. The picture of the location and relevant data collection could be framed by the following questions:

- Is social exclusion (or an element of it) defined explicitly in policy? Or is there a similar concept?
- What is the impact of social exclusion, on what outcomes, at what level?
- Who is affected?
- Through which institutions and processes?
- What are the main constraints to tackling social exclusion?
- Where are the entry points and opportunities for doing so?

#### a. Describe the policy/action response to social exclusion

The nature and focus of the questions shaping data collection here will depend on whether the focus of appraisal is a particular policy/action or a country/agency delivering a range of relevant policies/actions/programmes. The key questions to address in describing specific policies/programmes/institutional arrangements and/or community actions include:

- What is the nature of the policy/action/programmes?
- What ‘theory of change’ underpins it (or is the theory of change explicit)?

- Is there any explicit link being made between the focus on social exclusion and pathways to health inequalities?
- Who is targeted by it? Who designed and delivered it? What, if anything, was the particular role of the health system?
- What evidence, if any, was used in the process of policy development and/or delivery? When was it delivered and over what period? What institutional arrangements are involved (including who funded it, and if a donor agency, provide a link to the donor's information about criteria, program objectives)?
- What enforcement mechanisms/incentives, if any, are built into the policy/action/programme for the deliverers and/or the target group?
- What evidence is there on impact (intended or unintended; positive or negative) and how robust is the evidence?
- How much is being spent (which donors? what program?)?
- In what social/economic/cultural context is it being implemented?
- Is the policy/action/programme being monitored and/or formally evaluated?
- What methods are being used and who is involved?
- What action, if any, is being taken to sustain the policy/action/programme into the future?

## 2. EXPLANATION:

The focus here is on identifying factors which may help *to explain* why the policy/action came about and why it had the impact (intended or unintended; positive or negative) it had. Key questions structuring the data collection would include:

- How did the policy/action/programme originate?
  - What type of 'case' was made for the policy/action/programme e.g. economic/cost effectiveness, equity and social justice, etc?
  - Do these policies/actions have any historical significance – has social exclusion been a political issue in the past?
  - Were there any particular contextual factors in the policy delivery location which shaped implementation and/or impact positively or negatively?
  - What influence did the prevailing political local/national/international climate have on the emergence/development and/or delivery of the policy/action/programme?
  - How did the target group react to the policy?
  - Were they involved in developing, delivering and/or evaluating the policy/action/programme?
  - If government policy/action what other factors helped the issue onto the political agenda?
  - What groups had influence on policy development/delivery/impact, including for example: Ministers/politicians – particularly the health ministry; Media; Advocacy groups; Civil society; Private sector; Non-governmental/ community based organizations; International donor organizations; Other.
  - What was the role of evidence in the process of policy development?
  - Was there any obvious public debate about the policy/programmes/actions?
  - Were there any obvious tensions/conflicts in the policy development and/or delivery process?
  - What kind of barriers to the successful implementation and/or impact of the policy/action/programme can be identified including political, technical, funding, public opinion support, professional motivation/ implication?
- Conclusions drawn from the data analysis should seek to highlight lessons or insights policymakers and practitioners can draw from the experience of a particular policy/action/programme or country. For example, is it possible to identify particularly important elements of the development phase of the policy/actions? Which elements worked best? What were the most useful resources? Which resources could have improved the policy/actions had they been available, etc?

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